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Despite the adoption of national and supranational fiscal rules, fiscal policy performance or fiscal 
outcome in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been very poor, especially in terms of persistent deficits 
and unsustainable debt levels. This thesis analysed the performance of fiscal policy outcome in 
Africa vis-à-vis its adopted fiscal rules. It employs innovative empirical methods to investigate the 
determinants of fiscal transparency, a crucial controllable factor needed to accompany fiscal rules in 
order to achieve better fiscal outcomes. Despite its poor fiscal outcome and fiscal transparency, no 
known broad study focusing on these issues in the context of SSA is available. The findings of this 
thesis fill this literature gap. Chapter 1 provides a clear background to the study as well as the 
research objectives and significance of the thesis. Prior to the empirical investigation chapters and 
for proper guidance of our research estimations, relevant literature is reviewed and the theoretical 
framework for the study is presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 3, presents a broad overview of the 
research methods employed to address our research objectives. Chapter 4 addresses the first 
research objective – establishing the extent to which fiscal policy outcomes are determined by fiscal 
discipline (adherence to fiscal rules) in Africa. This chapter also x-rays the levels of fiscal 
transparency in Africa, upon situating fiscal transparency and accountability as elements of good 
governance. Using visual statistics such as graphs, tables and charts, the findings from Chapter 4 
reveal a failure of fiscal rules to exclusively deliver better fiscal outcome in SSA countries. It also 
reveals the presence of poor levels of fiscal transparency in SSA countries.  
The findings from Chapter 4 necessitate empirical investigations of the determinants of fiscal 
transparency in SSA, given its importance towards achieving better fiscal outcome. In line with the 
extant studies, the empirical chapters are broken down into institutional, political and economic 
determinants of fiscal transparency in SSA. A dynamic panel data GMM technique is employed in 
the three empirical chapters with a view to overcoming all sources of endogeneity and the 
weaknesses of prior cross-sectional studies, and also to accommodate for the dynamic component 
impact which may be attributed to policy reform efforts. The next substantial chapter, Chapter 5 
(empirical paper 1) empirically establishes the institutional determinants of fiscal transparency in 
SSA. This highlights the importance of fiscal transparency as an accompanying tool to fiscal rules if 
better fiscal outcome is to be realised and the need for the current poor level of fiscal transparency 
in Africa is to be reversed. This chapter investigates the role of institutional drivers of fiscal 
transparency in SSA. The findings revealed that the overall quality of institutions in Africa positively 
influences fiscal transparency when considered as an aggregate index, while discretely only 
government effectiveness and the rule of law significantly contribute to improvements in fiscal 
transparency in Africa. Control of corruption, political stability, voice and accountability and regulatory 
quality did not yield the expected positive relationship with fiscal transparency. This implies that the 
influence of institutional governance factors on fiscal transparency is more positively impactful when 
all of them are considered pari passu. It contributes to the literature in terms of scope and 
methodology as prior studies were mostly cross-sectional studies involving a global mixture of 
countries (developed and developing).  
The underlying political dynamics (factors) driving fiscal transparency in SSA were examined in 
Chapter 6. The highlights of this chapter include that it is the first to empirically examine the 
relationship between executive-legislative competitiveness (checks and balances) and fiscal 
transparency as well as its exclusive focus on SSA. Empirical evidence from the study reveals that 
political factors (internal and external) do sway the level of fiscal transparency in Africa. Specifically, 
evidence from the paper led to the conclusion that internal political forces such as partisan 
fragmentation and ethnic fractionalisation play a key role in determining the level of fiscal 
transparency in Africa. Interestingly, an important political instrument for public accountability, 
checks and balances does not positively influence fiscal transparency in Africa. A plausible reason 
for this finding may be attributed to the ‘toe the party line syndrome’ where party allegiance trumps 
democratic and institutional responsibilities, as is sometimes experienced in less developed 
democracies. Another key finding from this chapter is the positive role of independent candidature 





result confirms the positive contribution of the conditionality of improvements in fiscal transparency 
as a precondition for Africa’s receipt of foreign aid from donor agencies and countries. This has 
significantly contributed to improvements in fiscal transparency in SSA in the last decade. The 
findings also show that over-militarisation of the labour force (an indicator of a repressive regime) is 
negatively associated with fiscal transparency in Africa.  
In Chapter 7, the economic determinants of fiscal transparency were established. The chapter made 
contributions to the literature in terms of the scope, methodology and factors examined. The findings 
reveal that fiscal transparency in Africa is positively influenced by economic factors such as the 
extent of trade openness, debt service, foreign aid and business disclosure. In line with expectations, 
the study revealed a negative and significant association between natural resource revenue and 
fiscal transparency. This is not surprising given the level of opacity surrounding the reporting of 
mineral revenues in mineral-rich countries. The study is the first to consider both the de jure and the 
de facto measures of capital account openness in the capital account openness–fiscal transparency 
nexus discourse. The de jure measure of capital account yields a positive but not significant 
association with fiscal transparency, while the de facto measure yielded a negative nexus with fiscal 
transparency and statistically insignificant.  
From the findings of this thesis pertinent policy implications were drawn which could help improve 
fiscal transparency and consequently both fiscal outcome and public accountability. First is the need 
for a comprehensive institutional reform involving all the stakeholders in the budget process. These 
reforms should cover all the six sub-indices of institutions (underscored in Section 8.2) so as to 
achieve a major increase in fiscal transparency. On the political factors–fiscal transparency nexus, 
three discernible policy recommendations are drawn. First, there is a need for increased space for 
multiparty politics while also institutionalising the role of independent candidates in the electoral 
process. This would offer the principal (the electorate) a broader choice of candidates on the basis 
of transparency and immunity from the ‘toe the party line syndrome’ that encourages opacity in the 
management of public finances. There is also a need for capacity building for all arms of government 
that are involved in the budget process because they are the critical agents for proper checks and 
balances and hence public accountability. A deeper understanding of their role will help them 
comprehend the opportunity cost (the real cost) of surrendering their institutional independence to 
party lines – a less transparent public finance system, poor fiscal outcome, poor public accountability 
and consequently poor service delivery. Thirdly, from the external political scene, donor countries 
and agencies are encouraged to sustain their current foreign policy of tying receipt of future aid to 
improvements in current levels of fiscal transparency. With regard to the economic factors–fiscal 
transparency nexus in Africa, the positive link between trade openness on fiscal transparency calls 
for greater trade liberalisation reforms policies by SSA states, as countries of the world are more 
willing to trade with countries that are more transparent in the management of government’s 
finances. Also, closer economic integration between SSA countries such as the African Continental 
Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) will be a step in the right direction. There is also a need to reverse 
the negative influence of mineral revenues on fiscal transparency in Africa. This can be achieved by 
institutionalising the precepts and resource charter of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiatives 
(EITI), which sets the global standard for the good governance of oil, gas and mineral resources 
especially as it pertains to transparent reporting of revenues accruing from mineral wealth. Lastly, 
as with the foreign aid–fiscal transparency nexus, where aid receipt is tied to improvements in fiscal 
transparency, donor agencies should consider tying foreign aid to improvements in business 
disclosure given its positive nexus with fiscal transparency in Africa.  
Keywords: Fiscal Transparency; Fiscal Rules; Fiscal Policy Management; Better Fiscal Outcome; Institutional 
Improvements; Public Accountability; Rule of Law; Check and Balances; Natural Resource 
Revenue; Trade Openness; Foreign Aid; Debt Service; Civil Law; Business Disclosure; Dynamic 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the study 
Globally, fiscal policy performance or outcome is subject to a number of controllable and non-
controllable constraints.1 The challenge of establishing the causes of these constraints and how best 
to address them has drawn the attention of academics and policy makers in recent times. This 
challenge is more germane in Africa where the domestic demand for critical resource mobilisation 
needed for investment, and consequently growth, is crucial. Poor fiscal policy performance is 
characterised by persistent fiscal deficits, soaring and unsustainable debt levels resulting in a Debt 
to GDP ratio that deviates from the fiscal expectations at the time of formulating the budget, and 
other unfavourable macroeconomic consequences (Cebotarai et al., 2009).  
It will suffice to point out that debt and deficits are not necessarily inimical to the economy, so long 
as the debt is invested in critical sectors of the economy, and both are kept within a sustainable 
threshold. Generally, fiscal policy is crucial to economic development of any country. Thus, the need 
for better fiscal outcome cannot be overemphasised. The seminal work on public finance by 
Musgrave (1959) highlighted the threefold rationale for sound fiscal policy which comprises 
promoting macroeconomic stability, efficient resource allocation and solving the problem of 
distributional disparities. Sub-Saharan African (SSA) economies are not left out of the debate on 
poor fiscal policy performance or efforts to address its controllable causes.  
A recent study by Lledó and Poplawski-Ribeiro (2011: p. 1) aptly highlighted and confirmed the 
presence of poor fiscal policy performance in SSA. The study also suggested constraints to fiscal 
policy performance in SSA: “The implementation of fiscal policy in any country is subject to a number 
of constraints emanating from difficulties in, among other things, i) strategic considerations that lead 
to overambitious fiscal targets; ii) real time forecasting of downturns and recoveries; iii) lengthy 
budget procedures; and iv) political pressure to overspend or under tax…. Additional constraints 
comprise recurrent macroeconomic shocks, weak budget institutions, poor data quality, and 
weaknesses in forecasting capacity, reliance on unpredictable aid flows, slow project execution, and 
instability in the political system” (Lledó and Poplawski-Ribeiro, 2011: p. 1). 
IMF (2008) and Lledó et al. (2009) acknowledged these factors as the reasons why fiscal policies in 
SSA have tended to be more pro-cyclical than elsewhere.2 Also, the impact of aid inflows which can 
                                               
1 In the course of this research work, fiscal outcome and fiscal performance may be used interchangeably. Africa and 
sub-Saharan Africa may also be used interchangeably. 
2 Pro-cyclical fiscal policy is characterised by spending going up (taxes go down) in booms and spending goes down (taxes 
go up) in recessions. This is contrary to normative economic prescriptions that tax rates and discretionary government 





sometimes be volatile is easily felt by low-income countries. Ikhide (2004) identified the critical 
decline in aid inflow to developing countries and its attendant impact on development finance. He 
also identified the need for appropriate institutions for effective aid delivery. Obviously, in such 
countries, aid is more volatile than fiscal revenues, and gaps or shortages in aid and domestic 
revenues may coincide. In a related argument, studies such as de Renzio et al. (2011) found that 
aid-related issues have some explanatory power on the quality of public financial management 
systems. 
In recent times, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) standards and the need to disclose fiscal risk 
correctly have extended the debate to include the quality of institutions as well as governance issues. 
Whilst studies such as IMF (2008), Cebotari et al. (2009), Lledó et al. (2009), Lledó and Poplawski-
Ribeiro (2011) all focused on both controllable and non-controllable factors that affect fiscal policy 
implementation: the new theoretical perspective needs to focus on controllable factors such as fiscal 
transparency, accountability and governance on fiscal policy performance or outcome. Hence, the 
reason for the growing discourse on fiscal transparency, governance and the budgeting process. A 
more recent study by Makina and Mago (2015) considers the strengthening of public financial 
management systems and processes via enhanced transparency and accountability as essential 
elements for official development assistance. It will suffice to point out that the factors advanced thus 
far can be categorised into controllable factors (institutional and governance) and non-controllable 
factors (volatility in commodity prices and to an extent, foreign assistance).  
1.2 Motivation 
One of the major problems confronting developing countries is the need for efficient domestic 
resource mobilisation for development. A key way of achieving such domestic mobilisation of funds 
is from fiscal discipline enhancing savings efficiency which can only be achieved through a robust 
and efficient mechanism for good governance that is characterised by transparency and 
accountability in the use of public finances. This problem is, however, more evident in Africa where 
cases of widespread wastage and seeming disregard for laid-down budget processes abound. This 
is evidenced by poor levels of fiscal transparency currently recorded by SSA as evidenced by the 
consecutive Open Budget Surveys published by the International Budget Partnership (IBP) (see e.g. 
IBP, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2015) reports. Studies such as Kilpatrick (2001), Alt et al. (2006), 
Alt and Lassen (2006a), Andreula et al. 2009, Wehner and De Renzio (2013) and more recently 
Tekeng and Sharaf (2015) have highlighted the importance of fiscal transparency, an element of 
good governance, as a necessary accompanying tool to fiscal rules if better fiscal outcomes are to 





Figure 1.1: Trend of SSA’s total external debt stock and debt service, 1980-2015 
 
 
Source: Computed by author based on data sourced from World Bank – WDI (2017) 
 
Most SSA countries seem to have displayed over time a high level of fiscal indiscipline characterised 
by poor fiscal outcome in the midst of subsisting fiscal rules. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) consists of 
developing countries most of which are characterised by a high level of poverty, persistent fiscal 
deficit and debt overhang. The 1996 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, 
supplemented by the 2005 Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) was designed to provide debt 
relief for eligible countries in exchange for economic reforms. According to IMF as at 2017, the HIPC 
initiative has provided over US$76 billion in debt service relief to 36 countries, of which 30 were 
African countries. This represents over 80% of the countries that benefited from the HIPC initiative.3. 
From IMF (2017) statistics, barely ten years after the HIPC initiative, most HIPC-eligible African 
countries are either on a path to high-debt distress or debt crisis. 
As represented in Figure 1.1, Africa’s external debt stock and debt service can be seen to have 
mimicked the same expansionary path over time. Saddled with such huge debt burden, and by 
extension debt service, which is a first line charge expenditure on the countries’ revenue, such 
countries are left with very meagre resources to invest in critical socio-economic sectors that could 
stimulate growth in output in the long run and alleviate poverty.  
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Figure 1.2: SSA debt service versus economic growth, 1980-2016 
 
 Source: Computed by authorbased on data sourced from World Bank – WDI (2017) 
More worrying is the revelation shown in Figure 1.2, which juxtaposes the rate of economic growth 
in SSA against its total debt service (as a % of Gross National Income (GNI)). The figure reveals that 
between the 1980s and early 2000s, SSA’s debt service (% of GNI) was higher than its growth rate. 
This coincides with the period which Easterly (2001) described as the “lost decades”. However, from 
2004–2005, the peak of IMF and World Bank debt relief programmes saw a turn-around period when 
SSA’s economic growth was higher than SSA’s debt service. Nonetheless, between 2010 and 2015, 
debt has been on the rise. By 2016, debt service had overtaken growth, portending a return to the 
pre-HIPC conditions in SSA if immediate measures are not taken to address fiscal indiscipline.  
Despite years of budgetary allocation by SSA to key sectors of their economies, statistics from the 
World Bank’s poverty and equity data bank (2017) reveals that over 50% of SSA population live 
below the international poverty line of $1.90 between 1988 and 2013. The most recent country-by-
country statistic on poverty reveals that this trend has not changed.4 The more worrying trend is that 
at the peak of the HIPC initiative between 2004 and 2005, there was an ebb in the burgeoning 
external debt pattern in SSA. However, this trend seems to have been reversed as statistics suggest 
an increasing trend from 2008 till date. This suggests a possible return to the fiscal indiscipline of 
the 1980s or a systemic inability to keep track of factors affecting the public finances in Africa. There 
is a likelihood that if efforts are not made to address these issues and ensure fiscal discipline, SSA 
                                               
























economies may sink into another episode of debt crises such as that experienced in the 1990s which 
culminated in the need for the HIPC initiative. 
Despite the debt relief by the HIPC initiative and other macroeconomic stabilisation programmes 
embarked upon by African countries not long ago, SSA economies, as evidenced by the foregoing 
statistics, are on the verge of returning to the lost decades (1980s – early 1990s) (Easterly, 2001), 
which were characterised by persistent fiscal deficits accompanied by soaring and unsustainable 
debt levels and high poverty rates, all of which contributed to high levels of social unrest. 
The above underscored situations beg questions such as why do SSA economies continue to 
present poor fiscal performance? Are there other non-economic (institutional and governance) 
factors affecting fiscal policy outcome in SSA? If yes, are they within the control of each SSA country 
given that economic factors such as volatility in commodity prices and foreign aid may be non-
controllable and thus not within their purview? Have SSA countries tried to put in place some form 
of fiscal rules to help them achieve better fiscal outcome? How successful are these rules, if they 
exist? Have these fiscal rules, if they exist, helped SSA to achieve better fiscal outcomes? Crucially, 
how transparent is the fiscal (budgeting) process in SSA? Ultimately, what are the determinants of 
fiscal transparency, a vital controllable accompanying tool for the achievement of better fiscal 
outcome? Questions of this nature are what this study seeks to answer. 
From a fiscal policy perspective, the persistent high budget deficit as identified above will require 
higher taxes and borrowing in the future and may cause crowding out of private sector investment 
and consumption and thus dampen the rate of expansion in output (growth). Fiscal deficits can be 
financed through borrowing from domestic and foreign sources. However, given the conditionalities 
that most times accompany foreign borrowing, as well as the expeditious need for such funds, most 
governments generally tap into domestic borrowing as a first line of action when running into deficits 
and in need of resource mobilisation.  
Domestic resource mobilisation in the form of borrowing is mostly done via government bonds or 
borrowing from the central bank via new money creation or via increased taxation (Carlin and 
Soskice, 2006). Both the deficits and the resultant soaring debts if persistent are inimical to the 
economy in at least two ways. First, soaring government borrowing may crowd out credit to the 
private sector which dampens economic growth. Second, and more critical, is the need for SSA 
economies to mobilise domestic resources for investment into critical sectors of their economy and 
hence stimulate growth. Whilst certain sources of persistent deficits and hence soaring debts, such 
as a shortfall in revenue due to volatility in commodity prices, and foreign aid, which are exogenously 
determined, leakages in domestic expenditure and revenue may result from endogenous 
(controllable) factors such as institutional lapses and a weak governance framework such as poor 





The issue of domestic resource mobilisation and fiscal indiscipline cannot be completely discussed   
in isolation of the problem of lack of fiscal space in most developing countries. Several definitions of 
fiscal space have been advanced. However, all the definitions accentuate issues concerning the 
various aspects of resource mobilisation.  Roy et al. (2007 p.2) defined “fiscal space is the financing 
that is available to government as a result of concrete policy actions for enhancing resource 
mobilization, and the reforms necessary to secure the enabling governance, institutional and 
economic environment for these policy actions to be effective, for a specified set of development 
objectives”.  Creating fiscal space frees up additional financial resources that can be deployed into 
other more deserving government spending (or tax reduction).  
The basis for seeking to create fiscal space is for the creation of additional fiscal outlays which could 
aid economic growth and or pay for itself as a source of future revenue. Some of the diverse ways 
governments create fiscal space include: raising  extra tax revenues via numerous tax measure or 
via sealing off of tax loopholes and strengthening the tax administration systems; reprioritisation of 
public expenditure (entails curtailing lower priority items and creating space for needed expenditure 
items); borrowing (external or domestic); grants from external sources and finally Seignorage.  It is 
pertinent point out that seignorage, the printing of money by the central bank as mandated by the 
government with a view to lending such money to the government, is usually not the most considered 
option. This is owing to its inflationary tendency and the political backlash that easily comes with 
inflation before revenue from such a source is maximised. In addition to the challenges posed by the 
poor institutions in Africa, the problem of poor political systems often characterised by political parties 
that are most times not necessarily founded on economic and political ideology has not help matters 
when it comes to effective management of public finances in Africa. An in-depth discourse on the 
challenges posed by most of these issues such as fiscal indiscipline, poor institutions and poor level 
of fiscal transparency in SSA is presented in chapter 4. 
Recent IMF standards and the need to disclose fiscal risk correctly have extended the debate on 
fiscal outcomes and its challenges to include the quality of institutions as well as governance issues 
such as transparency and accountability. Hence, the approach of the study will be twofold. First, it 
will examine the performance of fiscal policy outcome vis-à-vis fiscal rules, after which it will isolate 
the controllable (institutional and governance related) factors from the general factors influencing 
fiscal outcomes in SSA. Secondly, upon isolating the controllable factor(s) which, if improved upon, 
can lead to enhanced fiscal policy outcome, it will investigate the determinants of the said controllable 
factor(s). 
While studies such as IMF (2008), Cebotari et al. (2009), Lledó et al. (2009) and Lledó and 
Poplawski-Ribeiro, (2011) all focused on both controllable and non-controllable factors that affect 
fiscal policy performance, none of them focused exclusively on controllable institutional issues such 





the fiscal policy space is geared towards addressing these weak institutions of governance around 
the budgeting system (controllable factors), especially as their quality can affect fiscal outcome 
(Dabla-Noris et al., 2010; and Khagram et al., 2013). The need to address these institutional factors 
affecting fiscal outcome cannot be overemphasised. First, fiscal outcome can trigger fiscal crises 
which have been noticed in the past to cause macroeconomic and financial sector instability. 
Secondly, against the backdrop of the forward-looking nature of economic agents, fiscal policy can 
also influence aggregate demand via future anticipated public debt stock (Blanchard and Summer, 
1984; Blanchard, 1985). A growing number of studies such as Drazen (2000), Alt and Lassen (2006) 
and Eslava (2010) have identified institutional and political factors that influence deficit and debt 
accumulation. None of these studies have examined these issues exclusively in the African context, 
thus this thesis fills this existing gap. 
The performance of fiscal policy is crucial to macroeconomic stability. Preliminary evidence suggests 
that SSA economies are currently struggling with poor fiscal outcomes as most of its soaring debts 
were incurred owing to the need to finance its persistent deficit in the budget resulting in poor overall 
and primary budget balances. These factors most times could culminate in excess borrowing by the 
government that can also lead to crowding out of the private sector from the credit market and 
consequently diminish the rate of growth of the economy (Hyman, 2002). These are in addition to 
the presence of other issues such as weak institutional and governance framework as well as the 
highly rent-seeking nature of most SSA economies. This then begs questions such as what should 
be done to improve fiscal performance in Africa? What are the controllable causes of poor fiscal 
performance in Africa? This study is also reinforced by the poor impact of budgets in Africa over the 
years as evidenced by poor socioeconomic indicators such as high poverty rates, poor literacy rates 
and high mortality rates despite huge budgetary allocations. Hence, this study analyses the issues 
surrounding the budgeting process in Africa, paying particular attention to the aforementioned 
controllable factors such as fiscal transparency, governance institutions etc. in the budgeting 
process, and proffers policy recommendations. 
As mentioned earlier, one of the key development finance issues in many developing countries is 
how to mobilise domestic resources for critical investments to stimulate growth. Hence policy 
prescriptions from a study of this nature will contribute towards addressing issues of poor fiscal policy 
management. Particularly, it will help improve accountability on expenditures and persistent deficits. 
It will also aid in addressing issues around domestic resource mobilisation.  
Against the backdrop of the foregoing, the new theoretical perspective in seeking to address poor 
fiscal outcomes needs to focus on controllable governance-centred factors such as fiscal 
transparency and accountability. Demanding accountability on public finances is predicated on the 
level of information or disclosure (i.e. fiscal transparency). There have been very few studies on the 





(2009), Wehner and De Renzio (2013) and Tekeng and Sharaf (2015). However, in terms of scope 
no such studies have been done exclusively on SSA.  
1.3  Research questions 
Bearing in mind the above research problems, the study sets forth to answer the following research 
questions:  
 To what extent are fiscal policy outcomes determined by fiscal discipline (adherence to fiscal 
rules) in Africa; and to what extent does fiscal transparency matter for fiscal outcomes? 
 What institutional factors drive fiscal transparency in Africa? 
 What political forces influence fiscal transparency in Africa? 
 What macroeconomic factors affect fiscal transparency in Africa? 
1.4 Objectives of the study 
Specifically, the objectives of the thesis are as follows: 
 To establish the extent to which fiscal policy outcomes are determined by fiscal discipline 
(adherence to fiscal rules) and to underscore the importance of fiscal transparency in Africa. 
 To investigate how institutional factors influence fiscal transparency in SSA;  
 To investigate how political forces influence fiscal transparency in SSA; and 
 To investigate how macroeconomic factors, influence fiscal transparency in SSA. 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
Three related empirical papers as well as a background study (concept paper) have been put 
together to answer each of the research questions for the thesis. It is crucial to note that there exists 
strong justification for each of the three empirical papers and a background study that make up this 
thesis. 
First, SSA countries have recorded poor fiscal policy outcomes evidenced by unsustainable debt 
levels and persistent deficits for over a decade. During this same period, it also recorded very poor 
levels of fiscal transparency. Attempts to address such poor fiscal policy outcome by employing the 
use of fiscal rules failed. However, the overwhelming literature as earlier highlighted points to the 
importance of high levels of fiscal transparency in conjunction with fiscal rules in order to address 
such poor fiscal outcome. The background study (Chapter 3) x-rayed the extent to which fiscal policy 
outcomes are determined by fiscal discipline (i.e. the quality and depth of fiscal rules) in Africa. The 
background study concluded that in addition to the adoption of fiscal rules, African countries need to 





determinants of fiscal transparency in Africa with a view to improving its fiscal transparency, coupled 
with the adoption of fiscal rules, will lead to improved fiscal outcomes in Africa. 
Three distinct groups of drivers of fiscal transparency have been identified from the prevailing 
literature: institutional, political and economic. It has been argued that institutional quality can 
improve the level of fiscal transparency. Employing the World Bank’s institutional governance 
indicators, the first empirical paper (Chapter 4) investigates the nexus between the quality of 
institutions and the level of fiscal transparency in SSA. It has been argued that the dynamics and 
interplay between domestic political forces such as partisan fragmentation and ethno-linguistic 
polarisation and international political forces influences the level of fiscal transparency. Hence, in the 
second empirical paper (Chapter 5), it was important to investigate the relationship between these 
political forces and the level of fiscal transparency in the context of SSA. 
Lastly, the fiscal transparency literature points to the emerging role of economic factors as an 
important group of influences that can improve the level of fiscal transparency. Amongst others they 
include economic openness (trade and financial openness), debt service, foreign aid and business 
disclosure. A study of the impact of these economic factors on fiscal transparency is reinforced by 
the ambition of African countries to form a common market with the prospects of ultimately becoming 
an economic union in the future (Gollwitzer, 2010). However, as a build-up to achieve such a level 
of economic integration, like the European Union (EU), a high level of fiscal discipline by member 
states is required. To achieve this, most African countries have adopted some form of supranational 
fiscal rules similar to those adopted by EU member states based on the Maastricht Treaty.5 This will 
entail ease of restrictions on cross-border capital flows and trade openness. However, like other 
drivers of fiscal transparency, studies are yet to be carried out examining the role of these economic 
drivers of fiscal transparency in Africa. The third empirical paper (Chapter 6) examines the role of 
these economic forces in driving fiscal transparency in Africa. 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organised around four main themes: an overview of fiscal outcome; fiscal discipline 
and fiscal transparency in Africa; institutions and fiscal transparency in Africa; the political 
determinants of fiscal transparency in Africa; and finally, the economic determinants of fiscal 
transparency in Africa. With the exception of the background chapter (Chapter 4), which situates and 
contextualises the thesis by establishing the importance of fiscal transparency to realising better 
fiscal outcome, each of our themes though related to fiscal transparency, are developed as a stand-
alone essay. 
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Chapter 1 introduces the research as well as the prevailing debates surrounding fiscal policy 
implementation and outcome. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework as well as a general 
review of relevant literature. From existing literature, it was possible to categorise the literature on 
the determinants of fiscal transparency into three discernible categories: institutional, political and 
economic. A theme-specific review of literature is presented in each of the empirical papers. In 
chapter 3, an overview of the research methodology employed to address each research question 
is presented. 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the outcome of fiscal policy implementation i.e., fiscal deficits, 
debts, revenue and expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) from 2008 till date. This was with a 
view to identifying the trend in their performance and localising the controllable causes of such 
trends. It reveals the efforts of SSA to achieve better fiscal outcome via adoption of fiscal rules and 
how this did not yield the desired fiscal outcome given the continued poor fiscal outcome posed by 
African countries despite the adoption of fiscal rules. Furthermore, and importantly, findings from the 
chapter also reveals the concurrent presence of poor levels of fiscal transparency in Africa. More 
importantly, it reveals the importance of fiscal transparency as a necessary tool to accompany fiscal 
rules in order to achieve better fiscal outcome.  
The empirical investigation commences in Chapter 5 with the empirical evaluation of the institutional 
determinants of fiscal transparency. Chapter 6 investigates the political determinants of fiscal 
transparency. The last empirical chapter, Chapter 7, assesses the economic determinants of fiscal 
transparency. The thesis ends with Chapter 8 which presents the summary, conclusions and policy 
recommendations drawn from the background study as well as from the findings of the three 
empirical chapters of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a review of the relevant literature as well as a conceptual and theoretical 
framework related to the thesis. A conceptualised framework will be developed based on the 
reviewed relevant literature on fiscal outcome and fiscal transparency. The chapter will build up to 
our theoretical framework. It will also entail an empirical review of prior studies aimed at establishing 
the determinants of fiscal transparency with a view to identifying and isolating into sub-thematic 
areas, the different factors whose relationship with fiscal transparency in Africa will subsequently be 
examined. Nonetheless, a theme-specific review of literature will also be presented in the empirical 
chapters (i.e. Chapters 4, 5 and 6). 
2.2 Conceptualised framework 
According to Jones (1950) and Millar (1963), the word fiscal is derived from the Latin word fiscus, 
which refers to the privy purse of Roman Emperors. Upon the coffers of such emperors lay the 
onerous responsibility (cost) of maintaining the army and its fleet, paying the bureaucracy that ran 
Roman administration, and grants to urban plebs such as distribution of moneys or food items. 
Centuries down the lane, the purview of the public finance process across countries is akin to its use 
in imperial times. These include the effect of the budget on allocation of resources, efficiency and 
effectiveness of resource use and macroeconomic performance (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1968; 
World Bank, 2012). By the latter part of the 20th century, the emerging principles underpinning 
modern budgeting or sound budgeting became governance cum institution-centred. These principles 
include comprehensiveness and discipline, honesty, information, contestability, legitimacy, flexibility, 
predictability and most importantly transparency and accountability (World Bank, 1998). 
One of the major debates that preoccupied the 19th and 20th century public finance and macro-
economic discourse was the causes of expansionary government expenditure. Different theoretical 
perspectives were offered during these periods for expansionary government spending. One of the 
earliest of such studies is Wagner (1883). Known as Wagner’s law, it attributed the growth in 
government expenditure to three factors: industrialisation-led increase in government expenditure; 
cultural factors and welfare expenditure (especially education and the redistribution of income). 
Wagner identified the development of a large number of monopolies due to large scale capital 
investment needed during the early stages of industrialisation. Musgrave (1969) and Rostow (1971) 





government expenditure to the development of an economy from a subsistence and traditional 
economy to an industrialised economy. Relating Wagner’s third factor to SSA, this may have been 
the situation in 1980s as most SSA economies had no option but to embrace privatisation of most 
elements of the public sector, and liberalisation as well as a reduction in public expenditure as 
preconditions for the IMF Stabilisation programmes (or Structural Adjustment Programmes). Bird 
(1971) highlighted the conditions for Wagner’s law to hold as including rising per capita income, 
technological and institutional changes and the implicit assumption of democratisation. Bird (1971) 
was a watershed moment in public expenditure management as it was one of the earliest studies to 
introduce the role of institutions and governance in the lexicon of public finance or public expenditure 
management.  
By the 1980s, the evolving and increasing role of institutions and governance on public finance 
management had begun to be noticed. One of such studies was Meltzer and Richard (1981): the 
Meltzer-Richard hypothesis employed the general equilibrium model, and found that majority voting 
decides the size of income distribution and thus the share of government expenditure. They argued 
that the median voter plays a crucial role in determining the size of the government sector in a 
democracy. And in a two-party democracy, the median voter will determine who will win the election 
and attempts will be made by both parties to win his support. To achieve this, Meltzer and Richard 
(1981) argued that there will be pressure for redistribution of income if the median voter’s income is 
less than the average income of the population. To gain the support of the median voter, political 
parties will advocate policies that could result in higher taxes and higher expenditure on social 
services (Black et al., 2008). 
As aptly explained by Hyman (2002), political candidates have the tendency to assume a position 
that is indicative of the median on the scale. Figure 3.1 reflects the net benefit received by each voter 
from each possible political platform on government activity, with an assumption that a greater 
quantity of government goods and services per year connotes a more liberal platform. Whereas most 
conservative voters preferred outcome occurs at zero government goods and services, most liberals 
prefer the opposite: a higher amount of government goods and services. Q* connotes the median 
most-preferred outcome and corresponds to the highest peak of the net benefit function of the 
median voter. Hence Q* is the political equilibrium point given that the net benefits of the voters are 
higher under Q*. The unbalanced productivity growth model by Baumol (1967) attributed a 
disproportionate increase in government expenditure to an increase in the prices of inputs used by 
the public sector relative to the private sector. Baumol (1967) developed this microeconomic model 





Figure 2.1: Median voter and political platform 
 
Source: Adapted from Hyman (2002) 
The 20th century saw the institutionalisation of democratic governance in most parts of the globe, 
characterised by huge bureaucratic structures and interest groups. This gave birth to the influence 
of vote maximisation on the management of public expenditure. As aptly pointed out by Black et al. 
(2008), in a democratic dispensation, and assuming the absence of a dictatorial rule, social choice 
rules will range from unanimity rule, by which a proposal will require 100% support before it can be 
passed, to an ordinary majority rule, by which 50% plus one vote are needed. Majority rule is the 
most preferred social choice rule. In representative democracies, voters’ interest is symbolised by 
the many actors including elected politicians, private and public interest groups as well as 
bureaucrats. The role of politicians is primarily vote maximisation from elections. Vote maximisation 
for politicians is akin to a utility-maximising consumer or profit-maximising entrepreneur. 
Theoretically, the fiscal policy implementation model is chiefly concerned with the maximisation of 
the utility of fiscal policymakers. For politicians to achieve this in a representative democracy, they 
apply the median voter theorem. This theorem defines the median voter as one whose sets of 
preferences partitions the voting community into exactly two halves after which they will set out 
different options of budget for which each of them will vote. The combinations of the budget options 
that will enjoy majority support above 50% is an option that will provide minimum welfare loss to the 
whole group (community of voters). One of the shortcomings is that both the electorate and 
politicians are not perfectly informed. Arrow’s (1951) impossibility theorem drew our attention to the 
limitations of the majority rule theorem citing the impossibility of arriving at a logically consistent set 
of social preferences from a corresponding set of individual preferences on the basis of an “ethically 














The link between fiscal transparency and the medium voter theorem is captured by the impact of 
fiscal transparency on the ability of the electorates to accurately monitor and assess the incumbent 
government’s budgetary policies including its debt levels prior to election. A higher degree of fiscal 
transparency, especially on current debt levels is easily adjudged by the electorates as a sign of a 
competent incumbent government. Employing the political agency model, Shi and Svensson (2002) 
as well Alt and Lassen (2003) revealed that voters prefer more competent elected officials in office, 
given their capability to provide more public goods at given levels of taxation and private 
consumption.  However, government’s redistributive expenditure and taxation policy thrust can be 
deleteriously related to growth given their adverse impact on capital accumulation (Alesina and 
Rodrik, 1994). It discourages savings because it redistributes wealth from the owners of capital (the 
rich) to the capital poor so as to resolve inequality. Taxes most times rise with higher incomes 
(progressive taxation) but the benefits of public spending (by government) accrues to all 
proportionately. Preferences however, differ and may not coincide with tax efforts. An individual who 
earns high income and pay higher taxes may actually prefer lower taxes and lower consumption 
expenditure. The economy's growth rate depends on the role of capital accumulation which in turn 
depends on the amount of tax government is able to raise to finance its expenditure. Hence 
policymakers are confronted with question(s) such as is what constitutes the growth maximising tax 
rate? Ordinarily this will be the high taxes on owners of capital. However, in reality, incumbent 
government(s) cannot levy this tax because it could lose an election if it does. It therefore levies the 
tax that is closer to the preference of the voters (median voter) in order to win elections, rather than 
levy a tax rate that maximises economic growth. 
The 1980s and 1990s were characterised by persistent fiscal crises, especially in developing 
countries. This was typified by persistent fiscal deficit, and unsustainable and skyrocketing debt 
thresholds. African countries formed the bulk of the heavily indebted countries. Easterly (2001) 
termed these periods as the lost decades. These periods were followed by the World Bank HIPC-
initiative with African countries accounting for over 70% of the countries that benefitted from HIPC-
initiative debt relief. The World Bank (1998) described the evolving key principles underpinning 
modern budgeting as institution-centred and comprising comprehensiveness and discipline, 
honesty, information, legitimacy, flexibility, predictability and, most importantly, transparency and 
accountability. Prakash and Cabezon (2008) cited institutional weaknesses as one of the main 
causes of poor economic growth in developing countries. Rodrik et al. (2002) argued that the level 
of institutional development helps explain differences in income (revenue) between countries. 
As part of their public finance reforms, with a view to achieving aggregate fiscal discipline (debts and 
deficits within the sustainable threshold) and enhanced public accountability, most African countries 
adopted various fiscal rules without meaningful success. Nonetheless, overwhelming emerging 





(2006) amongst others have identified fiscal transparency as an important tool that must accompany 
fiscal rules if such rules are expected to yield the desired fiscal outcome. Given the importance of 
fiscal transparency towards achieving fiscal discipline and public accountability, what then is fiscal 
transparency and what are the factors influencing fiscal transparency? The most comprehensive 
definition of fiscal transparency remains that offered by Kopits and Craig (1998 p. 1). They defined 
fiscal transparency as “openness toward the public at large about government structure and 
functions, fiscal policy intentions, public sector accounts, and projections. It involves ready access 
to reliable, comprehensive, timely, understandable, and internationally comparable information on 
government activities—whether undertaken inside or outside the government sector—so that the 
electorate and financial markets can accurately assess the government’s financial position and the 
true costs and benefits.” Against this background, the effectiveness of fiscal transparency and fiscal 
institutions has been recognised in public finance literature as crucial contributors to improved fiscal 
and outcomes. 
2.3 Institutional budget arrangements and fiscal transparency 
The budget system and process in democratic countries exemplify a Principal-Agency relationship. 
Figure 2.2 represents the reporting requirements (whom to report to) and the authority delegation of 
the budget process with the citizens as the ultimate delegator. A key objective of enhanced fiscal 
transparency is to achieve better fiscal outcomes and to improve public accountability. Such an 
enhanced public accountability process is expected, amongst other things, to ensure efficient public 
expenditure management which could in turn reduce the extent of deficits and debts. Amongst the 
initial studies that lay the foundation for governance and an institution-oriented approach to budget 
reforms for developing countries are the World Bank (1998) and Schick (1997 and 1998). The World 
Bank (1998) built on Schick’s (1997) proposition on getting the basics right in terms of budget reforms 
for developing countries. The World Bank (1998) argued that in considering budgetary reforms, 
countries should build institutional mechanisms that support and demand a performance orientation 
for all dimensions, arguing that such countries should also create mechanisms to promote 
transparency and accountability. However, both transparency and accountability to a large extent 
depend on the quality and timeliness of the reporting on fiscal information. This consequently 
emanates from the quality of institutions guiding the entire budget system and the whole range of 
pertinent players and stakeholders ranging from the president, ministers, the legislature, the 






Figure 2.2: Conceptual framework: institutional budget arrangements as a principal agency 
relationship 
 




Two notable deductions can be drawn from the foregoing positions by Shick (1997) and built on 
World Bank (1998). First, organisations are not institutions – without effective institutional drivers 
such as effective laws and regulations, government effectiveness, rule of law etc. guiding the budget 
process, the budget system will not be effective and fiscal policy performance could be 
compromised. Secondly, they highlighted the importance of transparency and accountability in an 
efficient budget process and political process.  
2.4 Theoretical Framework: Principal Agency theory 
An indispensable principle in the management of public finances is that some people (via elections 
or by appointments of elected officials) are saddled with the responsibility of spending other 
taxpayer’s (other people’s) money. Shah (2007) aptly highlights that in democracies, voters delegate 
the power over public spending and taxes to elected politicians. Two prominent theoretical 
paradigms – the principal-agency theory and the common pool theory – best capture and explain 
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of the key reasons why policy makers or politicians (agents) prefer a less transparent fiscal process 
is fear of political repercussions from their principals (the electorate) who hire them via elections and 
fire (fail to re-elect) them when poor fiscal outcomes are documented or at the first sign of 
unexplained secrecy on how government finances are being managed. 
De Simone et al. (2017) highlighted that most of the prevailing studies on fiscal transparency are 
predicated on the principal-agency theory which models the relationship between citizens (principals) 
and politicians (agents). Consistent with this model, such relationships are typified by imperfect and 
asymmetric information that permits fiscal policy misconduct by self-interested agents. Against the 
backdrop of the principal-agency framework, the mandatory release of fiscal information that is 
introduced by fiscal transparency measures will lessen information asymmetry, thus enabling 
monitoring by principals. This will facilitate the emergence of a government that will be more 
accountable and responsive to the electorate. Hence, fiscal transparency becomes an important 
requirement of public accountability as it rewards (votes in) or sanctions (votes out) agents (elected 
officials) based on whether or not they have been transparent. Essentially, it aids voters' 
understanding of government’s fiscal plans and processes (Von Hagen, 2007). 
As clearly emphasised by Lindstedt and Laurin (2010), fiscal transparency thus becomes the 
indispensable driver of the process of demanding accountability from fiscal policy decisions by 
politicians and hence the effectiveness of citizens’ delegating power. Heald (2013) reinforced this 
point further by emphasising that transparency is essentially about governance, and information 
flows can be expected to be compromised by attempts to cover the trail of corruption.  










































Fiscal transparency and accountability are anchored on the dynamics and varying interest between 
the policy makers (politicians), the quality of the governing institutions and the stakeholders in the 
budgeting process. As such, an improved level of fiscal transparency reduces the level of information 
asymmetry on the part of the electorate which in turn aids voters in making their voting decision 
within the retrospective voting paradigm. 
Von Hagen (2007) emphasized characteristics of the delegation arrangement that are vital to the 
conduct of fiscal policy. Foremost is the principal-agent relationship between the electorates 
(principals) and elected officials (the agents) which argues that elected politicians could receive rents 
from being in public office and spend public funds on projects other than those needed by the 
electorates. The next problem highlighted by Von Hagen is the common pool problem wherein 
government’s expenditure is drawn from a common pooled fund also known as the general tax fund, 
but spent on public policies aimed at benefitting individual groups (a particular constituency) rather 
than policies that could be beneficial to the society as a whole. This is mostly at the behest of the 
representative for such a constituency. Consequently, the net benefits for the targeted groups usually 
exceed the net benefits for society as a whole. Such situations yield excessive levels of public 
spending and huge deficits and debts (von Hagen and Harden, 1995; Velasco, 2000; Milesi-Ferretti, 
2004). 
This delegation of authority to elected politicians leaves room for the prospect of politicians extracting 
rents from the public position they occupy and executing public expenditures on projects other than 
those that the electorate desire. This is owing to the substantial residual powers which politicians 
have. Such residual powers emanate from the quantity and quality of information on the true state 
of government finances, how they are being managed and the significant discretionary expenditure 
powers that are privy only to elected officials (agents) and not to the electorate. Obviously, as such 
residual increase, the greater will be the divergence between voter preferences and actual policies. 
On the other hand, the electorate will wish to curtail these privileges by subjecting politicians to 
stringent and detailed rules that meticulously describe what they can and cannot do and under what 
definite circumstance(s). As aptly described by Persson et al. (1997) and Seabright (1996), the 
principal-agent relationship in the context of the budget process resembles an incomplete contract.  
2.5 Empirical Study 
Whereas the literature on fiscal transparency has gained traction amongst scholars and policy 
makers for quite some time, most of these studies have focused on the benefits of fiscal transparency 
rather than the factors influencing fiscal transparency. Kilpatrick (2001) and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) 
highlighted the need for fiscal transparency as an accompanying tool to fiscal rules in order to 





for sound fiscal policy management and thus a requirement for robust public sector governance. The 
lack of literature on its determinants, especially in the context of SSA, is still a source of concern. 
This is more worrying given the region’s poor fiscal performance for over two decades. Alt and 
Lassen (2003) corroborated this position stressing that theoretical literature on the causes and 
consequences of fiscal (or budgetary) transparency is limited. 
Wide-ranging factors have been identified from the prevailing literature as causes or triggers of 
transparency. Using data from the various states in the US, Alt et al. (2006) was one of the earliest 
empirical works to investigate the determinants of fiscal transparency. Their study revealed that both 
political dynamics as well as past fiscal outcomes affect the level of transparency. It also revealed 
that there is a propensity for political competition to lead to an increase in the level of fiscal 
transparency. Nevertheless, it is very important to point out that the over-simplistic definition of 
partisan fragmentation in the US context (where a two-party system prevails) as employed by Alt et 
al. (2006) may assume a stronger dynamic in multi-party democracies which is now common in 
African societies. Similarly, studies by Alt and Lassen (2006) based on OECD countries revealed 
that there is a propensity for political competition to lead to an increase in the level of fiscal 
transparency. Also, a higher and persistent prior (lagged) deficits level could also trigger calls from 
the electorate for more transparency in future government budget processes. 
A cross-sectional study by Andreula et al. (2009) was the first empirical study to specifically examine 
the role of institutions in influencing fiscal transparency. The study was based on 82 developed and 
developing countries using the basic Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Two Stage Instrumental 
Variables (IV2SLS) methods. Their study revealed that better institutional quality gives rise to better 
levels of fiscal transparency. Andreula and Chong (2016) arrived at a similar conclusion and revealed 
a positive association between the six World Governance Indicators (WGI) and fiscal transparency. 
Using the OLS, Gollwitzer (2011) found that strong budget institutions help to enhance fiscal 
balances and lower public external debt. Ellis and Fender (2006) revealed that fiscal transparency 
can be related implicitly or explicitly to the existence of levels of corruption and vice versa. 
Glennerster and Shin (2008) revealed a negative relationship between fiscal transparency and 
corruption. Heald (2013) suggested that information flows (transparency) can be expected to be 
compromised by attempts to cover the trail of corruption. 
Focusing on the nexus between mineral wealth and fiscal transparency, Ross (2011) identified the 
link between natural wealth and fiscal transparency for a sample of 83 countries. The study revealed 
that the nexus depends on the prevailing political system. Amongst democratic countries, a country’s 
mineral wealth is not related to the transparency of its government. However, this was not the case 
amongst autocracies where greater oil wealth was found to be correlated with less fiscal 
transparency. Interestingly, the study found non-fuel mineral wealth unexpectedly associated with 





interaction advances or impedes fiscal transparency: political transitions, fiscal and economic crises, 
political and corruption scandals, and external influences. External influence as a trigger for fiscal 
transparency has received most attention lately. This emanates mostly from international donor 
countries and agencies insistence as a policy, on tying improvements on the existing levels of fiscal 
transparency as a precondition for future donor support (Drummond, 2011). 
Most African countries transited from closed authoritarian regimes to democratic governance in the 
last two to three decades, a period which Huntington (1991) referred to as the third wave of 
democratisation. Prior to this period, most African countries were categorised as closed authoritarian 
regimes. Characteristically, such closed states were marked by low transparency thresholds given 
the paucity of institutions for checks and balances. Khagram et al. (2013) described multiparty 
democratic administrations as characterised by separation of power, policy contestations, party 
competition, organised civil society organisations, engaged citizenry and an active media. These are 
key ingredients for a transparent society. They argued that these triggers create opportunities and 
shape incentives for key players (including political leaders, civil servants, and civil society actors) 
to take action in designing, implementing, and sustaining reforms designed to promote fiscal 
openness. (Blöndal 2003) as underscored and cited by Benito and Bastida (2009) emphasized the 
crucial role played by the legislature in ensuring fiscal transparency and good governance. It pointed 
out that fiscal transparency goes with two crucial factors; 1) an effective legislation that scrutinises 
budget reports and discusses and influences budget policy; 2) an effective civil society represented 
through the media and nongovernmental organisations, which influences budget policy and holds 
government accountable. 
The role of political corruption scandals in the quest for greater fiscal transparency in SSA cannot be 
overemphasised. Itodo and O’Regan (2018) underscored the role played by political and corruption 
scandals in triggering fiscal transparency accountability, especially in Africa’s most populous country, 
Nigeria, where the promise of a more transparent government saw a peaceable change of power as 
the incumbent lost in the general election in 2015. At the core of democratic governance lies the 
principle of separation of power or checks and balances. This presupposes that for good governance 
to prevail, the institutions of the state that facilitate checks and balances must operate at their 
optimum and thus the oversight function of the parliament is to check and exert some form of 
transparency and accountability from the executive organ of the government to the public. Such 
demand for accountability on the efficient use of public resources is emphasised by Schiavo-Campo 
(2007), who rightly points out that the notion of good governance lies on four pillars: transparency, 
participation, predictability and accountability. 
Fiscal and economic crises can also trigger calls for higher levels of fiscal transparency. Caprio 
(1999) supports this position. Caprio’s study on the causes of the Asian financial crises revealed that 





Vishwanath and Kaufmann (1999) also argued that paucity of transparency and, consequently, the 
lack of public transparency can serve as a constraint on policy economic and social outcomes, 
impacting negatively on welfare and development. Tekeng and Sharaf (2015) extended the literature 
on fiscal transparency, being the first study to incorporate the impact of trade openness, capital 
account openness, business disclosure and literacy level into the determinants of fiscal transparency 
discourse. Using the Two Stage Least Square (2SLS), Tekeng and Sharaf focused exclusively on 
26 developing countries: only seven SSA countries that have the data needed to design the fiscal 
transparency index are included6. They also introduced factors such as natural resources wealth. 
They found that the quality of institutions (proxied by regulatory quality) as well as literacy rates 
positively affects fiscal transparency. 
Both Wehner and De Renzio (2013) and Tekeng and Sharaf (2015) examined the nexus between 
natural resource dependency and fiscal transparency. Both studies found that the level of natural 
resources influenced fiscal transparency negatively. Tekeng and Sharaf revealed that, contrary to 
expectations, capital accounts have a negative relationship with fiscal transparency. However, the 
quality of institutions and literacy were found to positively affect fiscal transparency. A theme-specific 
review of literature is presented in the empirical chapters – Chapters 5 to 7. 
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CHAPTER 3  
 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research procedures employed in this study. Amongst other things, it 
provides an outline of the research techniques and analysis employed in the chapters that dealt with 
our research objectives. Moreover, this chapter provides research direction in terms of the 
phenomena investigated by our research questions in the subsequent chapters as well as our 
research design and approach. The sources of data, time span of the data used to address our 
research questions, as well as the general scope of the study are also provided in this chapter.  As 
earlier highlighted, the structure of the thesis is organised around four main themes: 1) An overview 
of fiscal outcome; fiscal discipline and fiscal transparency in Africa; 2) Institutions and fiscal 
transparency in Africa; 3) The political determinants of fiscal transparency in Africa; and 4) The 
economic determinants of fiscal transparency in Africa. Baring the background chapter (Chapter 2), 
which situates and contextualises the thesis by establishing the importance of fiscal transparency to 
realising better fiscal outcome, each of our themes though related to fiscal transparency, are 
developed as a stand-alone essay. However, it is very pertinent to point out that owing to the need 
to capture the impact of prior policy reforms attempt on fiscal transparency, amongst other 
advantages that comes with it, we employed the panel data system GMM for our empirical chapters 
(chapters 5-7). 
A dynamic panel model is employed to empirically examine the nexuses between; fiscal 
transparency and institutional factors; fiscal transparency and political factors; and fiscal 
transparency and economic factors in the context of Africa in our empirical papers chapter 5, chapter 
6 and chapter 7 respectively. The advantages of the dynamic panel model over prior cross-sectional 
approaches especially as it relates to our study, and a more detailed theme-specific methodology 
are fully elucidated in our thematic empirical chapters on determinants of fiscal transparency (i.e., 
chapter 5, 6 and 7).  
3.2 Methodology on Research Objective 1 
Chapter 4 is dedicated to achieving Research Objective 1: To establish the extent to which fiscal 
policy outcomes are determined by fiscal discipline (adherence to fiscal rules) and to underscore the 
importance of fiscal transparency in Africa. The chapter entails an in-depth and analytical overview 
of the outcome of fiscal policy implementation in sub Saharan Africa (SSA). It uses virtual descriptive 
statistics such as charts, graphs and tables and statistical ratios to critically x-ray the performance 





identifying the trend in their performance and differentiate the controllable causes from the non-
controllable causes of such trends. To answer the research question on adherence to fiscal rules in 
Africa, the above-mentioned fiscal variable ratios are examined vis-à-vis the national fiscal rules or 
supranational fiscal convergence criterion where a country belongs to an economic integration 
block that has such fiscal convergence rules. The fiscal variable ratios are also compared against a 
more slightly relaxed IMF recommended ratios. This is with a view to identifying the trend in their 
performance. Crucially, chapter 4 examines whether or not fiscal rules have exclusively helped SSA 
countries to achieve better fiscal outcomes.  
Several influential works such as Kilpatrick (2001) and Milesi-Feretti (2004) emphasise the 
importance of fiscal transparency as a necessary accompanying tool to fiscal rules, if better fiscal 
outcome is the policy objective. Hence, the chapter also serves as a cross-walk linking fiscal 
transparency to fiscal outcome by establishing the importance of fiscal transparency for the 
achievement of better fiscal outcome. The section will further explore key SSA’s controllable fiscal 
governance indicators that can influence fiscal outcomes, particularly fiscal transparency. This is 
with a view of revealing the quality of fiscal transparency in SSA, and from existing literature, 
establishes the importance of fiscal transparency towards achieving better fiscal outcomes. The 
chapter therefore serves as a precursor to a robust empirical analysis of the determinants of fiscal 
transparency in subsequent chapters. Following these expositions, the specific questions chapter 4 
investigates are: What is the trend of fiscal policy performance (fiscal outcome) in in SSA? What is 
the depth of Fiscal Rules that were meant to ensure fiscal discipline in SSA and the “level of 
adherence to” in Africa? How Open (transparent) is the budgeting process in SSA? 
Chapter 4 relies on secondary data series drawn from various data sources including the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators and the IMF’s Fiscal Policy Monitor (various editions). 
Furthermore, using data from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicator, chapter 4 examines 
the performance of key budgetary institutional variables. The geographical scope of the data covers 
sub Saharan African (SSA) countries. Table 3.1 presents the list of variables employed, definitions 
and sources covering the period of 2008 till date, as well as from IMF projections for up to 2022.   
3.3 Methodology for Research Objectives 2, 3 and 4  
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are dedicated to achieving the Research Objective 2 (i.e., to investigate how 
institutional factors influence fiscal transparency in SSA) Research Objective 3 (i.e., to investigate 
how political forces influence fiscal transparency in SSA) and Research Objective 4 (i.e., to investigate 
how macroeconomic factors influence fiscal transparency in SSA) respectively. The chapters entail 
an in-depth econometric analysis of the underlying drivers of fiscal transparency in SSA countries. It 
uses a dynamic panel data model to x-ray which and how institutional factors, political forces; and 






Table 3.1: Variables, Definition and Sources 
Variable  Definition   Source  Period 
Overall Balance (fiscal balance) 
(as percentage of GDP) 
Refers to net lending and borrowing, defined as the difference between revenue and total 
expenditure, using the IMF’s 2001 Government Finance Statistics Does not include policy lending 
IMF: 




(as percentage of GDP) 
Gross debt minus financial assets corresponding to debt instruments. These financial assets are 
monetary gold and special drawing rights; currency and deposits; debt securities; loans, insurance, 
pensions, and standardized guarantee programs; and other accounts receivable. 
IMF: 
Fiscal Monitor October, 2017 
2008- 
2022  
Annual Economic Growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. 
Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in 
the value of the products. 
World Bank: 
African Economic Indicators 
  
ODA and Official Aid Net official development assistance (ODA) consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional 
terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries 
to promote economic development and welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA 
recipients 
World Bank: 
World Development Indicators 
2017 
  
Country policy and institutional 
assessment (CPIA): 
Quality of budgetary institutions 
Quality of budgetary and financial management assesses the extent to which there is a 
comprehensive and credible budget linked to policy priorities, effective financial management 
systems, and timely and accurate accounting and fiscal reporting, including timely and audited 
public accounts. 
World Bank: 





Transparency, Accountability, & 
Corruption in the Public Sector 
Rating 
An assessment of the extent to which the executive can be held accountable for its use of funds 
and for the results of its actions by the electorate and by the legislature and judiciary, and the 
extent to which public employees within the executive are required to account for administrative 
decisions, use of resources, and results obtained. The three main dimensions assessed here are 
the accountability of the executive to oversight institutions and of public employees for their 
performance, access of civil society to information on public affairs, and state capture by narrow 
vested interests. 
"   
CPIA: 
Public Sector Management & 
Institutions Cluster 
The public sector management and institutions cluster includes property rights and rule-based 
governance, quality of budgetary and financial management, efficiency of revenue mobilization, 
quality of public administration, and transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public 
sector. 
"   
Fiscal transparency in Africa (%)  This is a measure of the degree of public availability of budget information as measured by the 





general government revenue 
(percentage of GDP) 
Revenue is cash receipts from taxes, social contributions, and other revenues such as fines, fees, 
rent, and income from property or sales. Grants are also considered as revenue but are excluded 
here. 








Therefore, Chapter 5, 6 and 7 contribute to the existing empirical literature on causes of fiscal 
transparency that thus far has only been based on cross-sectional analyses irrespective of its known 
weaknesses.  Such prior studies include Andreula et al. (2009, Wehner and De Renzio (2013), 
Tekeng and Sharaf (2015), Khagram et al. (2013), De Simone et al.  (2017) and Andreula and Chong 
(2015). Owen to the stand-alone essay format of our study, to avoid repetition, we present here 
the summary of the dynamic panel data employed in Chapter 5, 6 and 7. An in-depth explanation of 
the estimation technique, data employed and their measurements and sources are presented in the 
methodology sections of the respective empirical chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
Why panel data? As highlighted by (Hsiao 2007), panel data econometric analysis comes with some 
advantages such as: augmenting (increasing) the variability of the data and hence permitting us to 
gain more degrees of freedom and hence more sample variability than cross-sectional data analysis. 
Similarly, as noted by Wooldridge (2010), whilst cross-sectional regression estimates might be 
biased owing to risk from omitted-variable bias, employing panel data allows for the control of 
unobserved time constant variables. As such, our hypothesis that there are associations between 
the underlying (institutional, political and macroeconomics) factors and the level of fiscal 
transparency in SSA countries is tested with the following panel data model. 
𝐹𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  𝑖 = 1, … … . . 𝑁; … … … … , 𝑇                                                   (3.1) 
Where 𝐹𝑇𝑖𝑡 signifies fiscal transparency for country 𝑖 at time 𝑡; 𝑥𝑖𝑡 denotes a set of time varying as 
well as time invariant covariates; 𝛽 denotes the associated vectors of parameters we intend to 
estimate. Our composite error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is given as 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡, where  𝜔𝑖 represents the 
unobserved country specific effect and 𝜖𝑖𝑡, is the idiosyncratic error term.  
For chapter 5 (i.e. the empirical paper 1), the covariates include the institutional governance quality 
index (IGQI) which is constructed by the author from six institutional governance indicators, using a 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA). They include voice and accountability; political stability and 
absence of violence; government effectiveness; rule of law; regulatory quality; and control of 
corruption. These indicators are drawn from Kaufman et al. (2010) and published by the World 
Bank’s (2016) Governance Indicators. For chapter 6 (i.e., empirical paper 2), our covariates consist 
of partisan fragmentation1; partisan fragmentation2; Checks and balances; Ethnofractionalisation; 
Civil law; Military; Natural Resource (as a percentage of GDP); Growth, Population Growth and Aid 
(as a percentage of GDP). We present detailed variable definitions in Table 6.1.  Lastly, for chapter 
7 (i.e., empirical paper 3), our covariates comprise of Trade Openness, de facto (actual) Capital 
Account Openness; de jure (formal) Capital Account Openness, Inflation, Overall Balance, Debt 
Service, Natural Resource Revenue (as a percentage of GDP), Civil law, Military personnel (as a 





Notwithstanding its highlighted advantages, there are some concerns as regards the panel data 
model represented by Equation (3.1). First, the assumption that fiscal transparency responds to 
changes in the covariates instantly may not always be the case as it is probable for the covariates 
to affect fiscal transparency with some lags. Also, past level of fiscal transparency could potentially 
influence the subsequent fiscal transparency level. This concern is shared by De Renzio (2011), who 
argued that current levels of fiscal transparency influence future transparency levels given that part 
of the major preconditions by donor countries for future aid is an improvement by recipient countries 
on their current levels of budget transparency. Moreover, contemporary level of fiscal transparency 
usually leads to calls by civil society organisations (CSOs) for future improvements, especially in the 
light of SSA’s poor fiscal transparency performance. Thus, we consider a dynamic panel data model 
that provides for partial adjustments as follows: 
𝐹𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑓𝑡𝐹𝑇𝑖 𝑡−1 + 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                           (3.2) 
Where 𝐹𝑇𝑖 𝑡−1 is the lagged dependent variable; and 𝛽𝑓𝑡 is the measure of the adjustment process, 
which is expected not to be greater than one (1). Thus, equations 3.1 and 3.2 denote the static and 
dynamic fiscal transparency models respectively.  
For estimation, the static panel model may be disposed to challenges such as endogeneity and 
unobserved heterogeneity as well as cross-sectional dependence issues. Endogeneity problems 
could emanate from the institutional (independent) variables as well as from omission of other 
relevant variables from the model. Also, though SSA countries may be made up of sovereign states, 
there still exists the possibility of equal response from the countries to commons shock. This 
suggests that some of the institutional or socio-economic factors considered in the model and 
ultimately fiscal transparency may be correlated. 
The dynamic panel model (Equation 3.2) is also disposed to some econometric challenges such as 
those underscored above. This is further made difficult by challenges posed by correlation between 
the lagged dependent variable and the error term, specifically with regard to the unobserved country-
specific heterogeneity 𝜔𝑖. The presence of the lagged dependent variables 𝐹𝑇𝑖 𝑡−1 as one of the 
regressors in the model could lead to autocorrelation challenges in the model. As argued by 
Roodman (2009), given such situations, employing the OLS technique will yield biased and 
inconsistent estimates and it will be better to adopt the generalised method of moments (GMM) 
estimator over the FE and IV estimators. Also, as highlighted by Bond (2002), GMM estimator 
permits the consideration of the dynamic process and is very important for recovering consistent 
estimates of the parameters of interest. In this regard, to avoid results that are potentially biased, we 
adopt the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator as it controls for the unobserved country 
heterogeneity (country-fixed effect) and endogeneity (bi-directionality) of the explanatory variables 
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CHAPTER 4  
AN OVERVIEW OF FISCAL OUTCOME, FISCAL RULE AND FISCAL 
TRANSPARENCY IN AFRICA 
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides an overview of the outcome of fiscal policy implementation in sub-Saharan 
Africa from 2008 till date, as well as an IMF projection for up to 2022. This section will also serve as 
a cross-walk linking fiscal transparency to fiscal outcome by establishing the importance of fiscal 
transparency for the achievement of better fiscal outcome. Essentially, it will examine fiscal rules in 
SSA vis-à-vis the performance of fiscal outcomes such as fiscal deficits, debts, revenue and 
expenditure with a view to identifying the trend in their performance. It also localises the controllable 
causes of such trends. Crucially, this chapter will investigate whether or not fiscal rules have helped 
SSA countries to achieve better fiscal outcomes. The section will further explore key SSA’s 
controllable fiscal governance indicators that can influence fiscal outcomes, particularly fiscal 
transparency. This is with a view of revealing the quality of fiscal transparency in SSA, and from 
existing literature, establishes the importance of fiscal transparency towards achieving better fiscal 
outcomes. Finally, this chapter serves as a precursor for a robust empirical analysis of the 
determinants of fiscal transparency in subsequent chapters. Thus, the main objective of this section 
is to establish the performance of fiscal outcome and the extent to which fiscal outcomes are 
determined by fiscal discipline (i.e. adherence to existing fiscal rules).  
4.2 Background 
Some of the serious economic challenges currently faced by SSA7 economies include the absence 
of sound fiscal policy implementation, often characterised by poor fiscal outcomes (i.e. persistent 
and unsustainable deficits resulting in soaring debts), a weak fiscal policy framework and poor fiscal 
transparency. Generally, fiscal policy is crucial to economic development of any country. The 
influential work by Musgrave (1959) emphasised the threefold rationale for sound fiscal policy: 
promoting macroeconomic stability, efficient resource allocation, and solving problems of 
distributional disparities. Oates (1968) and World Bank (2012) also corroborated this rationale for 
sound fiscal policy implementation. Thus, any distortion to sound fiscal policy implementation could 
have a negative macroeconomic and sociopolitical impact. 
                                               





Nonetheless, high and persistent fiscal deficits characterised by negative overall balance, coupled 
with soaring levels of public debt and a deluge of budget related scandals, seem to have become a 
common feature amongst SSA countries. Suffice it to say that fiscal deficits do not always connote 
poor macroeconomic management as they are sometime used as stabilisation tools. However, 
persistent year-on-year fiscal deficits could lead to unsustainable debt levels and a high cost of 
borrowing for the government, both of which are deleterious to the economy. This is particularly so 
when the borrowing to finance the deficit was mostly for consumption expenditure rather than capital 
expenditure which could place the economy on the path of economic growth. 
A key measure of fiscal performance is the trend of overall balance and debts run by an economy 
vis-à-vis the targeted (budgeted) figures for each fiscal year. Most SSA economies had poor fiscal 
outcomes as typified by their mostly negative (deficit) overall fiscal balance for over a decade as 
represented in Table 3.1. The macroeconomic implication of persistent negative overall balances, 
otherwise known as fiscal deficits, is its corollary, the persistent impact on the debt level of the 
economy, as it will continually be forced to borrow to augment its budgetary revenue requirements. 
Persistent fiscal deficits and unsustainable debt thresholds have implications for long-term fiscal 
consolidation.  
4.3 The role of fiscal policy in economic growth: implications of the various means of 
deficit financing  
As highlighted by the IMF (2015), in a challenging economic environment, fiscal policy accompanied 
by good monetary policy can continue to play a critical role in sustaining aggregate demand and 
rebuilding confidence in an economy. This can be achieved via a flexible use of fiscal policy, which 
can support growth, whilst mitigating risk and ensuring medium-term sustainability. However, the 
degree and type of flexibility will depend on a host of factors such as the individual country’s fiscal 
position, macroeconomic conditions and pertinent fiscal risks.  
The nexus between fiscal policy and economic growth has received attention from academics and 
policymakers for quite some time. Generally, the smooth running of every economy is predicated on 
the optimal mix of fiscal and monetary policy (Lucas and Stokey, 1983; Alesina and Tabellini, 1987). 
The major policy objective of fiscal authority includes economic stability, a higher growth rate and 
employment. Its key instruments include countercyclical tax and spending, and it prefers a lower 
unemployment rate to a lower rate of inflation. A persistent fiscal deficit is expansionary and 
increases aggregate demand thus leading to a higher interest rate and higher prices, while a budget 
surplus is contractionary and lowers the aggregate demand, the interest rate and prices.  
The 1980s saw many developing countries embarking on fiscal adjustment aimed at leading them 
out of economic crises. Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1993) examined how financial markets, 





also examined the behaviour of holdings of money, public debt, investment, and the real exchange 
rate. Their study revealed strong evidence that money financing of the deficit begets higher inflation, 
while debt financing begets higher real interest rates or increased repression of financial markets. 
They concluded that private investment is sensitive to the real interest rate, which rises under 
domestic borrowing to finance the deficit. In sum, they concluded that fiscal deficits and growth are 
self-reinforcing as good fiscal management maintains access to foreign lending and avoids the 
crowding-out of private investment, while growth stabilises the budget and improves the fiscal 
position. The growth–good fiscal management circle is one of the strongest arguments for a policy 
of low and sustainable fiscal deficits (Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1993). 
The germane question then becomes, how are deficits financed? The commonest way of funding 
budget deficits is via borrowing (domestically and externally). From a fiscal policy perspective, higher 
budget deficits will require higher taxes and borrowing in the future and may cause crowding out of 
private sector investment and consumption and thus dampen the rate of expansion in output (growth) 
in the long run. On the domestic front, fiscal deficits are most times financed via borrowing through 
government bonds or borrowing from the central bank via new money creation or via increased 
taxation (Carlin and Soskice, 2006).  
As clearly pointed out by Carlin and Soskice (2006), the macroeconomic roles of government’s fiscal 
policy include the planning and financing of government expenditure in ways that maintain a 
sustainable burden of public debt in the economy, the provision of automatic stabilisers that protect 
the economy to some degree from shocks to aggregate demand, and the stabilisation of output level 
around the equilibrium rate by employing discretionary changes in government expenditure and/or 
taxation. Blanchard (1985) reiterated this position by pointing out that fluctuations in the overall 
budget balance (the variance between revenue earned and spending) provides a good estimation of 
the short-term impact of fiscal measures on demand. Thus, the budget balance captures the 
difference between the resources deducted from private sector income (primarily via taxation) and 
what the budget contributes to aggregate expenditure in a given year. This is more so, because 
economic agents are forward looking. Fiscal policy can also affect aggregate demand via future 
anticipated deficits and public debt stock (Blanchard and Summers, 1984; Blanchard, 1985).  
A robust study by Ndebbio (2004) on SSA not only reiterated the nexus between financial 
development and economic growth, it went further to identify and establish the link between financial 
development, fiscal policy performance and economic growth. Findings from the study attributed the 
low or negative growth of per capita output in SSA to a shallow financial depth – a phenomenon 
which implies the presence of a narrow range of financial assets for the country. The study suggested 
that alongside factors such as price stabilisation, removal of fiscal deficit and restrictions on financial 





intermediation/development could impact positively on growth if, among other suggestions, the 
volume of investment is increased.  
Schmidt-Hebbel (1995) and Easterly and Levine (1994) both came to the conclusion that fiscal 
balance has been seen to have a positive effect on long-run growth, while fiscal deficit has a negative 
effect on growth. The debate on the relative effectiveness of fiscal or monetary policy in Africa has 
being going on for a while. UNECA (1989) attributed this debate to the peculiar presence of structural 
rigidities in SSA economies. Some of which include the presence of poor institutions, a very restricted 
production base, overdependence on external economies as well as a preponderance of the 
subsistent sector.  
Using the Nigerian economy as a case study, Olaloye and Ikhide (1995) found that fiscal policy is 
more effective than monetary policy in getting the country out of economic depression. They 
anchored their finding particularly on the role played by government expenditure. The study 
concluded by recommending the need for government to formulate suitable policies as it pertains to 
its mix of current and capital expenditure, subsidies and transfers as well as the need to review its 
massive expenditure projects that are not productive. Although government can also raise revenue 
to offset its deficit through seigniorage, this approach is limited by the attendant inflation that usually 
accompanies it. This is usually not the most considered option given the political backlash that easily 
accompanies inflation before revenue from such a source is maximised. Thus, the most feasible 
option left to governments to cover gaps between government expenses and revenue is public debt. 
Governments of both high and low-income countries rely heavily on debt finance over the years, 
albeit with the attendant consequences given that, in most countries, servicing prevailing debt is 
mostly a first line charge on revenue (Bell, 2003). 
The budget balance identity captures the difference between the resources subtracted from private 
sector income (largely via taxation) and what the budget contributes to aggregate expenditure in a 
given year. A declining budget balance reflects a positive fiscal contribution to aggregate demand 
and vice versa. For each fiscal period, the government must finance its expenditure plans and also 
pay interest on the government debt. This is captured in the government budget identity given by 
Equation 4.1: 
𝑮 +  𝒊𝑩 ≡  𝑻 + 𝜟𝑩 + 𝜟𝑯                                                                         (4.1) 
Where 𝑮 is government expenditure, 𝒊 is the nominal interest rate, 𝑩 is the outstanding stock of 
bonds and thus the value of the national debt at the beginning of the period, 𝑻 is Tax revenues net 
of transfers, 𝜟𝑩 is the value of the new bonds issued in the current period, and 𝜟𝑯 is the new high-
powered money generated by the central bank (Carlin and Soskice, 2006). However, Ndebbio (2004) 
cautioned that such monetisation of fiscal deficit via sales of government securities to the central 





4.4 Fiscal policy outcome in sub-Saharan Africa: deficit and debt profile 
Fiscal outcomes do not necessarily turn out according to projections8. Fiscal policy performance is 
described as the deviations of fiscal outturns (i.e. deficit, Debt/GDP ratio) from the fiscal expectations 
at the time of the budget (Cebotari et al., 2009). This raises questions such as what are the 
consequences of poor fiscal outcome? What are the endogenous (controllable) factors that cause 
such deviations from expectations? How can they be best addressed? Theoretically, the major effect 
or economic consequence of increasing budget deficits include increased inflation owing to the 
increase in aggregate demand as an increase in fiscal deficit is mostly associated with expansionary 
fiscal policy, crowding out the private sector from borrowing from the domestic market and, by 
extension, potentially reducing the level of private investment and growth.  
4.4.1 SSA overall fiscal balance 
In public finance, the difference between government revenues and spending is referred to as the 
overall balance – a positive overall balance reflects government budget surplus while a negative 
balance indicates a budget deficit. Table 4.1 reveals that most SSA economies have run a deficit 
budget since 2008. In 2016, Angola, Congo DR, Ghana and Kenya recorded deficits of 13.5%, 
12.9%, 8.9% and 8.7% respectively. These were almost thrice the national or supranational adopted 
fiscal rules and above the IMF recommended threshold. The IMF forecast for 2018 through 2019 to 
2022 still portends a similar trend of persistent budget deficit for most African economies and by 
extension increasing debt stock from borrowing to finance deficits. Interestingly, data from Table 4.1 
reveals that most countries that have a Fiscal Responsibility Act which stipulates that overall fiscal 
deficit in a fiscal year shall not exceed 3% of its GDP have not achieved this target in most of the 
years.9 The situation is more worrying when even a more relaxed IMF benchmark, which stipulates 
fiscal deficit of 4% of GDP, is considered. Most SSA countries could still not achieve this in some 
fiscal years. This raises questions such as why are fiscal targets most times not achieved in Africa? 
Do these countries have institutionalised fiscal rules governing the budget process? If yes, why have 
such fiscal rules failed? 
Deficit financing is not completely wrong as sometimes fiscal policies for growth and employment 
may cause governments to run a deficit. What is important is its impact. If deficit financing was to 
finance capital expenditure and thereby induce investment and growth, this will have a positive long-
run impact on growth. If deficit financing is used to finance recurrent expenditure, this will dampen 
the rate of growth of the economy in the long run. However, in both scenarios, two germane 
questions or issues deserve attention. First, how is this deficit financed, especially in SSA where the 
financial markets are not well developed?  
                                               
8 In the course of this work, fiscal outcome, budget outcome and fiscal performance are used interchangeably. 





Table 4.1: SSA overall balance, 2008-2022 (percentage of GDP) 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 
Angola -4.5 -7.4 0.0 -0.1 -4.4 -0.4 -7.3 -15.3 -13.5 -3.2 -1.1 -0.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 
Benin -0.1 -3.1 -0.4 -1.3 -0.3 -1.9 -2.3 -7.6 -5.9 -6.1 -4.0 -1.9 -0.8 -0.2 -0.6 
Burkina Faso -4.1 -4.7 -3.0 1.4 -3.1 -4.0 -2.0 -2.2 -3.3 5.5 4.6 -3.0 -3.1 -3.0 -3.3 
Cameroon 2.2 0.0 -1.1 -2.6 -1.6 -4.0 -4.0 -2.7 -6.1 -3.6 -2.8 -2.0 -1.6 1.4 -1.3 
Chad 3.6 -9.2 -4.2 2.4 0.5 -2.1 -4.2 -3.1 -2.0 1.7 1.5 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.7 
Congo DR -0.5 -0.9 -1.0 -1.0 1.9 3.1 1.2 0.9 0.1 -0.3 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 
Congo Republic 27.2 4.9 15.7 16.0 7.3 -4.5 -11.3 -41.7 -12.9 -1.8 3.8 4.6 4.9 5.6 4.1 
Côte d’Ivoire -0.4 -1.4 -1.8 -4.0 -3.1 -2.2 -2.2 -2.9 -4.0 -4.5 -3.7 -3.0 -3.0 -2.9 -2.9 
Ethiopia -2.9 -0.9 -1.3 -1.6 -1.2 -1.9 -2.6 -1.9 -2.4 -2.4 -2.5 -2.7 -2.8 -3.0 -2.9 
Ghana -8.0 -7.2 -10.1 -7.4 -11.3 -12.0 -10.9 -5.4 -8.9 -4.5 -3.7 -3.2 -3.1 -2.9 -2.8 
Guinea 0.4 -4.9 -9.6 -0.9 -2.5 -3.9 -3.2 -6.9 -0.1 -0.5 -1.9 -1.9 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 
Kenya -3.4 -4.3 -4.4 -4.1 -5.0 -5.7 -7.4 -8.1 -8.7 -8.4 -6.6 -5.6 -4.1 -3.1 -3.0 
Madagascar -2.0 -2.5 -0.9 -2.4 -2.6 -4.0 -2.3 -3.3 -1.3 -5.1 -4.7 -4.5 -3.8 -3.5 -3.3 
Mali -2.0 -3.7 -2.6 -3.4 -1.0 -2.4 -2.9 -1.8 -3.9 -8.5 -3.3 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 
Mozambique -2.1 -4.9 -3.8 -4.8 -3.9 -2.7 -10.7 -7.2 -5.7 -7.3 -7.0 -5.5 -4.5 -3.4 -2.8 
Niger 1.5 -5.3 -2.4 -1.5 -1.1 -2.6 -8.0 -9.1 -6.2 -7.5 -6.2 -4.8 -2.9 -0.8 0.0 
Nigeria 5.7 -5.4 -4.2 0.4 0.2 -2.3 -2.1 -3.4 -4.7 -5.0 -4.5 -4.3 -3.8 -3.7 -3.6 
Rwanda 0.9 0.3 -0.7 -0.9 -2.5 -1.3 -4.0 -2.8 -2.3 -1.9 -2.1 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.9 
Senegal -4.4 -4.6 -4.9 -6.1 -5.2 -5.5 -5.0 -4.8 -4.2 -3.7 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 
South Africa -0.7 -5.3 -4.9 -3.9 -4.4 -4.3 -4.2 -4.6 -4.0 -4.5 -4.3 -4.3 -4.2 -4.1 -3.8 
Sudan 0.6 -4.2 0.2 0.1 -3.3 -2.3 -1.4 -1.9 -1.8 -2.4 -2.6 -2.8 -3.0 -3.1 -3.6 
Tanzania -1.9 4.5 -4.8 -3.6 -4.1 -3.9 -3.0 -3.3 -3.1 -3.4 -4.3 -4.6 -4.1 -3.3 -2.6 
Uganda -2.6 -2.1 -5.7 -2.7 3.0 -4.0 -4.7 -4.6 -3.9 -3.2 -4.9 -4.8 -4.9 -1.2 -0.9 
Zambia -0.7 -2.1 -2.4 -1.8 -2.8 -6.2 -5.7 -9.3 -5.8 -8.0 -7.8 -7.2 -6.5 -5.3 -4.3 
Zimbabwe -2.0 -2.0 0.7 -0.5 0.0 -1.7 -1.4 -1.0 -8.4 -5.1 -3.4 -3.2 -3.3 -3.3 -3.1 






Table 4.2: SSA overall debt, 2008-2022 (percentage of GDP) 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 
Angola 16.6 22.7 44.3 33.8 29.5 32.9 40.7 65.4 75.8 65.1 66 67.1 66.9 66 66.1 
Benin 25 25.6 28.7 29.9 26.7 25.3 30.5 42.4 50.3 53.4 53.6 51.5 47.6 44 40.6 
Burkina Faso 25.6 29.1 30.7 28.1 28.2 28.8 30.6 33.4 35.7 36.5 37.7 37.3 37 36.7 37 
Cameroon 9.7 10.1 11.5 13.2 15.4 19 26.2 34.2 35.2 35.7 35.4 35 33.9 32.5 30.9 
Chad 19.9 31.6 30.1 30.6 28.8 30.5 39.4 43 51.2 46.6 43.3 39.2 34.5 30.4 29.1 
Congo DR 73.8 84.5 30.9 24.5 22.7 20 17.5 16.1 16.8 17 15.8 14.5 13.3 12 11.2 
Congo Republic 79.3 63.3 22.3 23.8 28.6 34.2 46.8 96.3 115 117.7 116 111.1 102.4 88.8 81.9 
Côte d’Ivoire 70.8 64.2 63 69.2 45 43.4 44.8 47.8 48.7 48.7 48.3 47.1 46.5 45.9 45.5 
Ethiopia 41.7 37.8 40.5 43.9 36.9 42.4 46.3 60 57.9 59.7 59.1 58.3 56.9 55.8 55.1 
Ghana 33.6 36.1 46.3 42.6 47.9 57.2 70.2 72.2 73.4 70.5 66.1 62.8 60.1 57.6 55.1 
Guinea 58.5 61.3 68.8 58.1 27.2 34 35.1 42.1 42.9 42.9 47.2 48.3 47.6 45.5 43.7 
Kenya 41.5 41.1 44.4 43 43.9 44 48.6 51.6 52.6 56.2 56 52.5 51.4 48.7 46.6 
Madagascar 31.5 33.7 31.7 32.2 33 33.9 34.7 35.5 38.7 41.9 42.8 43.7 43.4 42.8 41.9 
Mali 20.3 21.9 25.3 24 25.4 26.4 27.3 30.7 35.9 34.7 35.5 36.9 38.4 39.8 41.1 
Mozambique 36.3 41.9 43.3 38 40.1 53.1 62.4 88.1 113.3 88.2 85.6 82 78.8 73.8 65.6 
Niger 21.1 27.7 24.3 27.8 26.9 26.3 32 41 46.3 51.5 52.8 53.8 52.1 49.8 47.5 
Nigeria 7.3 8.6 9.6 12.1 12.6 12.4 12.5 13.2 17.6 21.3 22.8 23.8 24.3 24.8 25.2 
Rwanda 19.5 19.5 20 19.9 20 26.7 29.1 33.4 37.6 40.2 42.1 44.1 44.3 43.7 42.9 
Senegal 23.9 34.2 35.5 40.7 42.8 46.9 54.4 56.9 60.6 61.1 59.9 58.1 56.4 54.8 53.6 
south Africa 26.5 30.1 34.7 38.2 41 44.1 47 49.3 51.7 53 55.6 57.1 58.1 58.8 59.2 
Sudan 68.8 72.1 73.1 70.6 94.5 89.9 77.3 72.6 66.5 53.5 47.9 44.1 41.6 39.4 37.6 
Tanzania 21.5 24.4 27.3 27.8 29.2 30.9 33.8 36.7 37.2 37.4 38.3 39.5 40.3 40.8 41 
Uganda 20.3 19.2 22.4 23.4 24.5 27.6 30.7 33.3 37.3 38.6 39.9 41.3 41.6 41.2 40 
Zambia 19.2 20.5 18.9 20.8 25.4 27.1 35.6 61.4 60.5 55.6 60 62.4 63.3 63.7 62.8 
Zimbabwe 68.6 51.4 59.3 41.6 38.4 48.3 49.6 51.9 69.7 70.7 68.5 67 68.4 69.9 71.8 
SSA 21.8 23.7 22.2 23.1 22.7 24.1 25.9 30.6 36 38.6 38.6 38 37.6 37.3 37 





Secondly, and worthy of note, is why have  resource-rich countries such as Angola, Congo DRC and 
Nigeria posted some of the highest levels of fiscal deficits in some of the years? This may point to 
the issue of spending inefficiency, a pointer to institutional strength or challenges. 
4.4.2 Fiscal balance and the evolution of debt in SSA 
One of the major outcomes of the fiscal balance alluded to earlier is the growing trend in debt in 
many SSA economies. Available data for some SSA countries represented in Figure 4.1 reveals an 
ominous debt stance for SSA economies. It depicts a worsening net debt as a percentage of GDP 
between 2008 and 2022. The projection for 2019-2022 may see slight ebb in the ratio of net debt to 
GDP, but these forecasts will still be worse than the situation was prior to 2008. Rising debt as a 
percentage of GDP portends an increasing burden on future generations. In 2017, Congo DR and 
Mozambique recorded a Debt-GDP ratio of 117% and 88.2% respectively (see Table 3.2). SSA’s 
composite gross Debt-GDP ratio is projected to rise from about 21.8% in 2008 to 37% by 2022 (IMF, 
2017). By 2016, countries such as Burkina Faso, Congo DR, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, 
Niger, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe had crossed the 50% threshold of debt 
to GDP. 
Figure 4.1: Net debt trend (% of GDP) in some SSA countries 2008-2022 
 
Source: Computed by the author based on data from IMF Fiscal Monitor October, 2017 
An examination of the gross Debt-GDP ratio reveals the same worrying upward trend of Debt-GDP 
ratio in SSA countries. As highlighted in Chapter 1, there are worries that SSA economies may slide 




















further domestic and foreign investment and harm economic growth (Krugman, 1988; Sachs, 1989; 
Patillo et al., 2002). The exact nature of the nexus between debt and economic growth is shrouded 
in controversy in the economics literature. However, what we do know is that beyond a certain debt 
threshold, economic growth begins to contract, especially owing to increasing debt service and the 
consequent less public investment. 
In Figure 4.2, we present the trend of average and median annual GDP growth rates relative to the 
level of debt to GDP ratio for all African countries covering the period 2008-2018 based on data from 
the African Development Indicators. It can be observed that when debt to GDP ratio was about 20%, 
both median and average annual GDP growths were relatively higher compared to when debt to 
GDP ratios were higher than 20%.  
Figure 4.2: Economic growth and debt for Africa, 2008-2018 
 
Source: Computed from African Economic Indicators 
4.4.3  SSA revenue structure 
Between 2008 and 2017, SSA’s revenue trajectory, represented in Figure 4.3, has generally been 
on a decline, dipping from 19.4% in 2008 to 12.6% in 2017. IMF (2017) projections for 2018-2022 
do not reflect a significant change. Table A.1 of the Appendix provides a vivid country-by-country 
basis statistics. Apart from Mali and Zimbabwe, all other SSA countries are projected to be worse off 
by 2022 than they were during the baseline year of 2008 in terms of their revenue. Only very few 
countries like Ghana and Angola are expected to have better revenue by 2022. Particularly bad 
cases are Nigeria and Sudan – both countries may see their revenues drop from 20.1% and 24% to 
6.8% and 7.6% respectively. Such a phenomenal drop in revenue may be understandable in the 
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Figure 4.3: SSA revenue (% GDP) profile 
 
Source: Computed by author based on IMF (2017) fiscal monitor statistics 
However, in the case of Nigeria, there is need for further investigation, especially in terms of 
transparency and accountability in revenues from the oil and gas sector of the country. Recall that 
total deficit in a given fiscal year (𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑡) is defined as 
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑟 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐺𝑡 − 𝑇𝑡                                                                      (4.2)  
where 𝑟 represents interest payment on the outstanding debt, 𝐺𝑡 represents government expenditure 
and 𝑇𝑡  is the tax revenue. From the foregoing identity, if tax revenue declines, then the total deficit is 
likely to increase. Between 2008 and 2018, SSA’s revenue had dropped by over 34% with no strong 
projection of a return to pre-2008 revenue levels. Why has SSA’s revenue trajectory witnessed a dip 
for quite some time? This can be attributed to a lot of germane emerging factors.  
First is the over-reliance on resource-based taxes in resource-rich countries. Non-resource tax 
revenues are particularly low in some resource-intensive economies. The excess reliance on 
resource revenues exacerbates the effect of declines in commodity prices on economies such as 
Nigeria and Angola. Also, there are serious structural constraints which creates fiscal space 
challenges. for example, in SSA it may be difficult to increase taxes beyond what the current levels 
are for developing countries and thus, such governments are left with a small window of financing 
deficits. Another factor is the impact of trade liberalisation (abolition of tariffs and non-tariff barriers). 
Given the high share of trade taxes in poorer countries, such abolition of tariffs could impede revenue 
generation. Furthermore, the erosion of the already shallow tax base by excessive granting of tax 
preferences, inefficient taxation of activities in the extractive industry, coupled with inability to fight 
abuses of transfer pricing by multinational enterprises (MNEs) only worsens the situation. This is in 








































administrative organisation, taxpayer identification and registration, filing, revenue controls and post-
filing arrangements – resulting in poor tax mobilisation efforts. 
4.4.4  Foreign aid and fiscal deficit in Africa 
Some SSA countries articulate foreign aid into the government budget revenue framework.10 
However, with the graduation of many SSA states from low income to middle- and upper-income 
countries, access to foreign aid for such countries is reduced. Other factors that may have affected 
SSA’s revenue outcome include volatilities in its receipt of official aid. Statistics from the World 
Development Indictors (2017) represented in Figure 4.4 reveals that SSA experienced negative 
change in its receipts of Official Development Aid (ODA) in some periods. This could be attributed 
to donor fatigue as outlined by earlier studies. The impact of this could be felt more by countries such 
Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya whose annual budgets rely heavily on ODA and Official Aid.  
According to IMF (2017), as at 2012 fiscal year, both Tanzania and Uganda had a 39% share of 
external aid as a percentage of GDP. The volatility in foreign aid received by African countries may 
also not be unconnected with the emerging trend of increase in donor conditionalities for fiscal 
transparency as a condition for giving aid (Mills, 2013).  
Figure 4.4: Volatility (change) in SSA net ODA and official aid 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2017 
4.4.5 Foreign aid, tax leakages and corruption 
Studies have linked countries’ ability (or inability) to efficiently mobilise domestic resources to high 
levels of corruption. Friedman et al. (2000) pointed out that excessive corruption levels lower tax 
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revenue to GDP ratio.11 This is highly pertinent to the SSA situation as most of them rely heavily on 
international trade taxes which are often fraught with corruption. Customs and excise duties 
collection is couched in corruption in many of these countries (UNECA, 2016).  
4.4.6 Findings on the cross-over between fiscal outcome and institutional weakness 
From the foregoing, it is evident that most SSA economies experience a poor fiscal outcome in terms 
of fiscal deficits, debt and revenue. This reinforces questions asked earlier such as what are the 
causes of poor fiscal performance in Africa and how can they be addressed against the backdrop of 
the prevailing evidence of inconsistencies between growth rate and tax revenue, fluctuations and 
sometimes decline in official aid due to aid fatigue, the absence of strong fiscal rules, poor 
transparency and efficiency in the management of official aid that is manifest in SSA? It can be 
inferred that poor fiscal outcomes in Africa may be caused by factors such as unrealistic budget and 
expenditure assumptions, inefficiency and leakages in the tax system or other institutional factors 
such as corruption and the rent-seeking nature of most SSA economies. Thus, there is a need for 
SSA economies to realign their expenditure pattern to reflect this declining revenue projection in a 
more transparent manner so as reduce the level of deficits.  
Recent studies, though not on SSA, by Dabla-Noris et al. (2010) as well as that by Rajkumar and 
Swaroop (2008) found a nexus between fiscal outcome, governance and institutions. As earlier 
highlighted, Africa’s poor fiscal policy outcome can be traced to both exogenous and endogenous 
factors. Whereas the exogenous (non-controllable) factors, such as volatility in export commodity 
(e.g. oil and agriculture) prices and the impact of environmental elements (including drought), are 
crucial to SSA’s revenue structure, this study focuses on controllable factors such as fiscal rules and 
fiscal transparency which have been less researched in the various African countries.  
4.5 Governance institutions and fiscal rules 
As earlier highlighted, the current debates on factors influencing fiscal policy outcomes have 
gradually shifted towards controllable factors. Most of these factors fall under the scope of economic 
governance and the quality of budgetary institutions in a country. Although a very eclectic concept, 
World Bank (2007) described good governance as typified by predictable, open (i.e. transparent) 
and enlightened policymaking processes, a bureaucracy that is imbued with a professional ethos, 
an executive arm of government that is accountable for its actions, and a strong civil society that 
partakes in public affairs, and all behaving under the rule of law.  
Increasingly, in SSA countries, the role of governance and institutions are beginning to gain traction 
in economic discourse and on the outcome of fiscal policy implementation. However, our major 
                                               





preoccupation is firstly to conceptually understand the notions of institutions and governance as well 
as their emerging role in effective fiscal policy management (i.e. fiscal governance). As defined by 
North (1990: p.1), “institutions are humanly devised constraints (formal and informal) that structure 
political, economic and social interaction. They consist of sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and 
codes of conduct”. In essence, they can be described as the rules (formal and informal) of the game 
which affects economic incentives and behaviour. As clearly highlighted by Williamson (1985), the 
key focus of the literature on institutions and transactions cost is based on institutions as efficient 
solutions to problems of organisations in a competitive framework. It can be rightly argued that 
institutions are therefore not organisations – they transcend organisations as they entail the 
presence of the organisations and the totality of what it takes to run them efficiently.  
Dovetailing from the broad definition of institutions to why they are vital for fiscal policy outcome, 
fiscal institutions too have received attention from scholars as well policymakers. As defined by 
Gollwitzer (2010: p.1), “fiscal institutions comprise the policies, rules, and procedures of the public 
revenue and expenditure process; thus is the most important macroeconomic commitment to 
institutions for government”. Alesina and Perotti (1996) defined fiscal institutions as all the rules and 
regulations according to which budgets are drafted, approved and implemented. From a formal 
perspective, budgetary institutions and processes fulfil numerous vital functions (Shah et al., 2007) 
such as:  
i. Setting priorities in the allocation of public resources, 
ii. Planning to achieve policy goals,  
iii. Establishing financial control over inputs to ensure compliance with rules,  
iv. Managing operations with fiscal prudence, efficiency and integrity, and 
v. Ensuring accountability to taxpayers.  
Nonetheless, the situation in Africa is quite different.  Shah et al. (2007) pointed out that budgetary 
processes and institutions in Africa are yet to be adequately developed to deliver on the above-
identified functions given their misplaced emphasise on work mostly as a way of legalistic control. 
Shah et al. emphasised the need for reform of these institutions as this is crucial to enhancing service 
delivery by the government as well as reinforcing citizens’ oversight on the operations of the 
government. However, it is imperative to point out that citizens’ oversight ability is predicated on the 
level and quality of information made available to it. Killick (2005), on the budgeting system in Ghana, 
reveals issues that are not so different from other SSA countries’ experience.  The study revealed 
evidence of a poorly performing budget system characterised by frequent discrepancies between 
budget estimates and actual spending.  
Dabla Norris et al. (2010) and Gollwitzer (2010) highlighted the importance of institutions in the 





institutional quality across the African continent. It also revealed that strong budget institutions help 
enhance fiscal balances (higher primary budget balance) and lower public external debt outcomes.  
4.6 Fiscal rules and fiscal discipline in sub-Saharan Africa 
Amongst the key public finance problems faced by most SSA countries is the spiraling and 
unsustainable upward trend of deficits and debts. To address these challenges and ensure fiscal 
discipline, many SSA countries have adopted some form of national or supranational numerical fiscal 
rules. Fiscal rules can be described as permanent constraints on fiscal policy via simple numerical 
limits on budgetary aggregates (IMF, 2009). As highlighted by Mabugu and Marinkov (2013), the 
success of fiscal rules in delivering the expected fiscal outcome is predicated on the adopting of an 
easy to understand fiscal indicator which can also be easily scrutnised and publicized. They are 
largely employed with the view to achieving fiscal sustainability. They can also be employed in 
stabilising the economy as well as in shrinking or enlarging the size of government. 
In an attempt to realise their sustainable public finance objectives, including sustainable debt levels 
and less persistent fiscal deficits, most SSA countries adopted some form of fiscal rule, or in some 
cases a combination of fiscal rules. The aim of such fiscal rules is to forestall fiscal indiscipline and 
return these countries towards sustainable public finances. This development has increased the 
demand for some form of institutional response, hence the emergence of fiscal rules as institutional 
innovations with the goals of promoting fiscal prudence and ensuring balanced fiscal policies in the 
last decade. As detailed by Cangiano et al. (2013.p80), fiscal rules or fiscal responsibility laws as 
they are sometimes referred to as “legal frameworks that embed in law an agreed set of policies, 
processes or arrangements intended to improve fiscal outcomes, discipline, transparency and 
accountability by requiring governments to commit to fiscal policy objectives and strategies that can 
be monitored”. Such legal frameworks can thus be a component of the budget laws albeit such laws 
have to cover a wider scope bordering on the entire public finance management systems and 
processes as they assist countries to maintain fiscal discipline. Hence, they connote a long-lasting 
restraint on fiscal policy via numerical limits on budgetary aggregates with the implication that such 
fiscal policy parameter boundaries are not frequently altered (Bova et al., 2015).  
Fiscal rules have increasingly been recognised as important tools to promote sound fiscal policies. 
By constraining discretion, fiscal rules enhance fiscal discipline and make fiscal policy more 
predictable. In particular, fiscal rules can help governments establish fiscal targets that support fiscal 
sustainability. IMF (2009) summarised the different types of fiscal rules into the following: 
i. Budget balance rules. These can be predicated on the overall balance, the structural balance 
or cyclically adjusted balance, 
ii. Debt rules. These aim at achieving a certain threshold of debt to GDP ratio. It is effective in 





iii. Expenditure rules. These put boundaries on total, primary or current spending (i.e. spending 
of the ordinary state budget plus spending of the public investment budget) in relation to 
GDP. 
iv. Revenue rules. These aim at boosting revenue and/or preventing a tax burden.  
4.6.1 Performance of fiscal rules in Africa 
How effective have fiscal rules been in helping SSA countries overcome poor fiscal outcomes? 
Following a cursory investigation of Table A.2 on fiscal rules in Africa (see Appendix), vis-à-vis 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2, i.e. performance of fiscal outcome (deficit or overall balance and debt) in SSA, 
several inferences can be deduced on how SSA’s attempt at fiscal discipline or desire to achieve 
better fiscal outcome has performed. Generally, the last 10 years reveals that despite the adoption 
of fiscal rules, most SSA countries were unable to achieve fiscal outcomes (fiscal deficits and debts) 
that were within the stipulations of their adopted fiscal rules. This has been examined by Rodrik 
(1998), Mosley (2005) and Cangiano et al. (2013). An in-depth breakdown of fiscal discipline based 
on regional adopted supranational convergence criteria is provided below.  
4.6.2 Fiscal rules and fiscal outcomes in Africa 
First, upon in-depth examination of the enforcement of fiscal rules and fiscal outcome in Africa (Table 
A.4), it can be observed that most African countries have one or another form of numerical fiscal 
target rules to guide the management of their public finances. Most of these countries belong to 
regional monetary unions which have supranational fiscal rules12 and fiscal convergence criteria as 
can be seen in Table A.2. One of the earliest templates for such rules and convergence criteria is 
the Maastricht Treaty. In a bid to avoid the need for bail-out of member countries by the European 
Central Bank owing to deficit spending, the treaty required that European Monetary Union (EMU) 
member countries avoid excessive deficits. Excessive deficits were defined by the treaty as deficits 
exceeding 3% of GDP. The 1997 stability and growth pact signed in Amsterdam strengthened the 
initial provision of the treaty by adding a quasi-automatic review process with financial fines imposed 
on member countries with excessive deficits (Poterba and von Hagen, 1999). Between 2000 and 
2008, several economic communities in Africa began replicating such supranational fiscal rules, 
albeit with very little success as shown in their fiscal outcomes both in terms of deficits and debt. It 
may suffice to point out that supranational fiscal rules have their limitations on member states' ability 
to achieve an optimal mix of fiscal and monetary policy as the Eurozone financial crises exposed in 
Greece, Portugal and Spain. 
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The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) is one of the regional economic 
communities in Africa. The WAEMU countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea 
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. Its 1st order convergence criteria on balanced budgets 
require that overall fiscal deficit (including grant) remains below 3%. From our findings, most of the 
countries under WAEMU could not balance their budget in large parts of the last 4-5 years, not even 
on their adopted convergence criteria of 3% (see Tables 4.1, 4.2 and A2). A major institutional 
weakness of the WAEMU is the vagueness of special circumstances for exemption as contained in 
its Article 71. This provides leeway for member countries not to be exempted from satisfying their 
obligation of meeting part or all of its convergence criteria. An IMF (2013) study of WAEMU called 
for strengthening of the WAEMU framework as well as addressing some of its nebulous special 
circumstances so as to ensure compliance by member states.   
The East African Monetary Union (EAMU) and other African economic integrations have a similar 
convergence criterion to WAEMU of overall fiscal deficit (including grants) remaining below 3% of 
GDP and a 50% ceiling on gross public debt. These rules came into effect in 2013 with a view to 
securing convergence by 2020/2021. Table 4.1 also reveals that most EAMU member states have 
in the last four years posted fiscal deficit figures higher than their projected convergence figure. The 
Economic and Monetary Community of Central African (CEMAC)13 is not doing any better. Nigeria 
has its own national Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA, 2007) which was passed in 2007. It stipulates 
that on a given fiscal year, the Deficit-GDP ratio should not exceed 3%. However, as Table 4.1 
reveals, Nigeria has breached the Act several times without any sanctions on the key macro-
economic management team or officials responsible for implementation of the FRA (2007). 
4.6.3 Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) as fiscal rules in SSA 
The last ten to fifteen years have seen most African countries embarking on a series of budgetary 
reforms. A key component of these reforms was the adoption of the Medium-Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF), also known as the Medium-Term Budget Framework (MTBF). Though a broader 
definition, the MTEF is a set of institutional arrangements for prioritising, presenting and managing 
revenue and expenditure over a period of three to five years (Harris et al., 2013; Brumby and 
Hemming, 2013). A comprehensive MTEF must have an explicit limit on total expenditures and the 
budget deficit for each year. One fiscal policy area where the quality of a country’s fiscal institutions 
and performance of the entire governance actors can easily be scrutinised is the MTEF. Given the 
cyclical nature of the budget process and the vulnerabilities to both exogenous and endogenous 
shocks, most countries in developing countries have embraced the MTEF with a view to putting in 
                                               





place a key institutional and governance framework that will ensure fiscal discipline and hence 
macroeconomic stability. 
A key feature of the MTEF is the constraints it fixes on budget decisions – fiscal targets. This is 
coupled with its provision of procedures to ensure that policy changes are in line with budget 
constraints. Allen et al. (2017) assessed the effectiveness of MTEF in achieving fiscal discipline and 
resource allocation certainty of funding in six SSA countries. The study revealed that in most 
countries, though there were early successes, these were not sustained and budgetary outcomes 
did not improve. The lack of success was largely attributed to the fact that the reforms were not 
supply driven and partly due to technical issues such as poor data coupled with an inadequate 
forecasting methodology. This reinforces the need for country ownership of reforms. Moreover, 
MTEF data on most of these countries (Table A.3) in the Appendix raises more institutional questions 
than it answers. More worrying is the fact that for some of the countries, such as Namibia, Tanzania 
and Zambia, the legislature did not need to approve the budget ceilings. This begs questions such 
as: What is the role of the Parliament in the Medium-term Budget Strategy for such countries? Is the 
over-reliance on very volatile foreign aid by countries such as Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia as a 
share of their federal government expenditure sustainable? Finally, some countries (e.g. Tanzania) 
are not obliged to publish MTEF, thus creating room for a shroud of opacity (i.e. less transparency) 
in the budgeting process. Tanzania’s fiscal transparency score of 8% and ranking of 93 rd in the global 
fiscal transparency ranking in 2017 (see OBI, 2017) confirms this stance; because poor fiscal 
transparency cannot yield fiscal discipline or better fiscal outcome even if there were fiscal target 
rules. 
4.6.4 Summary of findings on fiscal rules in Africa 
African countries formed the bulk of the beneficiaries of the HIPC initiative as highlighted earlier. 
Efforts by the SSA countries to address their poor fiscal outcomes via the adoption of fiscal rules 
have not yielded the desired result as is evidenced from our background study. Why have such 
efforts not yielded the desired sustainable better fiscal outcome? A cursory examination of Tables 
4.1 and 4.2 from the IMF (2017) overall fiscal balance and debt statistics reveals that the majority of 
SSA countries have numerical fiscal rules. However, when examined vis-à-vis their fiscal outcome 
performance, the results show a lack of fiscal discipline in most years as these numerical fiscal rules 
have failed to produce the desired or targeted fiscal outcome. This begins to provide some insights 
for questions such as why fiscal rules have failed in Africa.  
4.7 Fiscal outcome and fiscal rules in SSA: the need for fiscal transparency 
According to World Bank (2003), poor management of the budget is mostly responsible for the 
challenges faced by government in developing countries in terms of translating public spending into 





analysed the nexus between governance and public spending outcomes. Rajkumar and Swaroop 
(2008) argued that merely allocating public resources to the appropriate goods and services may 
not yield desirable outcomes if budget institutions involved in budget formulation, execution and 
monitoring malfunction. Amongst the key measures of good economic governance is transparency 
(fiscal transparency for the purpose of our study). Transparency on fiscal risk is crucial to managing 
risks, reduce cost of borrowing and improving economic efficiency.  
Transparency helps to ensure that risks are recognised in good time and properly managed to 
promote earlier and smoother policy responses as well as strengthening accountability and risk 
management. Some cross-country studies e.g. Glennerster and Shin (2008) and Hameed (2005) 
revealed evidence that suggests that fiscal transparency is associated with better sovereign bond 
ratings and greater access to international capital markets. Kilpatrick (2001), Alt et al. (2006) and Alt 
and Lassen (2006) also found a positive link between fiscal transparency and better fiscal outcomes. 
Schiavo-Campo (2007) tied up the governance links and how they influence the entire budget 
process and rules from formulation stage through implementation to oversight stage on four pillars: 
accountability, transparency, predictability, and participation. Accountability entails the capacity to 
call public officials to task for their actions. Transparency entails low-cost access to relevant 
information. Predictability results primarily from laws and regulations that are clear, known in 
advance, and uniformly and effectively enforced. And participation is needed to generate consensus, 
supply reliable information, and provide a reality check for government action. However, it is pertinent 
to point out that a crucial basis for good public participation is a well functional local government. 
Possibly one of the biggest institutional weaknesses in most African countries is the level of and 
volume of skilled personnel at the local government level.   
4.8 The quality of budgetary institutions in Africa  
The notion of good governance is eclectic and multifaceted. Implicit in the various descriptions of 
elements of good governance is the role of transparency and accountability as part of a broader 
description of institutions. For over a decade, empirical papers (Islam, 2003; Hameed, 2005; Tekeng 
and Sharaf, 2015) have identified the significance of fiscal transparency as a feature of efficient fiscal 
policy as well as a good measure of economic and public governance. Fiscal transparency is a 
specific element of governance from the broad literature on governance measuring the quality of 
government. Institutional weaknesses have mostly been identified as one of the key causes of poor 
economic growth in developing countries (Prakash and Cabezon, 2008). Unsurprisingly, most 
African countries rank abysmally low in most institutional and governance ranking as presented in 
Table 4.3.  
Table 4.3: Country policy and institutional assessment (CPIA) of budgetary institutions 





Institutions Cluster and Corruption in the Public Sector Rating 
2005 3.00 2.81 
2006 2.99 2.78 
2007 2.99 2.78 
2008 2.96 2.75 
2009 2.98 2.73 
2010 2.98 2.72 
2011 3.00 2.78 
2012 2.95 2.71 
2013 2.94 2.71 
2014 2.96 2.74 
2015 2.96 2.71 
2016 2.97 2.68 
 Source: World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (2017)  
 
Studies by Rodrik et al. (2004) revealed that institutions are critical determinants of economic growth. 
Crucial to public finance, they concluded that the level of institutional development helps explain 
differences in income (revenue) between countries. Brautigam and Knack (2004) underscored lack 
of budgetary institutions such as a well-functioning civil service in SSA, and how this has adversely 
affected the effectiveness of external aid utilisation. A similar observation has been highlighted by 
Birdsall (2007). Against the backdrop of the foregoing arguments, the effectiveness of budgetary 
institutions has been recognised in the economic literature as critical contributors to improved fiscal 
and economic outcomes. 
Citing Table 4.3, the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) measure of 
fiscal policy-related institutional indicators reveals a very poor, yet portentous, sign for Africa that is 
worth examining further. It reveals that generally on a scale of 1 to 6 (where 1 is low and 6 is high), 
SSA countries have performed below average, below 50% (i.e. less than 3 points) in terms of the 
ratings on most variables. The dataset for 2005-2016 reveals a poor and yet further depreciating 
level of transparency, accountability and corruption in the public sector. This is very worrying 
considering that the public sector is where the budget gets implemented. This has the potential of 
influencing the authenticity of expenditure items in the budget, and legitimacy of the procurement 
projects and by extension could contribute to the persistent deficits run by most SSA countries.  
4.9 Fiscal transparency trend in SSA 
Globally, the last two decades have witnessed a surging interest in fiscal transparency in the fiscal 
decision-making process (Khagram et al., 2013). This interest may not be unconnected with the 
frequent fiscal crises that have engulfed most economies (either developed or developing) in recent 
times and the attendant macroeconomic instability witnessed by many of these economies. This is 
coupled with the emergence of open government initiatives that have commanded the discourse on 
governance in the last ten years. By and large, even though several variables have been found to 





recent studies as a key representative of the quality of fiscal institution and also has the capacity to 
influence fiscal outcome (Alesina and Perotti, 1996 Andreula, 2009; Golwitzer, 2010; Shah, 2007; 
Tekeng and Sharaf, 2015).The most recent study, Tekeng and Sharaf (2015), narrowed the 
discourse to fiscal transparency and its determinants in developing countries.  
At the core of the current debates around fiscal policy performance in Africa are questions such as 
to what extent does the quality of fiscal institutions and governance affect fiscal outcomes? Why do 
budgets fail to achieve their projected outcomes in SSA? How transparent and participatory is the 
budgeting system? What are the determinants of fiscal transparency in Africa? Are there links 
between the quality of budgetary institutions and fiscal transparency in Africa?  
Numerous definitions have been advanced in an attempt to explain the concept of fiscal 
transparency. According to IMF (2012: p.1), fiscal transparency is defined as “the clarity, reliability, 
frequency, timeliness and relevance of public fiscal reporting and openness to the public of the 
government’s fiscal policy making process”. The most cited definition is that offered by Kopits and 
Craig (1998: p.1) which considered fiscal transparency as “openness toward the public at large about 
government structure and functions, fiscal policy intentions, public sector accounts and projections. 
It involves ready access to reliable, comprehensive, timely, understandable and internationally 
comparable information on government activities so that the electorate and financial market can 
accurately access the governments’ financial position and the true cost and benefits of governments’ 
activities including their present and future social and economic implications.” 
Benito and Bastida (2009) summarised this as implying that fiscal transparency is the systematic 
and timely release of all relevant fiscal information. Amongst the earliest works to highlight the nexus 
between fiscal rules and fiscal outcome was OECD (2002). It defined transparency as a key 
component of good governance which has characteristics such as openness around policy intentions 
of the government, formulation and implementation. The study highlighted the critical role played by 
the budget given that it is the single most important policy document of government where all policy 
objectives are reconciled and implemented in concrete terms.  
The main elements of a transparent budgetary process include public participation, budget oversight 
and timely disclosure (transparency) of key budget reports. All these three key elements are 
important and reinforcing. For instance, the provision of sufficient budget information aids the public 
to engage in budget discussions in an informed manner. It strengthens public participation by civil 
society organisations and private citizens. It also aids the quality of the budget process including pre-
budget statements, which reveals in good time the macro-fiscal projections of the budget to the 
public, mid-year budget performance reports, quarterly budget review reports and, most importantly, 
a citizen’s guide to understanding the budget. These key highlights increase the quantity and quality 





important is the accuracy, accessibility and timeliness of the release of the quarterly, mid-year and 
annual reports as well as the reports from oversight visits. The timely release of such reports helps 
ensure accurate ex ante and ex post review of budget proposals and implemented budgets 
respectively. It further helps to achieve budget realism (realistic budget parameter assumptions) and 
hence to achieve better fiscal outcome. 
Currently, the only comprehensive measure of fiscal transparency is that published by the 
International Budget Partnership (IBP). It is the world’s only independent, comparable measure of 
budget transparency, participation and oversight and is carried out as IBPs Open Budget Survey. 
Each country is allocated a score ranging from zero (0) to a hundred (100). A country’s score 
depends on the level of detail and timeliness of budget information its governments are making 
publicly available. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) leading 
international best practice template on fiscal transparency and budget matters pursued by its 
member countries led to improved structural deficits and return to economic growth in the 2000s. 
The relevance of good governance in public finance is crucial given that public expenditure 
constitutes a significant portion of the size of the economy.  
In addition to the highlighted fact, King (2014) suggested that achieving good governance also entails 
managing risks and performance through robust public financial management, and implementing 
good practices in transparency, reporting and audit to deliver effective accountability. 
4.9.1 How transparent is the fiscal process in Africa? 
A high level of fiscal opacity (i.e. poor fiscal transparency) in the budgeting process in Africa is shown 
in Figure 4.5 and Table A.4. With an 89% level of fiscal transparency, only South Africa qualified to 
be described as having a transparent budget process. Another very important inference from the 
SSA data is that on average, Anglophone countries seem to have performed better than most 
francophone and Lusophone countries as typified by the presence of only one francophone country, 
Senegal, among the top five best performing countries in SSA. The abysmal performance of conflict 
states such as Sudan and South Sudan is not surprising as some of these countries rank high in the 
list of fragile states. This raises questions such as what are the factors influencing fiscal transparency 
in Africa? Do administrative heritages such as the legal system impact on the level of fiscal 
transparency? Such questions will be investigated in the empirical chapters of the study.  
There were mixed results from two of the countries with the highest aid as a percentage of national 
expenditure (Uganda and Tanzania). Uganda ranked second to South Africa on fiscal transparency 
in SSA with a score of 60%, whilst Tanzania recorded an abysmal 10% on the fiscal transparency 





foreign assistance in improving fiscal transparency, especially when donor agencies attached fiscal 
transparency as a condition for receipt of donor assistance.  
The mixed result of performance by this group of countries warrants a more empirical investigation 
with a view to establishing causality or not between fiscal transparency and foreign aid. Some of 
these African countries are heavily factionalised ethno-linguistically and may have experienced civil 
and ethnic conflicts of late; thus, necessitating questions such as to what extent has ethno-linguistic 
fractionalisation affected fiscal transparency in SSA. This research question demand empirical 
investigation. 
Figure 4.5: Fiscal transparency in Africa (%) in 2017 
 
Source: Computed by author based on data from International Budget 
Partnership – Open Budget Index 2017 
4.9.2 Improved fiscal transparency in SSA: implications for better fiscal outcome  
Several influential studies e.g., Milesi-Feretti (2004), World Bank (1998) and Kilpatrick (2001) have 
highlighted the importance of fiscal transparency as a necessary accompanying tool to fiscal rules, 
if better fiscal outcome is the policy objective. Alesina and Perotti (1996) noted that reduction in 
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accounting which in the long run would become a hindrance against achieving expenditure control 
and fiscal consolidation. Lack of transparency will aid in the creation of confusion and opaqueness 
on the exact level of public finances especially public debt and future obligations. This submission is 
predicated on the theoretical notion that elected official will generally will prefer such ambiguity.  
The first theory in this regard is the fiscal illusion theory by Buchanan and Wagner (1977). According 
to this theory, uninformed and naïve voters underestimate the cost implications of current and future 
public programmes, especially when budgets are not transparent. Second, as argued by Rogoff 
(1990), even with rational voters, strategic ambiguity could create an advantage for policymakers in 
pursuing their objectives. Moreover, when fiscal rules alone are used and in a rigid form it creates 
the temptation for countries to embark on the practice of creative accounting – a situation whereby 
accountants, in this case government accountants and policy makers, can exploit loopholes in the 
rules to manipulate the figures reported in the accounts (Amat et al.,1999). Kilpatrick (2001) went 
further to highlight the two-fold benefit of transparency in this information age: its ability to, promote 
a better understanding of policy as well as enhancing fiscal discipline, particularly, when it is in 
conjunction with adequately defined fiscal rules and mature and respected institutions. This is an 
approach that has thus far not been fully applied by SSA countries as available data reveals that 
SSA countries have not achieved a covetous level of fiscal transparency whilst concurrently not 
achieving their desired fiscal outcome despite the adoption of fiscal rules. 
A few empirical studies have buttressed the nexus between fiscal transparency and fiscal discipline 
further. Von Hagen (1992) revealed that between the 1980s and early 1990s, budget procedures 
that were more transparent were associated with more fiscal discipline. Interestingly, building upon 
the earlier study by von Hagen (1992), Hagen and Harden (1995) also arrived at a similar conclusion 
that countries with more transparent budget procedures achieve more fiscal discipline. An empirical 
study of 20 Latin American countries by Alesina and Perotti (1997) revealed that greater 
transparency coupled with considerable powers to the ministries of finance (MoF) over departmental 
spending are associated with lower budget deficits. The study also revealed that countries with the 
lowest transparency in the budget process ran public deficits at an average of 1.8% of GDP. 
However, countries with the highest level of transparency and aggregate control mechanisms ran 
surpluses averaging 1.7% of GDP. 
The World Bank’s (1998) new paradigm of getting the basics right in public expenditure management 
also advocates for improvement in fiscal transparency. It argued that when transparency is 
enhanced, the higher the transparency the lesser the need for a rigid rule. The proposition here is 
that if fiscal authorities behave in a transparent, credible manner, a fiscal rule can allow for some 
cyclical variation in spending and some flexibility in the budget planning process (World Bank, 1998; 
Kilpatrick, 2001). It highlighted further that introducing mechanisms to promote transparency and 





the abuse of flexibility and engender the demand for information. In sum, lack of transparency in the 
budget process will in the long run become a hindrance to achieving expenditure control and fiscal 
consolidation. 
4.10 Summary, findings and recommendation 
As clearly established from the foregoing discourse, SSA economies have experienced poor fiscal 
outcomes for over a decade. The IMF projections into 2022 also hold ominous worsening fiscal 
outcomes for African countries. Attempts at addressing such poor fiscal outcomes have seen most 
SSA economies adopt one form of national fiscal rules or another. Some SSA countries adopted 
national fiscal rules while others adopted supranational or regional convergence fiscal rules. 
Nonetheless, as evidenced by IMF data on fiscal policy monitor and World Bank WDI data, despite 
the adoption of such fiscal rules, African countries have continued to post poor fiscal outcomes over 
the years. Failure to address this trend may see African countries return to the pre-HIPC years that 
were characterised by a huge accumulation of unsustainable debt thresholds.  
More importantly, our findings reveal that contrary to robust arguments earlier advanced by various 
economic scholars, SSA countries’ fiscal rules were not accompanied by the requisite high levels of 
fiscal transparency. Most African countries recorded abysmal levels of fiscal transparency. However, 
from the foregoing argument and empirical studies, it is evident that improvements (higher levels) of 
fiscal transparency are also needed to accompany fiscal rules in order for such rules to achieve the 
desired fiscal outcome. This is a situation that is lacking in Africa. On average, the level of fiscal 
transparency varies across administrative heritage lines with anglophone countries doing somewhat 
better than the francophone and lusophone countries. In sum, our study identified fiscal outcome 
challenges, a very weak regulatory framework and fiscal rules that were not accompanied by 
enhanced levels of fiscal transparency and could not yield better fiscal outcomes in most SSA 
countries. These speak to the reason why most SSA countries can hardly meet their adopted fiscal 
targets or the IMF recommended fiscal targets such as deficits as a percentage of GDP and debt 
rules.  
By and large, whereas, fiscal rules may serve as a necessary condition, they are not a sufficient 
condition when applied without enhanced fiscal transparency if a better fiscal outcome is the 
anticipated policy objective of a government. Good fiscal outcome can be a balanced budget or 
deficit which is 3% of GDP or as per the agreed national or supranational benchmark deficit as 
percentage of GDP.  More worrying and portentous is IBP’s (2017) report on OBI, which highlighted 
an 11% drop in SSA’s average level of fiscal transparency between 2015 and 2017. This reinforces 
the need for an empirical investigation that would answer important questions such as what are the 
determinants of fiscal transparency in Africa? Subsequent chapters will entail empirical examination 
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Table A.1: SSA general government revenue 2008-2022 (percentage of GDP) 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 
Angola 50.9 34.6 43.5 48.8 45.9 40.2 35.3 27.3 18.7 17.1 16.6 17.2 17.1 17.1 17.1 
Benin 19.8 20.2 18.9 18.8 19.2 18.5 17.2 17.3 15.3 17.9 17.9 18.5 18.9 18.9 19.3 
Burkina Faso 16.8 19.5 19.8 20.7 22.4 24.5 21.7 19.4 19.6 22.6 22.7 23.6 24.2 24.8 25.2 
Cameroon 21.2 17.4 16.6 17.9 17.9 18 18.1 17.9 16.3 16.6 17.2 17.6 17.7 17.7 17.8 
Chad 22.4 14.9 20.2 24.8 24.4 20.7 17.8 14 12.6 16.5 15.8 15.7 15.8 15.5 15.9 
Congo DR 11.5 13.7 15.6 13.7 16.5 14.6 18.6 16.8 12 10.6 11.6 11.7 12.2 12.7 13.9 
Congo Republic 54.8 30.3 36.7 41.4 42.7 45.1 40.7 30.4 32.3 32.7 32.9 33.3 33 32.6 32.6 
Côte d’Ivoire 19.9 18.5 18.1 14.2 19.2 19.7 18.9 20.2 19.8 19.8 20.2 20.6 20.9 21 21 
Ethiopia 15.9 16.2 17.2 16.6 15.5 15.8 14.6 15.4 16 15.1 15.1 15.3 15.6 15.9 16.3 
Ghana 15.9 16.4 16.7 19.1 18.5 16.7 18.4 19.6 17.3 18.9 18.6 19 19.1 18.9 18.7 
Guinea 10.5 11.4 10.8 15.1 17.5 14.8 17 14.9 16.2 17.6 18.1 18.8 19.3 19.4 19.3 
Kenya 19.4 18.8 19.8 19.5 19.1 19.7 19.8 19.2 18.8 19 19.5 19.6 19.8 20 19.9 
Madagascar 15.9 11.5 13.2 11.7 10.8 10.9 12.4 11.8 14.7 15.1 15.3 15.6 15 15.4 15.7 
Mali 17 19.1 17.7 17.1 14.6 17.4 17.1 19.1 18.3 20.6 20 20.4 20.4 20.6 20.8 
Mozambique 21.8 24 26.1 27.3 27 31.4 31.8 28.1 26.1 24.7 26.1 26.2 26.2 25.9 25.9 
Niger 24.1 18.6 18.2 17.9 21.4 24.6 23 23.5 20.6 21.2 21.3 22.1 23.4 24 24.6 
Nigeria 20.1 10.1 12.4 17.7 14.3 11 10.5 7.7 5.3 5.2 5.7 5.9 6.4 6.6 6.8 
Rwanda 24.8 23.8 24.6 25.3 23.2 25.5 24.2 24.7 23.7 22.01 21.9 21.7 21.7 21.7 21.7 
Senegal 21.8 22 22.1 22.7 23.3 22.6 24.8 25.1 26.8 25.1 25.7 26 26 26.3 24.1 
South Africa 28 26.4 26.5 26.9 27 27.3 27.6 28.3 28.9 29.1 24.4 29.6 29.7 29.7 29.7 
Sudan 24 16.4 19.7 18.6 9.9 11 12 11 10 9.8 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.1 7.6 
Tanzania 16.6 15.7 15.5 15.6 15.7 15.5 14.9 14.5 15.5 16.1 16.3 16.7 16.9 17.1 17.7 
Uganda 14.2 13.2 13.2 14.5 13.6 12.7 13.5 14.8 14.9 16.3 16.5 17.2 17 18.4 19 
Zambia 18.8 15.7 15.6 17.7 18.7 17.6 18.9 18.8 18.2 17.3 18.4 18.4 18.9 19.4 19.6 
Zimbabwe 2.2 11.7 21.8 24.2 24.9 24.6 23.8 24.3 21.7 21.7 21.1 20.9 20.7 20.6 20.6 
SSA 19.4 13.9 15.3 18.3 16.7 14.9 14.6 13 12.2 12.6 12.8 12.8 13.1 13.5 13.7 







Table A.2: SSA fiscal rules and their enforceability in Africa 
S/N Country 
Type of Rule / 


















1 Cape Verde Budget Balance Rule (1998) Statutory Central 
Government 
No No No No 




No No No No 
2 Benin Budget Balance Rule (2000, 
2015); Debt Rule (2000,2015); 
Revenue Rule (2000, 2005) 
N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes  
(for all three) 
N/A 
3 Botswana Expenditure rule (since 2003); 
BB Rule; Debt Rule 2015 
Statutory Central 
Government 
No No No No 
4 Burkina 
Faso 
Budget Balance Rule (2000); 
Debt Rule (2015);  
Revenue Rule (2015) 
N/A Central 
Government 
Yes N/A Yes  
(for all three) 
N/A 
5 Cameroon Balance Budget Rule (2002, 
2008);  
Debt Rule (2002) (SR) 
N/A Central 
Government 
N/A N/A Yes; 






Balance Budget Rule (2002, 
2008);  
Debt Rule (2002) (SR) 
N/A Central 
Government 
N/A N/A Yes; 
No for Debt 
Rule 
N/A 
7 Chad Balance Budget Rule (2002, 
2008);  
Debt Rule (2002) (SR) 
N/A Central 
Government 
N/A N/A Yes; 
No for Debt 
Rule 
N/A 
8 Congo Balance Budget Rule (2002, 
2008);  
Debt Rule (2002) (SR) 
N/A Central 
Government 
N/A N/A Yes; 





Budget Balance Rule (2000, 
2015);  
Debt Rule (2000,2015); 
Revenue Rule (2000, 2005) 
N/A Central 
Government 
N/A N/A Yes 




Balance Budget Rule (2002, 
2008);  
Debt Rule (2002) (SR) 
N/A Central 
Government 
N/A N/A Yes;  
No for Debt 
Rule 
N/A 
11 Gabon Balance Budget Rule (2002, 
2008);  
Debt Rule (2002) (SR) 
N/A Central 
Government 
N/A N/A Yes; 








Type of Rule / 




















Budget Balance Rule (2000, 
2015);  
Debt Rule 2000,2015); 
Revenue Rule (2000, 2005) 
N/A Central 
Government 
N/A N/A Yes  
(for all three) 
N/A 
13 Kenya Budget Balance (2013) SR; 





No No Yes No 
14 Liberia Debt Rule (Since 2009) Statutory General 
Government 
No No No No 
15 Mali Budget Balance Rule (2000, 
2015); Debt Rule (2000,2015); 
Revenue Rule (2000, 2005) 
N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes  
(for all three) 
N/A 
16 Mauritius Debt Rule (2008) Statutory General 
Government 
Yes No No Yes 
17 Namibia Expenditure Rule (2010); 





No No No No 
18 Niger Budget Balance Rule (2000, 
2015);  
Debt Rule (2000,2015); 
Revenue Rule (2000, 2005) 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
19 Nigeria Budget Balance Rule (2007) Statutory Central 
Government 
No No No No 
20 Senegal Budget Balance Rule (2000, 
2015);  
Debt Rule (2000,2015); 
Revenue Rule (2000, 2005) 
N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes  
(for all three) 
N/A 
21 Togo Budget Balance Rule (2000, 
2015);  
Debt Rule (2000,2015); 
Revenue Rule (2000, 2005) 
N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes  
(for all three) 
N/A 
22 Burundi Budget Balance (2013) SR;  





No No Yes No 
23 Rwanda Budget Balance (2013) SR;  





No No Yes No 
24 South 
Sudan 
Budget Balance (2013) SR;  





No No Yes No 
25 Uganda Budget Balance (2013) SR;  

















Table A.3: Characteristics and scope of the medium-term budget framework in selected African countries 
 Nigeria Kenya Namibia S/Africa Tanzania Uganda Zambia Advanced 
Economics* 
Date of Establishment of MTBF 2008 2000 2000 1998 2000 1998 2004 1980-2000s 
Lead Ministry** Pre 2015: 
MoF; 





MoF NT MoF & 
Planning 
Commission 
MoFP MoFP Usually MoF 
Characteristics and Coverage: 
        
Coverage*** CG BCG BCG GG BCG BCG BCG CG or GG 
Excluded Transaction-Social 
Security Debt Interest 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Frame 3 Years 3 Years 3 Years 3 Years 3 Years 3 Years 3 Years 3 Years 
Fixed or Flexible Framework Rolling Rolling Rolling Rolling Rolling Rolling Rolling Rolling or 
Flexible 
Ceilings approved by Legislature Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No In some 
cases 
External aid included No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Not relevant 
Publication of MTEF Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Share of external aid **** <1% 8% <1% <1% 39% 39% 10% N/A 
Source: Author’s compilation and IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) 
 Notes of the table:  
** MoF= Ministry of Finance; MoB&NP= Ministry of Budget and National Planning; MoP = Ministry of Planning; MoFP= Ministry of Finance and Planning 
  *** BCG= Budgetary Central Government; CG=Central-Government; GG= General Government 






Table A.4: Fiscal transparency in Africa (%), 2006-2017 
Countries   2006 2008 2010 2012 2015 2017 
Average 
(2006-2017) 
Angola 5 4 26 28 26 25 19 
Botswana 65 62 51 50 47 8 47 
Burkina Faso 11 14 5 23 43 24 20 
Cameroon 29 5 2 10 44 7 16 
Chad 5 8 0 3 4 2 4 
DRC  1 6 18 39 29 19 
Equatorial Guinea  0 0 0 4 0 1 
Ghana 42 50 54 50 51 50 50 
Kenya 48 58 49 49 48 46 50 
Liberia  3 40 43 38 36 32 
Malawi 42 28 47 52 65 26 43 
Mali   35 43 46 39 41 
Mozambique   28 47 38 41 39 
Namibia 50 46 53 55 46 50 50 
Niger  26 3 4 17 0 10 
Nigeria 20 19 18 16 24 17 19 
Rwanda  1 11 8 36 22 16 
Senegal  3 3 10 43 51 22 
Sao Tome and Principe  1 0 29 29 31 18 
South Africa 86 87 92 90 86 89 88 
Sudan  0 8 8 10 2 6 
Tanzania 48 36 45 47 46 10 39 
Uganda 32 51 55 65 62 60 54 
Zambia 37 48 36 4 39 8 29 






CHAPTER 5  
INSTITUTIONS AND FISCAL TRANSPARENCY IN AFRICA14 
5.1 Introduction 
Poor fiscal outcomes characterised by persistent budget deficits, skyrocketing and unsustainable 
debt threshold with its attendant soaring debt service, is a frequent phenomenon in SSA (Siebrits 
and Calitz, 2006; Gollwitzer, 2010). The early 2000s saw the emergence of strong arguments for 
fiscal transparency as a necessary tool needed to accompany fiscal rules if fiscal rules are to yield 
the desired fiscal outcome. Kilpatrick (2001) is one of the strongest proponents for this argument. 
Kilpatrick (2001) opined that when combined with fiscal rules and well-developed institutions, 
transparency could aid in enhancing the understanding of policy as well as the achievement of 
greater fiscal discipline. Later studies such as Milesi-Ferretti (2004) corroborate this argument. 
Fiscal transparency is an important component of political accountability as it enables voters to 
comprehend government’s fiscal plans. Von Hagen (2007) argued that an essential condition of the 
retrospective voting paradigm15 is the ability to compare the actual performance of the government 
against its past plans and intentions. He went further to argue that concentrating on numerical targets 
for the main budgetary parameters creates natural yardsticks by which voters can measure the 
actual performance of a government. However, understanding the political bargaining process 
surrounding the budget and checking whether individual policy makers kept the commitments they 
entered into during this process is an indispensable condition for holding policy makers accountable 
in elections (Von Hagen, 2007). Hence, the institutions that shape the budget process environment 
should be designed in a way that enhances fiscal discipline via the strengthening of the accountability 
of political agents to their political principals (the voters). 
Given the importance of fiscal transparency for improved fiscal outcomes, the abysmal level of fiscal 
transparency amongst SSA countries thus raises questions such as what then are the institutional 
determinants of fiscal transparency in SSA? One of the earliest studies to x-ray the nexus between 
fiscal transparency and fiscal rules at a supranational level is Milesi-Ferretti (2004). With emphasis, 
on how the Maastricht Treaty influences fiscal outcome in EU member states, the study concluded 
that fiscal transparency does influence fiscal performance, given that in a transparent fiscal 
                                               
14 This paper has been presented at the 2019 Africa Meeting of the Econometric Society’s Conference organised by the 
Econometric Society and the Bank Al Maghreb and held in Rabat, Morocco from 10th-13th July 2019. 
15 The retrospective voting paradigm refers to the process of voting only upon taking into consideration factors such as the 
performance of a political party, an officeholder or/and an administration. It is more concerned with previous policy 





atmosphere, fiscal transparency will compel elected officials to carry out measures that are vital to 
balancing the budget. 
This chapter focuses on examining the underlying institutional determinants of fiscal transparency in 
SSA. It is a key component of the institutional, political and economic categories of factors that extant 
literature on the determinants of fiscal transparency globally considers. In other words, our study 
presents an empirical investigation with a view to establishing the nexus between institutional factors 
and fiscal transparency in SSA. The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 presents 
a background on fiscal transparency, as well as some stylised facts on the quality of institutions and 
fiscal transparency in Africa. Section 5.3 reviews relevant literature and theoretical underpinning. 
Section 5.4 presents the methodology comprising model specifications and estimation technique. 
Section 5.5 presents the empirical results and discussions. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes with some 
policy recommendations.  
5.2 Background and stylised facts on institution and governance in SSA 
5.2.1 Background of the study 
The last two decades have witnessed a surging global interest amongst scholars and policy makers 
on fiscal transparency, accountability, good governance and participation in the fiscal decision-
making process (Khagram et al., 2013). This surging interest in fiscal transparency is predicated on 
the failure of fiscal rules to address the persistent fiscal deficits and debts in most developing 
countries including SSA.  
Although various definitions of fiscal transparency have been advanced by scholars and policy 
makers, one of the most comprehensive definitions is that offered by Kopits and Craig (1998, p. 1), 
which defined fiscal transparency as “openness toward the public at large about government 
structure and functions, fiscal policy intentions, public sector accounts, and projections. It involves 
ready access to reliable, comprehensive, timely, understandable, and internationally comparable 
information on government activities so that the electorate and financial markets can accurately 
assess the government’s financial position and the true costs and benefits of government activities, 
including their present and future economic and social implications.” Benito and Bastida (2009) 
summed it up as the systematic and timely release of all relevant fiscal information.  
Fiscal transparency has also been defined as “the clarity, reliability, frequency, timeliness, and 
relevance of public fiscal reporting and the openness to the public of the government’s fiscal policy-
making process ― a critical element of effective fiscal management” (IMF, 2012, p. 4). Institutions 
have been defined as humanly devised constraints (formal and informal) that structure political, 
economic and social interaction (North, 1990). They consist of sanctions, taboos, customs, norms, 





(formal and informal) which affect economic incentives and behaviour. Institutions and governance 
are inextricably linked. Though quite eclectic and ubiquitous, the term governance has been referred 
to as all of the processes of governing, whether undertaken by a government, market or network, 
whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal body or territory, and whether through the laws, norms, 
power or language of an organised society (Bevir, 2013). 
Despite the global attention that fiscal transparency has drawn in the last decade and a half, not very 
many empirical studies have been carried out on its (fiscal transparency’s) determinants. Of the few 
empirical studies, no known study thus far has focused exclusively on SSA. This is worrying 
considering that African countries form the bulk of the countries that have experienced poor fiscal 
performance in the last three decades. This is reinforced by other factors such as frequent reports 
of budget-related corruption scandals, some of which can be attributed to the opacity surrounding 
the budget process in Africa. Most of the studies on fiscal transparency have focused on benefits of 
fiscal transparency rather than its drivers. Prior studies have found that fiscal transparency is 
associated with improved fiscal discipline (Alesina and Perotti, 1996), and better credit ratings 
(Hameed 2005). Djankov et al. (2004) took the argument further by emphasising that a more 
transparent government permits the economy to incur lower social costs as the government 
undertakes the task of controlling economic disorder. The IMF (2007a) maintained that budget 
transparency helps in shedding light on potential risks to the fiscal outlook. It argued that such 
insights could yield timely and smoother fiscal policy responses to fluctuating economic conditions, 
thus mitigating the incidence as well as the severity of crises. 
Employing a set of 27 former socialist countries, Jarmuzek et al. (2006) examined the role of fiscal 
transparency in creating better fiscal discipline. The study found a negative, albeit weak, relationship 
between fiscal transparency and debt accumulation. Alt and Lassen (2006) revealed that fiscal 
transparency reduces public debt and deficits, even after controlling for political variables such as 
legal heritage and political competition. Fiscal transparency also helps in ensuring that fiscal risks 
are recognised and addressed promptly. However, one of the lessons from the 2008-2012 global 
financial crises is need for timely and accurate understanding of national governments’ fiscal position 
(debts and deficit levels) as well as the prevention of all forms of creative accounting. 
5.2.2 Some stylised facts on institutions and governance in SSA 
The concepts of good governance and institutions are inextricably linked. The notion of good 
governance has assumed an eclectic dimension. It entails a process whereby public institutions 
conduct public affairs, manage public resources, and guarantee the realisation of human rights. It 
has been defined in quite a number of ways. The World Bank (2007. p. 1) defined governance as 





public policy and provide public goods and services”. According to Kaufmann et al. (2010), 
governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.  
Table 5.1: Institutional measures of governance 
S/N Clusters Sub-category 
1 Selection, accountability & replacement of  
authorities  
-Voice and accountability  
-Political stability & lack of violence  
2 Efficiency of institutions, regulations, 
resource management  
-Regulatory framework  
-Government effectiveness  
3 Respect for institutions, laws & interactions 
among players in civil society, business & 
politics 
-Control of corruption  
-Rule of law  
          Source: World Governance Indicators (2016) 
 
A more recent definition in the African Finance Governance Outlook published by the African 
Development Bank (AfDB) in (2018) defined governance as a process referring to the manner in 
which power is exercised in the management of the affairs of a nation, and its relations with other 
nations. The key elements of good governance were identified as ensuring participation, 
accountability and transparency, combating corruption and promoting an enabling legal and judicial 
framework. In addition to the management of the affairs of a nation and promotion of an enabling 
legal framework, more importantly, this definition highlights the need for transparency and 
accountability. Despite the numerous definitions of what good governance should entail, Kaufman 
et al. (2007) and Kaufman and Kraay (2007)) highlighted that on the whole, many of these definitions 
aptly underscore the significance of a capable state that is accountable to its citizens and functions 
under the rule of law. The World Bank’s compendium of institutional governance indicators, WGI 
(2016) encapsulates these qualities of a capable state that is accountable to its citizens under the 
rule of law, essentially qualifying them to be collectively described as good governance. 
Abysmal governance provides greater motivation and increases opportunities for ethical misconduct. 
Governance is the processes and institutions over which decisions in a country are reached and 
authority is exercised. It rests on the twin values of inclusiveness and accountability (IMF, 1997). In 
measuring institutional governance, the World Bank’s Governance Indicators have aptly 
decomposed governance into three main clusters and six sub-indices as summarised in Table 5.1. 
These measures have formed the key measure of institutional quality for over two decades. 
Institutions form the incentive structure of a society, and consequently, the political and economic 
institutions are the underlying determinants of economic performance (North, 1990). Acemoglu et al. 
(2003) argued that institutions matter for growth outcome. 
The trend of the different institutional governance indicators in Africa for the period 1996-2017 is 





governance range from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) institutional governance performances. Generally, 
in all the six institutional governance indicators, SSA countries have revealed very weak institutional 
performance for the period considered, as they are all negative. It can be inferred that generally, 
barring 2004-2006, the control of corruption in Africa has only worsened. As aptly highlighted by the 
IMF (1997), corruption undermines the public’s trust in its government and thus could be detrimental 
to economic activity and could affect budget outcome. It also threatens market integrity, distorts 
competition, and endangers economic development. From the late 1990s the IMF has been 
increasingly interested in governance issues, such as promoting public sector transparency and 
accountability. Heald (2013) argues that information flows can be expected to be compromised by 
attempts to cover the trail of corruption. Hence, part of the efforts to improve information flow 
(transparency) is to address corruption challenges. 
Abysmal governance provides greater motivation and increases opportunities for ethical misconduct 
or corruption (i.e. the abuse of public office for private gain). However, within the framework of public 
accountability and governance, we shall limit the notion of governance to the efficient and effective 
use of public resources in a transparent and corrupt-free framework that is protected by stability of 
the political system and the rule of law. These characteristics are encapsulated by the six WGI (see 
Table 5.1). Referring to Figure 5.1, it could be argued that although specific institutional governance 
indicators in SSA have evolved differently over time, the indicators for corruption, government 
effectiveness, and political stability have deteriorated since 1996 while measures of regulatory 
quality, rule of law, and voice and accountability improved. A Study by Rodrik et al. (2004) revealed 
that institutions are critical determinants of economic growth. Their study also concluded that the 
level of institutional development helps to explain differences in income (revenue) between countries. 
Brautigam and Knack (2004) point to the lack of institutions of governance such as a well-functioning 
civil service in SSA, and how this has adversely affected the effectiveness of external aid utilisation. 
A similar observation has been highlighted by Birdsall (2007), who pointed out that weak institutions 
avert the most effective use of external aid, which is a key source of financing the budget in some 
SSA countries. Figure 5.1 further shows that generally, baring slight ebbs in 2005 and in 2015, 
African countries experienced a modest improvement in political stability. This is understandable as 
most conflicts in SSA are being resolved. There has been an upward trend in voice and 
accountability, suggesting there is increasing space for civil societies and civil liberties such as media 
freedom, freedom of association, freedom of expression and the ability of citizens to elect their 
government. However, whether or not these voice and accountability agencies are asking the right 
questions that can yield a better level of transparency in the fiscal policy space can only be 
established via an empirical analysis of the association between fiscal transparency and voice and 





governments in Africa are elected, albeit there still exist pockets of political instability and violence, 
most of them post-election related.  





Source: World Governance Indicators (2017) 
 
Government effectiveness, a reflection of government’s ability to offer good quality public services, 
and formulate and implement policies that are indicators of government effectiveness, has been on 
a steady and gradual decline for our research period 1996-2017. The rule of law in Africa generally 
deteriorated between 2003 and 2013, although with some swings. It improved slightly between 2014 
and 2015 and deteriorated again in 2016. Regulatory quality in SSA has not defined a clear path of 
evolution during the period 1996–2017. It improved marginally between 1998 and 2003 and then it 
declined up till 2011, only to achieve some recovery between 2012 and 2014. By the end of 2014, 





governance indicators in Africa have not witnessed significant improvement over the period under 
consideration. 
The emerging key principles underpinning modern budgeting are institution-centred, and include 
comprehensiveness and discipline, honesty, information, contestability, legitimacy, flexibility, 
predictability and, most importantly, transparency and accountability (World Bank, 1998). 
Essentially, institutional weaknesses have mostly been identified as one of the main causes of poor 
growth in developing countries (Prakash and Cabezon, 2008). Predictably, most African countries 
rank abysmally low in most institutional governance rankings.  
5.3 Conceptual framework, theoretical underpinning and literature review 
5.3.1 Conceptual framework: institutional budget arrangements and fiscal transparency 
Within the ambits of the budget system of democratic countries, the budget process mimics a 
Principal-Agency relationship. The reporting requirements (whom to report to) and the authority 
delegation of the budget process with the citizens as the ultimate delegator are represented in Figure 
5.3. A key objective of enhanced fiscal transparency is to improve on public accountability. 
Consequently, an enhanced public accountability process is expected amongst other things to 
ensure efficient public expenditure management which could in turn reduce the extent of deficits and 
debts. Some of the early studies that lay the foundation for an institution-oriented approach to budget 
reforms for developing countries are World Bank (1998) and Schick (1997 and 1998). The World 
Bank (1998) built on Schick’s (1997) proposition on ‘getting the basics right’ in terms of budget 
reforms for developing countries. The World Bank (1998) suggested that when considering 
budgetary reforms, countries should build institutional mechanisms that support and demand a 
performance orientation for all dimensions, arguing that such countries should also create 
mechanisms to promote transparency and accountability. Nonetheless, both transparency and 
accountability to a large extent depend on the quality and timeliness of the reporting on fiscal 
information. This in turn emanates from the quality of institutions guiding the entire budget system 
and the whole gamut of relevant players ranging from the president, ministers, the legislature, the 
community, central agencies, line agencies, and individual managers or front-line providers (World 
Bank, 1998). Such discipline connotes North’s (1990) definition of institutions.  
Two significant deductions can be drawn from the forgoing positions put forward by Shick (1997) 
and World Bank (1998). First, organisations are not institutions: without effective institutional drivers 
such as effective laws and regulations, government effectiveness, rule of law etc. guiding the budget 
process, the budget system will not be effective and fiscal policy performance could be 
compromised. The second highlights the importance of transparency and accountability in an 





Figure 5.3: Conceptual framework: institutional budget arrangements as a principal agency 
relationship 
 
                                 Source: Adapted from World Bank (1998) Public Expenditure Manual 
5.3.2 Theoretical underpinning – Principal Agency theory 
The two most renowned theoretical constructs that best explain the political and institutional 
determinants of fiscal transparency are the principal-agency and common pool theories. As 
represented in Figure 5.4, a key suspicion on why policy makers or politicians (agents) prefer an 
opaque fiscal process is fear of the backlash from their principals (the electorate) who hire them via 
elections and fire them when poor fiscal outcomes are recorded or at the first sign of unexplained 
secrecy on how government finances are being managed. 
As reported by De Simone et al. (2017), the majority of the existing studies on fiscal transparency 
are largely based on the principal-agency theory which models the relationship between citizens 
(principals) and politicians (agents). According to this model, such a relationship is characterised by 
imperfect and asymmetric information that permits fiscal policy misconduct by self-interested agents. 
Against the backdrop of the principal-agency framework, the mandatory release of fiscal information 
that is introduced by fiscal transparency measures will reduce information asymmetry, consequently 
facilitating the monitoring by principals (the electorate). This will facilitate the emergence of a 
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Following the exposition, fiscal transparency becomes an important requirement for rewarding 
(voting in) or sanctioning (voting out) agents based on whether or not they have been transparent. 
As clearly highlighted by Lindstedt and Laurin (2010), fiscal transparency becomes the indispensable 
driver of the process of demanding accountability from fiscal policy decisions by politicians and 
hence the effectiveness of citizens’ delegating power. Heald (2013) also buttressed this point by 
stressing that transparency is essentially about governance – information flows can be expected to 
be compromised by attempts to cover the trail of corruption. Thus, fiscal transparency and 
accountability are anchored on the dynamics and varying interest between the policy makers 
(politicians), the quality of the governing institutions and the stakeholders in the budgeting process 
The conduct of fiscal policy mimics a principal-agent relationship, where the electorates (principal 
delegates the responsibility of managing the budget process to the politicians (agents). An earlier 
work that identified this relationship is Von Hagen (2007).  However, it identified two key problems 
with this delegation arrangement. First, is the tendency for elected officials (the agents) to receive 
rents as public office holders but spend public funds on projects other than those considered 
necessary by the electorates. Secondly, is the common pool problem in which the elected governing 
authorities spends on public policies from the general tax fund (common pool), albeit to the benefit 
of individual groups (a particular constituency) rather than policies that could be beneficial to the 
society as a whole. This is mostly at the behest of the representative for such a constituency. Thus, 
the net benefits for the targeted groups usually exceed the net benefits for society as a whole. Such 
situations yield excessive levels of public spending and huge deficits and debts (von Hagen and 
Harden, 1995; Velasco, 2000; Milesi-Ferretti, 2004). 
Hires 



























As earlier mentioned, but not expatiated, this delegation of authority to elected politicians leaves 
room for the prospect of politicians extracting rents from being in office and spending public moneys 
on projects other than those that the electorate desire. This is owing to the substantial residual 
powers which politicians have. Such residual powers emanate from the quantity and quality of 
information on the true state of government finances, how they are being managed and the 
significant discretionary expenditure powers that are privy only to elected officials (agents) and not 
to the electorate. Evidently, the greater these residual powers, the more the divergence between 
voter preferences and actual policies will be. On the other hand, the electorate will want to curtail 
these privileges by subjecting politicians to stringent and detailed rules that meticulously describe 
what they can and cannot do and under what definite circumstances. Thus, as aptly described by 
Persson et al. (1997) and Seabright (1996), the principal-agent relationship in the context of the 
budget process resembles an incomplete contract. Khagram et al. (2013) itemised four key causal 
triggers whose complex interaction in combination advances or impede fiscal transparency: political 
transitions, fiscal and economic crises, political and corruption scandals, and external influences.  
Specifically, the last two to three decades witnessed a massive wave of transition into a multiparty 
democratisation process, a period which Huntington (1991) referred as the third wave of 
democratisation. Prior to this period, most African countries were previously characterised as closed, 
authoritarian regimes. Characteristically, such closed states were marked by low transparency 
thresholds given the paucity of institutions for checks and balances in such systems. Khagram et al. 
(2013) described multiparty democratic administrations as characterised by separation of power, 
policy contestations, party competition, organised civil society organisations, engaged citizenry and 
an active media. These are key ingredients for a transparent society. They argued that these triggers 
create opportunities and shape incentives for key players — political leaders, civil servants, and civil 
society actors — to take action in designing, implementing, and sustaining reforms designed to 
promote fiscal openness. Fiscal and economic crises can also trigger calls for higher levels of fiscal 
transparency. Studies such as Caprio (1998) support this position. Caprio’s (1998) study on the 
causes of the Asian financial crises revealed that the hardest hit Asian countries during the financial 
crises were the least transparent Asian countries. Vishwanath and Kaufmann (1999) also argued 
that paucity of transparency, and consequently the lack of public transparency, can serve as a 
constraint on economic policy and social outcomes impacting negatively on welfare and 
development.  
The role of political corruption scandals in the quest for greater fiscal transparency in the 
management of government finances cannot be overemphasised, particularly in the context of some 
SSA countries. Recently, a flurry of allegations of corruption by incumbents and the promise of a 
more transparent and accountable government by opposition parties, seems to have had some effect 





role played by political and corruption scandals in triggering fiscal transparency accountability, 
especially in Africa’s most populous country, Nigeria. They stressed that there is an invigorated push 
for transparency and accountability in Nigeria owing to an increased level of activism coupled with a 
desire to collectively and robustly confront corruption. External influence as a trigger on fiscal 
transparency has mostly emanated from international donor countries and agencies in the form of 
insistence as a policy, and on tying improvements to the existing levels of fiscal transparency as a 
precondition for future donor support (Drummond, 2011).  
5.3.3 Review of related literature 
The literature on fiscal transparency and institutions has gained traction amongst scholars and policy 
makers for quite some time. Whereas fiscal transparency has been identified as a vital element 
needed for sound fiscal policy management and thus a requirement for robust public sector 
governance, the dearth of literature on its determinants, especially in the context of SSA, is still a 
source of concern. This is especially so given the region’s poor fiscal performance for over two 
decades. As highlighted earlier, whilst much has been written on the benefits of fiscal transparency, 
there are still very few studies on the determinants of fiscal transparency. The theoretical literature 
on the causes and consequences of fiscal, or budgetary, transparency is small (Alt and Lassen, 
2003). Of these few prior studies, more have focused on the political and economic determinants 
with fewer studies focusing on the institutional determinants. 
Using the basic OLS, Gollwitzer (2010) found that strong budget institutions help to enhance fiscal 
balance and lower public external debt. One of the earliest empirical studies to examine the 
determinants of fiscal transparency was Alt et al. (2006), which employed data from the various 
states in the US to empirically examine the determinants of fiscal transparency. Categorising their 
explanatory variables into two sets, political settings and fiscal environment, they found that political 
dynamics as well as past fiscal outcomes affect the level of transparency. The study also revealed 
that there is a propensity for political competition to lead to an increase in the level of fiscal 
transparency. However, it is important to point out that the over-simplistic definition of partisan 
fragmentation in the US context as employed by Alt et al. (2006), where a two-party system prevails, 
may assume a stronger dynamic in multi-party societies such as in SSA.  
While studies like Kilpatrick (2001) and Milesi-Feretti (2004) highlighted that fiscal transparency is 
needed as an accompanying tool to fiscal rules in order to achieve better fiscal outcomes, a study 
by Alt and Lassen (2006) based on 19 OECD countries revealed that there is a propensity for political 
competition to lead to an increase in the level of fiscal transparency. A cross-sectional study by 
Andreula et al. (2009) was the first empirical study to specifically examine the role of institutions in 
influencing fiscal transparency. Their study was based on 82 (developed and developing) countries 





that better institutional quality gave rise to better levels of fiscal transparency.  Studies by Andreula 
and Chong (2016) arrived at a similar conclusion and revealed positive association between the six 
WGIs and fiscal transparency.  The crucial role played by institutions such the media, civil societies 
and the legislature in promoting fiscal transparency and accountability cannot be overemphasised 
(Blöndal, 2003) as cited in (Benito and Bastida, 2009).  
Studies by Ellis and Fender (2006) revealed that the presence of corruption and fiscal transparency 
can be related, implicitly or explicitly related to each other and vice versa. Studies by Glennerster 
and Shin (2008) revealed a negative relationship between fiscal transparency and corruption. 
Reinikka and Svensson (2004) found that fiscal transparency reduces creative accounting. Heald 
(2013) suggested that information flows (transparency) can be expected to be compromised by 
attempts to cover the trail of corruption. Employing the OLS and the IV2SLS both Andreula et al. 
(2009) and Andreula and Chong (2016) found a positive association between control of corruption 
and all the sub-indices of fiscal transparency. Focusing on the nexus between mineral wealth and 
fiscal transparency and based on a sample of 83 (developed and developing) countries, a study by 
Ross (2011) identified the nature of the relationship between natural resource wealth and fiscal 
transparency. The study revealed that the nexus is contingent on the prevailing political system. 
Amongst democratic countries, a country’s mineral wealth is found not to be related to the 
transparency of its government. However, this is not the case amongst autocracies where greater 
mineral wealth was found to be correlated with less fiscal transparency. Interestingly, the study also 
found non-fuel mineral wealth unexpectedly associated with greater transparency. 
Employing the IV2SLS, a study by Tekeng and Sharaf (2015) focused exclusively on 26 developing 
countries: only seven SSA countries that have the data needed to fit into their designed fiscal 
transparency index were included16. They introduced factors such as natural resources wealth, the 
quality of institutions (proxied by regulatory quality) and the level of literacy in an economy into the 
discourse on the determinants of fiscal transparency. They found that the level of natural resources 
influenced fiscal transparency negatively. They also found that the quality of institutions (proxied only 
by regulatory quality), as well as literacy rates positively affects fiscal transparency. In addition to 
their index, they employed the IBP’s OBI and Andreula et al.’s (2009) index. Their findings imply that 
good levels of fiscal transparency are associated with countries with where literacy rates are high , 
ceteris paribus. This further implies that higher literacy rates could lead to more informed 
communities, civil societies and groups, and pressure groups that demand access to information 
and participation in the fiscal policy decision-making process.  
                                               
16 The seven SSA countries included in the sample of developing countries are Kenya, Gabon, Namibia, Ghana, Equatorial 





Wehner and De Renzio (2013) examined the nexus between natural resource dependency and fiscal 
transparency. A unit increase (equivalent to about nine log units) in per capita oil and gas revenues 
was found to lead to a 17-point decrease in a country’s OBI scores. Employing cross-sectional 
studies, Wehner and De Renzio focused on global datasets of 85 developed and developing 
countries. They expanded the scope of the study by including new variables that could explain the 
fiscal transparency changes. The findings from the study revealed that civil law regimes were 
associated with lower levels of fiscal transparency by more than ten points, albeit the result is 
statistically insignificant. This finding is similar to earlier arguments advanced by La Porta et al. 
(1999) that an interventionist legal or administrative heritage impacts negatively on economic 
performance. Similar findings were arrived at by Alt and Lassen (2006). Employing the opposite legal 
system (i.e. common law), Alt and Lassen’s study of 19 OECD countries revealed that the practice 
of common law is associated with higher levels of fiscal transparency. This implies that administrative 
heritage seems to influence budget transparency. 
5.4 Methodology 
5.4.1 Estimation of the underlying drivers of fiscal transparency 
In this section, we outline the procedure for estimating the econometric model of the underlying 
institutional forces driving changes in fiscal transparency in SSA for the period (2006-2015). We also 
present the data employed, their measurements and sources. 
Panel data econometric analysis comes with an advantage of augmenting the variability of the data 
and enables us to gain more degrees of freedom and hence more sample variability than cross-
sectional data analysis (Hsiao 2007). Also, as noted by Wooldridge (2010), whilst cross-sectional 
regression estimates might be biased owing to risk from omitted-variable bias, employing panel data 
allows for the control of unobserved time constant variables. Moreover, panel data analysis includes 
a time variation (within-country standard deviation), as well as country variation (between-country 
standard deviation). As such, our hypothesis that there is a positive association between the quality 
of institutional governance indicators and the level of fiscal transparency in SSA countries is tested 
with the following panel data model. 
𝐹𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  𝑖 = 1, … … . . 𝑁; … … … … , 𝑇                                                   (5.1)  
Where 𝐹𝑇𝑖𝑡 represents fiscal transparency for country 𝑖 at time 𝑡; 𝑥𝑖𝑡 represents a set of time varying 
as well as time invariant covariates; 𝛽 denotes the associated vectors of parameters we intend to 
estimate. Our composite error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is given as 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡, where  𝜔𝑖 represents the 
unobserved country specific effect and 𝜖𝑖𝑡, is the idiosyncratic error term. Our covariates variable 
includes the institutional governance quality index (IGQI) constructed by the author from six 





violence, government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, and control of corruption. These 
indicators are drawn from Kaufman et al. (2010) and published by the World Bank’s (2016) 
Governance Indicators. 
We built the IGQI using the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) with a view to obtaining aggregate 
measures of institutional quality index in Africa, and hence measuring the overall impact of the quality 
of institutions on fiscal transparency. The PCA technique aims at describing a variable with a set of 
variables with a lower dimensionality. Statistically, the PCA can be defined as an orthogonal linear 
transformation that transforms the data into to a new coordinate system such that the greatest 
variance by any projection of the data lays on the first coordinate, called the first principal component 
(Andreula and Chong, 2016). Hence, this method will permit us to arrive at the best linear 
combination of the variables. 
Our empirical models investigate the relationship between IGQI and fiscal transparency. We 
consider the nexus between each of the different components of our institutional governance index 
and fiscal transparency. Following the extant studies, IGQI has been shown to be one of the key 
variables that positively influence fiscal transparency (see e.g. Andreula et al., 2009; Andreula and 
Chong, 2016). These two studies found positive relationships between the individual institutional 
indices and fiscal transparency. Regulatory quality has been found to have a positive impact on fiscal 
transparency (Tekeng and Sharaf, 2015). The control variables considered include administrative 
heritage (Civil law), military expenditure, revenue derived from natural resources; business 
disclosure (Business), and economic growth and population growth rate (Popngrowth).  
Some of these socioeconomic factors may affect fiscal transparency positively or negatively. For 
instance, natural resource wealth has consistently revealed a negative relationship with fiscal 
transparency (see e.g. Wehner and De Renzio, 2013; Tekeng and Sharaf, 2015). This may be 
attributed to the rentier state nature of such economies and their attendant vulnerabilities to factors 
such as corruption which De Simone (2017) showed to be negatively correlated to fiscal 
transparency. The poor level of transparency in the extraction of such natural resources may also 
be a contributing factor. Private disclosure and government disclosure go hand-in-hand with overall 
government transparency. Tekeng and Sharaf (2015) argued that compelling private firms to a high 
standard of transparency, particularly when engaging in government contracts, could broadly aid in 
improving transparency.  
The extent of militarisation of a country relative to the total labour force is also expected to be 
negatively associated with fiscal transparency (Tekeng and Sharaf, 2015).  Similar to Tekeng and 
Sharaf, to capture and measure the power that the political regimes or administrations wield to the 
detriment of freedom of expression, we included a variable for military personnel. This is measured 





the country derived from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2016). Civil law, which is 
rooted in the French legal system, was chosen as our preferred dummy variable measure of 
administrative heritage. La Porta et al. (1999) argued that societies based on civil law are usually 
interventionist and mostly record poor economic performance. Hence, we hypothesise that civil law 
is associated with lower levels of fiscal transparency. 
Population growth is expected to have a positive relationship with fiscal transparency. As nations 
experience population increase, the pressure of judicious and transparent use of resources is 
expected to be higher. Economic growth is expected to have an ambivalent relationship with fiscal 
transparency. If the growth is inclusive, it will lead to an improvement in well-being; the citizenry will 
become more knowledgeable about their rights and will be able to seek more transparency in use of 
public funds. The opposite will be the case if growth is not inclusive. 
A concern with the econometric model (Equation 5.1) stems from the assumption that fiscal 
transparency responds to changes in the covariates instantly. In reality, it is probable for the 
covariates to affect fiscal transparency with some lags. In addition, the past level of fiscal 
transparency could potentially influence the subsequent fiscal transparency level. As suggested by 
De Renzio (2011), current levels of fiscal transparency influence future transparency levels given 
that part of the major preconditions by donor countries for future aid is an improvement by recipient 
countries on their current levels of budget transparency. The current level of fiscal transparency 
usually leads to calls by civil society organisations (CSOs) for future improvements, especially in the 
light of SSA’s poor fiscal transparency performance. Thus, we consider a dynamic model as it 
provides for partial adjustments as follows: 
𝐹𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑓𝑡𝐹𝑇𝑖 𝑡−1 + 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                              (5.2) 
Where 𝐹𝑇𝑖 𝑡−1 is the lagged dependent variable; and 𝛽𝑓𝑡 is the measure of the adjustment process, 
which is expected not to be greater than one (1). All our variables are as previously defined above. 
Equations 5.1 and 5.2 denote the static and dynamic fiscal transparency models respectively. 
However, the static panel model may be disposed to challenges such as endogeneity and 
unobserved heterogeneity as well as cross-sectional dependence issues challenges. Whilst the 
unobserved heterogeneity effect can be addressed using the fixed effect (FE) estimator by treating 
the unobserved effects as time invariant, the random effect (RE) estimator is employed17 whenever 
statistical evidence suggests that the unobserved heterogeneity is a random variable and is not 
correlated with the covariates (𝑥𝑖𝑡). Endogeneity problems could emanate from the institutional 
                                               
17 The choice between FE and RE estimators is determined by carrying out the Hausman test with a null hypothesis (H0): 
unobserved heterogeneity ( 𝜔𝑖) is not correlated with the covariates (𝑥𝑖𝑡). Under the null hypothesis (H0), the RE is 
consistent and efficient. Regardless of whether or not H0 is true, the FE estimator is always consistent, the random effect 





variables as well as from omission of other relevant variables from the model. Nonetheless, the 
unobserved time invariant heterogeneity issues as well as the endogeneity issues can be addressed 
using the Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator that is based on FE. However, results from both FE 
and IV could also be biased due to the presence of cross-sectional relations. SSA countries may be 
made up of sovereign states, there still exists the possibility of equal response from the countries to 
commons shock. This suggests that some of the institutional or socio-economic factors considered 
in the model and ultimately fiscal transparency may be correlated. 
The dynamic panel model (Equation 5.2) is also disposed to some econometric challenges such as 
those underscored above. This is further made difficult by challenges posed by correlation between 
the lagged dependent variable and the error term, specifically with regard to the unobserved country-
specific heterogeneity 𝜔𝑖. In addition to these challenges, given that 𝐹𝑇𝑖𝑡 is also a function of  𝜔𝑖 , 
which is time invariant, the inclusion of 𝐹𝑇𝑖 𝑡−1 as one of the regressors in Equation 5.2 may correlate 
with 𝜔𝑖  and hence with 𝜀𝑖𝑡. Also, the presence of the lagged dependent variables 𝐹𝑇𝑖 𝑡−1 as one of 
the regressors in the model could lead to autocorrelation challenges in the model. As aptly argued 
by Roodman (2009), given such situations, employing the OLS technique will yield biased and 
inconsistent estimates and it will be better to adopt the generalised method of moments (GMM) 
technique over the FE and IV estimators. Furthermore, as highlighted by Bond (2002), panel data 
estimator permits the consideration of the dynamic process and is very important for recovering 
consistent estimates of the parameters of interest. 
In this regard, to avoid results that are potentially biased, we adopt the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
GMM estimator as it controls for the unobserved country heterogeneity (country-fixed effect) and 
endogeneity (bi-directionality) of the explanatory variables as well as the lagged dependent variable, 
to estimate our dynamic model. For instance, while some empirical studies (e.g. Andreula et al., 
2009) revealed a positive impact of government effectiveness measures on fiscal transparency, 
Montes et al. (2018) identified a reversed causal relationship. Specific to our case, the dynamic panel 
GMM approach will permit us to treat fiscal transparency as a dynamic process as well as addressing 
such issues of bi-directionality. However, there are two types of GMM estimators: the difference 
GMM estimator and the systems GMM (SGMM) estimator. Our estimations of the empirical 
relationship between fiscal transparency and institutional variables as well as other control variables 
of interest will be estimated using the SGMM estimator because it has proven more efficient. With 
the SGMM, additional instruments are easily obtained from the system of two equations (a 
differenced and a level equation). The addition of the second equation yields more instruments and, 
more importantly, the SGMM is suitable and particularly relevant for our study as it is designed for 
situations with short time periods and many countries (Roodman, 2006). This clearly fits our dataset 





Two types of systems GMM estimator exist: the one-step estimation and the two-step estimation. In 
this study we employed the two-step estimator which has the Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard 
errors because this is asymptotically more efficient than the one-step estimator. The orthogonal 
deviations were used because we have a panel with gaps. This is with a view towards maximising 
the sample size. Lastly, to check for consistency of our estimates, we use two specification tests: 
the Hansen test of over-identification restrictions and the Arellano and Bond test for second-order 
serial correlation in the error term. The Hansen test measures the validity of the instruments by 
analysing sample analogues of the moment conditions used in the estimation. By design, the error 
term may be serially correlated in the first order. Nevertheless, second order serial correlation will be 
a sign of misspecification (i.e. AR (2) must not be significant). 
Our core variables of interest, the institutional variables, have values that range from -2.5 (weak) to 
+2.5 (strong). Response variables that can be both positive and negative are often characterised by 
skewness which often necessitates logarithmic transformation. However, most log transformations 
focus on the normal log transformation, in situations where the variable concerned is strictly positive 
or is zero. Given that our institutional variables contain both negative and positive values, we 
employed the special case transformation known as the negative log transformation, which helps us 
to deal with the log of negative numbers based on the work by Whittaker et al. (2005). Particularly, 
it reduces skewness and produces a nearly linear or additive relationship. The negative log 
transformation overcomes the difficulty of taking the log of negative numbers as well as that of zero. 
The negative log transformation applies the following rules when taking the log of a variable: 
𝑙𝑛(𝑥) = {
−ln (𝑥 + 1), 𝑥 ≤ 0
ln (𝑥 + 1), 𝑥 > 0
                                                                                   (5.3) 
  
 Equation 5.3 can also be written as  
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑥) ln(|𝑥| + 1) = {
1, 𝑥 > 0
−1, 𝑥 < 0
                                                                                   (5.4) 
This function passes through the origin, behaves like x for small x, positive and negative, and like 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑥)𝑙𝑛(𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑥)) for large |x|. The gradient is steepest at 1 at x = 0, thus, the transformation pulls 
in extreme values relative to those near the origin. It has recently been dubbed the neglog 
transformation (Whittaker et al., 2005). An earlier reference for this approach was given by John and 
Draper (1980).  
Lastly, the panel unit root test was not conducted in this study. This is owing to the small sample 
nature of the study – an unbalanced panel of 3-5 years for just 23 countries. Hurlin and Mignon 
(2007) strongly argued that indeed, it is well known that unit root tests generally have low power in 
small sample sizes to distinguish non-stationary series from stationary series that are persistent. 





number of observations by including information relating to various individuals or countries. Against 
the backdrop of our scope of study, which is on sub-Saharan Africa, with a defined number of 
observations, and due to data limitations, it is not practical for us to increase either the number of 
countries or the time dimension of our study. Also, as an important rule with the system GMM 
technique, we ensured that the number of instruments was never more than the number of groups. 
5.4.2 Data sources 
Our data set is an unbalanced panel of 23 SSA countries over the period 2006-2015. Our length of 
time series dimension is largely determined by the availability of data for different SSA countries. It 
is pertinent to point out that, although our dependent variable data, the Open Budget Index (OBI) is 
available up to 2017, the corresponding data for most of the other variables of interest were not 
available up to 2017. Thus, the scope of our empirical analysis is limited to 2006–2015. See Table 
5.2 for full details of data, sources and definitions. 
As rightly identified by De Simone (2009) and Tekeng and Sharaf (2015), one of the most important 
challenges of the literature on fiscal transparency remains its measurement. Varied existing 
measures of fiscal transparency exist, however, most of them are fraught with challenges ranging 
from geographical localisation to lack of homogeneity in the data collection process for the various 
indices. For instance, the OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency data provides data only for 
OECD states. Guerrero and Hofbauer (2001) propose an index of budget transparency for five Latin 
American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru. Some measures are also drawn from 
non-numerical reports such as the IMF’s Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSCs). 
The ROSCs employs dummy variables to measure simple adherence to fiscal transparency 
principles. Hameed (2005), Jarmuzek et al. (2006) and Andreula et al. (2009) employed the use of 
(ROSCs) after which they allocated numerical values to the performance of the countries selected 
according to specific aspects of the report. In their study on determinants of fiscal transparency in 
developing countries, Tekeng and Sharaf (2015) employed different measures of fiscal transparency 
but only seven African countries could be captured in the list of twenty-seven developing countries 
covered by the study. To overcome the measurement challenges highlighted, our study will employ 
data from the International Budget Partnerships’ Open Budget Index (OBI), (2006-2015) derived 







 Table 5.2: Variables, sources and definition 
Variable Definition Source 
ft 
Fiscal Transparency measured in percentage (%) 
International Budget Partnerships, 
Open Budget Survey (2006-2015) 
Gastilpolcivil 
Political and civil liberties 
International Budget Partnerships, 
Open Budget Survey (2006-2015) 
Military 
No. of military personal as a (%) of total labour force 
World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 2016 
GDPPC 
GDP per capita in current US$ 
World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 2016 
Latitude Distance from the equator  
Natres Natural resource revenue as a (%) of GDP “ 
Business Measure of the extent to which private actors are protected via disclosure of their 
ownership and financial information. 
“ 
Growth Growth rate of GDP at market prices (in %) “ 
Popngrowth Growth rate of the number of people in a given country “ 
Urbpopn Number of people in the urban area of a given country “ 
Voice Perceptions of the extent a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, freedom of expression and association, and a free media. 
“ 
Pol Political stability and absence of violence measuring perceptions of the likelihood of 
political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, with terrorism. 
“ 
Regq Regulatory quality which reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development. 
“ 
Geff Government effectiveness reflecting observations of the quality of public services, 
quality of the civil service, degree of its independence from political pressure, quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and credibility of the government’s commitment 
to such policies. 
“ 
Corpt Control of Corruption: reveals perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including petty and grand forms of corruption and capture of 
the state by private interests. 
“ 
ROL Rule of law: reveals perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society and the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts. 
“ 
Ethno-fractionalisation The average of available data for ethnic & linguistic fractionalisation Alesina et al. (2003). 
Civillaw =1 if legal origin of country is France, 0 otherwise Author’s computation 
IGQI Index measuring the combined quality of institutions derived using the Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) from the Six World Governance Indicators 
Authors computation based on PCA 





The OBI is the world’s only independent comparative measure of national governments’ budget 
transparency. It assigns countries covered by the Open Budget Survey a transparency score on a 
100-point scale. It uses a subset of questions that assess the quantity and timeliness of budget 
information that central governments make publicly available in eight key budget document areas 
during the budget cycle and in accordance with international good practice standards. The OBI is 
not published annually, hence our datasets are for 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2015. It is pertinent 
to point out that we built an index of aggregate institutional governance measure. This is to enable 
us to measure the combined effect of all our institutional governance indices on fiscal transparency. 
Other main sources of data are World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank’s 
World Governance Indicators (WGI) and Polity IV database.  
5.5 Empirical results and discussions 
5.5.1 Summary statistics and correlation matrix 
This section presents and discusses the empirical results from the model estimation. We start with 
the presentation of the descriptive statistics to provide us with a simple description of the data 
employed for the analysis. This is followed by a presentation of the correlation matrix and 
subsequently by a formal presentation of the empirical results that test our stated hypothesis. Table 
5.3 presents the descriptive statistics.  
The average level of fiscal transparency for Africa is 32.33% for the period 2006-2015. This is quite 
abysmal, and corresponds to a low level of fiscal transparency characterisation on the open budget 
index scale (0-100%). When considered individually, on average, all the measures of the different 
elements of institutional quality (i.e. political stability, voice and accountability, rule of law, 
government effectiveness and regulatory quality) posted very weak results as they all posted 
negative outcomes on a scale of -2.5 (for weak) to 2.5 (for strong). This finding corroborates the 
earlier findings from the stylised facts in section 5.2.2 on institutions and points to institutional 
vulnerabilities in SSA. We also looked at the trend of our control variables including natural resources 
as a percentage of GDP, military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, administrative heritage 
proxied by the legal system practiced (civil or common law), population growth, business 
environment, and economic and population growth. 
On average, natural resources as a percentage of GDP are over 15% in SSA. This is not surprising 
as most African countries depend on revenues from sale of natural resources. This can breed 
institutional vulnerabilities such as a rentier system that is mostly characterised by corruption and 
fraud. The average growth rate for SSA is 5.73% whilst Africa’s population grew at an average of 





 Table 5.3: Summary statistics of variables 
Variable Observation Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
ft 104 32.33 23.53 0.00 92.00 
Civillaw 104 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Ethno-fractionalisation 104 0.72 0.17 0.22 0.92 
Latitude 104 0.13 0.09 0.00 0.29 
Military  97 0.55 0.57 0.08 2.71 
Natres 104 15.44 12.93 1.37 58.04 
Business 100 5.02 1.93 0.00 8.00 
GDPPC 104 2,494.13 4,030.03 182.00 28,103.00 
Growth 104 5.73 3.98 -9.09 18.99 
Popngrowth 104 2.83 0.71 1.05 4.61 
Urbpopn 85 5.54 6.58 0.89 28.30 
Gastilpolc~l 103 4.08 1.60 1.50 7.00 
Voice 104 -0.38 0.61 -1.48 0.65 
Pol 104 -0.51 0.92 -2.67 1.20 
Regq 104 -0.49 0.54 -1.59 0.68 
Geff 104 -0.64 0.61 -1.80 0.83 
Corpt 104 -0.61 0.63 -1.61 1.06 
Rol 104 -0.63 0.58 -1.76 0.66 
(IGQI) 104 -4.30e-09 1.00 -1.94 2.23 
Source: Computed by authors 
 
However, on a cautionary note, whether or not Africa’s growth rate has been inclusive and has led 
to a general improvement in well-being and thus affords its citizens the knowledge with which to seek 
greater transparency is another area that can be examined. The average GDP per capita is 
US$2,494.13 with a minimum value of US$182 per capita. This accounts for why most SSA countries 
are characterised as low income to lower-middle income economies under the World Bank’s 
classification.18 
The pairwise correlation matrix for the variables that we employed in our empirical analysis is 
presented in Table 5.4. Generally, correlation results serve as a pointer of causal relationships 
although they do not establish causation. In terms of signs and magnitude, upon inspection it can be 
seen that most of our institutional indices have the expected relatively high positive correlation with 
fiscal transparency. We anticipate that an improvement in the quality of institutions will lead to an 
improvement in fiscal transparency. Other control variables such natural resource revenue, military 
(number of military personal as a percentage of total labour force) and the practice of civil law have 
the expected negative correlation with fiscal transparency. This is not surprising as most natural 
resource rich African countries have recorded poor levels of fiscal transparency (OBI, 2006-2015). 
This is coupled with the rentier nature of such countries coupled with the poor transparency that 
accompanies the reporting of proceeds from mineral sales. The negative correlation between military 
and fiscal transparency is expected given that such levels of military force in developing countries 
often characterises repressive and less transparent regimes.   
                                               









Table 5.4: Correlation matrix of variables 
Variable Ft Voice Polstab Regq Geff Corpt Rol Civillaw Military Natres Business Growth Popngrowth 
ft 1.000                         
Voice 0.707 1.000                       
Pols 0.379 0.534 1.000                     
Regq 0.676 0.721 0.604 1.000                   
Geff 0.687 0.754 0.643 0.932 1.000                 
Corpt 0.527 0.692 0.679 0.839 0.893 1.000               
Rol 0.652 0.811 0.747 0.881 0.922 0.906 1.000             
Civillaw -0.597 -0.623 -0.150 -0.355 -0.413 -0.322 -0.422 1.000           
Military -0.091 0.037 0.054 -0.025 0.085 0.113 0.057 0.117 1.000         
Natres -0.406 -0.516 -0.276 -0.612 -0.599 -0.465 -0.577 0.286 -0.045 1.000       
Business 0.169 0.214 0.364 0.439 0.392 0.436 0.378 0.314 -0.195 -0.114 1.000     
Growth -0.164 -0.145 0.029 0.002 0.024 0.052 -0.048 0.057 0.035 0.234 -0.105 1.000   
Popngrowth -0.587 -0.627 -0.280 -0.642 -0.715 -0.647 -0.596 0.493 -0.374  0.512 -0.226 0.131 1.000 
IGQI 0.652 0.812 0.747 0.881 0.922 0.906 1.000 -0.422 0.057 -0.577 0.378* -0.048 -0.596 
  Source: Author’s computation 





Upon inspection of our correlation matrix, it can be seen that the six dimensions of institutions in 
Africa hold a high pairwise correlation amongst each other. This trend is not surprising as most SSA 
countries’ institutional qualities fell under the negative spectrum (lower performance) on the scale of 
-2.5 to +2.5. As highlighted earlier, this necessitated our employment of the PCA to build our 
aggregate institutional quality index (IGQI). However, it is pertinent to point out that the high 
correlation amongst the six dimensions of institutions in Africa gives no cause for general concern 
of multicollinearity. This is owing to the fact that in our chosen methodology, they will not be used in 
the same model. The remaining covariates do not hold high correlation values 
5.5.2 Findings of the underlying drivers of fiscal transparency 
This sub-section presents and discusses the empirical results from the panel-data country regression 
summarised in Table 5.5. As highlighted earlier in the methodology section (5.4.1), owing to the 
limitations of the static panel data model and its estimators and the fixed effect and instrumental 
variables technique, the analysis and reports for our study are predicated on the dynamic panel data 
models estimated with a system GMM estimator.  
There are seven dynamic regression models in the results table. The first six present the regression 
estimates of the institutional governance indicators, namely voice and accountability (lvoice), political 
stability and absence of violence (lpolstab), regulatory quality (lregq), government effectiveness 
(lgeff), control of corruption (lcoc), and rule of law (lrol). The seventh regression is governance quality 
(lIGQI). Referring to their definitions in Table 5.2, the higher the institutional value, the better the 
institutional indicator. The expected or predicted signs of 𝛽𝑠 for the institutional variables are 
intuitively expected to be positive and statistically significant. Sometimes institutional factors can be 
somewhat correlated, as in this case. Employing the seven main variables of interest individually in 
each of the seven models permits us to capture the near-exact impact (size) of each variable on 
fiscal transparency, hence avoiding the possibility of overlapping impact. 
From Table 5.5, the lag of the dependent variable Ft(-1) is statistically significant and positively 
associated with contemporaneous levels of fiscal transparency in Africa. More importantly, the 
absolute value of this autoregressive parameter is less than unity. This is a necessary condition for 
a dynamic panel data model to be considered stationary (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Ashley and Sun, 
2016). Our measure of the overall quality of institutions in Africa (IGQI) exhibits a positive association 
with fiscal transparency in Africa albeit not significant at the conventional 5%.19 This implies that a 
simultaneous improvement in the six) different dimensions of institutions would lead to an 
improvement in fiscal transparency in African countries. 
                                               





Table 5.5: Empirical results from dynamic model estimations 
Dependent variable: Fiscal Transparency 
Explanatory Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ft (-1) 0.668*** 0.617*** 0.581*** 0.754*** 0.570*** 0.609*** 0.562*** 
 (0.083) (0.043) (0.069) (0.074) (0.073) (0.044) (0.150) 
lVoice -1.521       
 (1.709)       
lPolstab  -1.642***      
  (0.316)      
lRegq   -2.092***     
   (0.499)     
lGeff    3.726***    
    (0.646)    
lCorpt     -1.350***   
     (0.303)   
lRol      2.827**  
      (1.143)  
lIGQI        1.530 
       (2.309) 
Civillaw -11.213** -6.522* -15.264*** -7.610* -9.689*** -5.866 -15.656** 
 (4.194) (3.410) (3.879) (4.046) (3.397) (3.464) (6.825) 
Military -1.107 -6.868*** -5.963** 5.326 -8.872*** -5.692** -1.733 
 (2.988) (1.921) (2.251) (3.221) (1.771) (2.210) (6.389) 
Nat.Res 0.115 -0.048 -0.032 0.146 -0.032 0.003 0.510*** 
 (0.106) (0.096) (0.120) (0.095) (0.090) (0.102) (0.162) 
Business 4.778** 1.338 4.845** 5.901*** 2.808* 1.053 5.376** 
 (1.770) (1.213) (1.855) (1.617) (1.368) (1.206) (1.943) 
Growth -0.468* -0.417 -0.437* -0.524** -0.518** -0.645** -0.599* 
 (0.248) (0.277) (0.215) (0.235) (0.202) (0.241) (0.347) 
Popngrowth -4.284* -7.606*** -1.294 -4.641 -8.027*** -8.556** -11.356* 
 (2.466) (2.409) (3.265) (2.706) (2.168) (3.262) (2.146) 
Constant 9.364 40.178*** 11.500 -5.072 39.837*** 42.895*** 25.908 
 (15.129) (10.239) (16.499) (16.563) (11.711) (11.534) (24.613) 
Diagnostics:         
No. of Obs. 78 78 78 77 78 78 78 
No. of Groups 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
No. of Instrument 23 23 23 23 23 23 16 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 194.0*** 828.9*** 653.5*** 163.0*** 1061.0*** 2517.0*** 17.91*** 
AR (1): (p-value) 0.220 0.833 0.267 0.247 0.333 0.367 0.236 
AR (2): (p-value) 0.783 0.322 0.651 0.672 0.653 0.667 0.852 
Hansen: (p-value) 0.507 0.341 0.203 0.750 0.420 0.548 0.447 
 Notes:  (a) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (99%, 95% and 90% significance levels respectively) 
 (b) Standard errors in parentheses,  
(c) Variables in small letters are in log form and variables in capital letters are in levels. All estimations are 







A similar positive association between the aggregate measure of institutional quality and fiscal 
transparency was established by Andreula et al. (2009) and Andreula and Chong (2016) and the 
result from their study was significant at the conventional 5%. Employing the IV2LS and data from 
82 developing countries, both studies concluded that there was a strong positive relationship 
between aggregate institutional variable and fiscal transparency. It will suffice to highlight that IBP 
(2010) reinforces this position in part by positing that some of the institutional governance indicators 
such as Control of Corruption and Voice and Accountability are in part implicit measures of a 
government’s commitment to budget transparency. In other words, they are contributing factors to 
fiscal transparency levels. Nonetheless, unlike Andreula et al. (2009) and Andreula and Chong 
(2016) studies which were cross section analyses on over 82 countries (developed and developing), 
we employed a dynamic panel model estimated by system GMM for our analysis covering only SSA. 
As discussed earlier, this frees our results from the biasness associated with the OLS and 2SLS. It 
also frees our analysis from the limitations of cross-sectional analysis. Our analysis also overcomes 
the bias associated with studies based on a heterogeneous collection of countries (developed and 
developing). We proceeded to investigate, individually, the relationship between our six institutional 
governance indicators and fiscal transparency. In line with our hypothesised expectations, two of our 
institutional governance measures, namely government effectiveness (geff) and rule of law (rol), 
were highly statistically significant and revealed a positive association with fiscal transparency in 
Africa. This is similar to findings by Andreula et al. (2009) and Andreula and Chong (2016). 
This result may be attributed to the incremental enhancement in the quality of the public service in 
Africa. Several international and local capacity building strides have been made in recent years. 
Public financial management innovations by international bodies such as the World Bank’s 
Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) have been successfully domesticated 
by the Ministries of Finance (MoF) in many African countries. The rule of law’s positive relationship 
with fiscal transparency may be attributed to the transition from totalitarian and mostly military rule 
to democratic rule by most African states. Khagram et al. (2013) identified political transition as one 
of the triggers of fiscal transparency. This has resulted in the relative improvement in the 
independence of the judiciary in most SSA countries. One of the key institutional indices that has 
drawn much attention due to its deleterious impact generally on the economy, fiscal performance 
and fiscal transparency, is corruption. In our analysis, employing control of corruption (CoC) we 
examined the nexus between control of corruption and fiscal transparency. We hypothesise a 
positive relationship between control of corruption and fiscal transparency. It is important to point out 
that corruption affects the budget process in several ways.  
As with most developing countries, public financial corruption in SSA countries is manifest and 
affects the budget in the areas of public procurement, direct taxation and customs (Schiavo-Campo, 





making it easy for side-stepping of such rules via an understanding between contactors and public 
officials. The other two corruption-centred public finance problems highlighted by Schiavo-Campo 
(2007) include, firstly, masking of corruption by good fiscal marksmanship on the revenue side of 
domestic taxation. This entails the forecasting of fiscal revenue to close to the previous year’s 
revenue and relative to actual tax revenue collected. This tax revenue figures may not be close to 
the potential tax revenue that can be collected on the basis of the profile and number of tax payers. 
Secondly, falsification of certificates of origin so as to deliberately misclassify imported items into a 
lower tariff category is another public finance corruption technique. 
Contrary to a priori expectations, our results reveal a negative but highly statistically significant 
association between control of corruption and fiscal transparency. Our finding is contrary to earlier 
findings by Andreula et al. (2009) and Andreula and Chong (2016). Their study revealed a strong 
positive relationship between control of corruption and fiscal transparency. Khagram et al. (2013) 
amongst other factors identified reports of political corruption scandals as one of the triggers of fiscal 
transparency. Studies by Mauro (1995), Hall and Jones (1998) and Rodrik (1998) also highlighted 
deleterious effects of corruptions and rent seeking on economic development (an offshoot of 
economic growth). As aptly pointed out by Baldrich (2005), avoiding corruption is at the core of a 
transparent fiscal framework. Glennerster and Shin (2008) found a negative relationship between 
fiscal transparency and corruption. Ellis and Fender (2006) found corruption was associated implicitly 
or explicitly with fiscal transparency and vice versa. 
A plausible explanation of why improvements in control of corruption and fiscal transparency are 
having the contrary relationship could be as a result of creative accounting and sharp practices that 
permit the exploitation of loopholes in the legal and public finance framework of the country. Reinikka 
and Svensson (2004) found a negative relationship between fiscal transparency and creative 
accounting. From a public finance viewpoint, creative accounting entails exploitation of the loopholes 
in the legal and public finance framework of the country. This is especially so when there are no 
sanctions for such actions. The IBP’s Open Budget Survey (2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2015 & 2017) 
has consistently revealed that most African countries either do not produce the requisite budget 
review documents or, when they do, they are rarely made public on time. This deprives the electorate 
of the needed timely data with which to engage the politicians. Thus, any efforts in controlling 
corruption need to include sanctions for hindering full and timely disclosure (transparency) in the 
budget process.  More so,  it is  very important to highlight that our finding may also be attributed to 
the fact that the outcome of control of corruption may be  somewhat difficult to observe, except the 
government of the day makes it explicitly obvious by revealing the outcome decision on every 
corruption case, especially high-level corruption cases from its government. Thus, it is very possible 
that any perceived increase in corruption control may not be seen as adequate to justify effective 






Our empirical analysis reveals that, contrary to a priori expectations, voice and accountability is 
negatively associated with fiscal transparency in SSA albeit not statistically significant. Andreula and 
Chong (2015) employed OLS on a cross section of countries (developed and developing) and found 
a positive and significant relationship between voice and accountability and fiscal transparency. 
Voice and accountability reflect the extent to which a country’s citizens are perceived to be able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
and a free media. Accountability connotes the capacity to call public officials to task for their actions 
(Schiavo-Campo, 2007). This is not so much the case in SSA. In many parts of Africa, the electoral 
process is mostly characterised by suppression of voters and lack of credibility. Press freedom is not 
guaranteed as obtains in climes with stronger institutions. This is corroborated by the fact that most 
African countries score very low in terms of media participation in the budget process.  
The Open Budget Survey (OBS) 2018 Report on 2017 open budget survey buttresses this point, 
stating that African countries have the worst decline in budget with transparency, with a drop of about 
11% between 2015 and 2017.20 This is compounded by limited space for CSOs. The report argued 
further that the “declines in budget transparency are worrisome against a global backdrop of rising 
inequality, restrictions on media and civic freedom, and a weakening of trust between citizens and 
their governments” (OBS 2017: p 4). To date, some African states are yet to have a freedom of 
information (FOI) Act, and where they do, most times they have not been institutionalised thus 
making it difficult to timeously elicit most fiscal information from government agencies. Blöndal (2003) 
as cited in Benito and Bastida (2009) highlighted the importance of robust legislations that provide 
for efficient monitoring of the budget process coupled with efficient civil society and media groups in 
order to be able influence budget policy as well as demand for effective public accountability.  
Our finding then begs new questions which can only be answered by a field study, such as: Are 
CSOs asking the right budget governance related questions of SSA governments, especially in terms 
of how to enhance the level of fiscal transparency in SSA? Are these questions being channelled to 
the appropriate government agencies responsible for reforming the fiscal disclosure process of 
governments? Finally, contrary to a priori expectations, political stability and regulatory requirements 
showed significantly negative in their relationship with fiscal transparency in Africa. These findings 
are also different from the two prior studies of Andreula et al. (2009) and Andreula and Chong (2016) 
that examined the same phenomenon. 
Following the existing literature, we controlled for some socio-economic cum political economy 
dynamics. Some of the control variables we used have been used in prior literature on determinants 
                                               






of fiscal transparency including military force as a percentage of total labour force, natural resources 
revenue as a percentage of GDP, business disclosure index, administrative heritage proxied by legal 
system operated by the various African countries (civil law dummy), GDP growth, and population 
growth (Tekeng and Sharaf, 2015; Wehner and De Renzio, 2013). For administrative heritage, we 
employed dummy variables. We also experimented with the literacy level, but paucity of data on the 
literacy rate in most SSA countries hindered us from including it in the model. 
The type of legal system employed in the different SSA countries was used as our measure of 
administrative heritage. In our empirical analysis, we elected to use civil law which is the basis of the 
French legal system as our chosen indicator variable (measure of administrative heritage). The 
dummy variable technique was employed in our empirical analysis where (1) stood for countries that 
practice civil law and (0) for countries that do not practice civil law. Whereas civil law, which is rooted 
in the French legal system, was chosen as our preferred dummy variable measure of administrative 
heritage, La Porta et al. (1999) revealed that, in interventionist legal cultures where civil law is 
applied, it usually yields inferior government performance on a range of indicators, including 
corruption, compared to those predicated on the British common law tradition. Hence, we expect a 
negative relationship between civil law regimes and fiscal transparency in SSA. 
Generally, as argued by Wehner and De Renzio (2013), there is a nexus between the overall 
administrative machinery of a country and the design of its budget systems including its level of 
transparency. In consonance with our hypothesised expectations, and similar to earlier findings by 
Wehner and De Renzio (2013), our study revealed a negative association between civil law 
administrations (our indicator for administrative and legal heritage) in Africa and fiscal transparency 
for all our models. Similarly, employing common law (the opposite of civil law), Alt and Lassen (2006) 
found a positive relationship between common law and fiscal transparency. However, unlike Wehner 
and De Renzio (2013) our results were statistically significant.  
These findings are similar to earlier findings by Alt and Lassen (2006) and corroborate the arguments 
by La Porta et al. (1999) on the nexus between legal heritage and government efficiency. Using a 
set of 19 OECD countries and a system method, Alt and Lassen (2006) revealed that common law 
(the opposite of civil law) legal origin is positively correlated with their measure of fiscal transparency. 
As stated earlier, La Porta et al.’s (1999) analysis points to the negative impact of interventionist civil 
law legal cultures as they usually yield inferior government performance on a range of indicators 
such as public sector efficiency, provision of public goods, political freedom and corruption compared 
to those based on the British common law tradition.  
The contrary will be the case if the English common law is considered. English common law was 
designed and shaped by parliament and the aristocracy to reduce the power of the crown sovereign, 





citizens against the government. In contrast, the French civil law system is more interventionist and 
does not protect the rights of citizens as much as the common law system.  Common law can thus 
be adopted as a proxy for the intent to limit rather than strengthen the state (La Porta et al., 1999; 
David and Brierley, 1978; Finer, 1997). These are in line with the position by North (1990) which 
highlighted the path dependency argument which in effect contends that budget systems might trace 
the path or reflect historical circumstances of the country in question.  
Studies by Andrews (2009) and Lienert (2003) also highlight the importance of administrative 
heritage on budget procedure and practice in Africa. Stylised facts drawn from successive OBI 
performance surveys reveal the disparity between the level of fiscal transparency in Anglophone and 
francophone countries, with Anglophone African countries displaying a higher level of fiscal 
transparency than their francophone counterparts. Austin’s (2008) ‘reversal of fortune’ thesis 
identified and reinforced the presence of such institutional and economic disparities in former African 
colonies. The study identified other economic reason that helped to define such disparities. It 
categorised the type of institutions left by the different colonial powers into two categories: those 
oriented around protection of private property, and those focused on extracting rents. It concluded 
that the difference in the type of institutions influenced post-colonial economic fortunes. 
We hypothesised a negative relationship between the extent of militarisation of the labour force and 
fiscal transparency. From our empirical analysis, in line with our a priori expectation, the percentage 
of military personnel, including paramilitary forces, in the population of the country is negatively 
associated with fiscal transparency and statistically significant in most of our models. In their study 
on 26 developing countries, drawn from Asia, Latin America and Africa, Tekeng and Sharaf (2015) 
had similar findings. As explained earlier, in the context of developing countries, heavily militarised 
countries are characterised by larger military forces and expenditure and are associated with 
suppression of all forms of freedoms and oppression of the population by the protected government. 
As such there will be a high level of opacity (less transparency) in terms of government fiscal 
processes. Such repressive tendencies could thwart civil societies’ efforts to hold the government 
accountable with a view to achieving a greater level of fiscal transparency and better fiscal outcomes. 
In line with economic expectations results from our analysis indicate that natural resources as a 
percentage of GDP in Africa has a negative relationship with fiscal transparency in close to half of 
our specification models. Thus, there is some evidence, though modest, that natural resource wealth 
is associated with less fiscal disclosure in Africa. Interestingly, this was recorded when considering 
models that had political stability, regulatory requirement and corruption as our institutional variable 
of interest; all of which are key vulnerabilities of mineral-rich countries. Characteristically, a number 
of previous Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) reports attributed part of the problems 





Employing the 2008 Open Budget Index, a study by Khagram et al. (2013) also revealed a negative 
and significant association between oil income and fiscal transparency amongst autocratic states. 
They argued that countries with larger natural resource wealth are less transparent given that larger 
natural resource wealth could diminish the pressure for transparency because such governments 
will rely less on non-natural resource taxation to raise revenue. This has evidently been the case 
with some SSA oil-rich states such as Nigeria. It is pertinent to point out that their study was based 
on 85 countries, most of which were not SSA countries. Mineral wealth has been associated 
negatively with fiscal transparency.  
Employing a sample of (developed and developing) countries, an empirical study by Ross (2011) 
revealed that the link between mineral wealth and fiscal transparency is predicated on the prevailing 
political system in individual mineral rich countries. The  study revealed that whereas  amongst 
democracies, a country’s mineral wealth is not related to the level of transparency of its it 
government,  the same cannot be said of autocratic states where greater oil wealth was found to 
correlate with less fiscal transparency, while greater non-fuel mineral wealth is surprisingly 
connected with better levels of  transparency (Ross, 2011). This may serve as a plausible reason for 
Khagram et al.’s (2013) conclusion that findings such as Ross (2011) and theirs lend support to the 
contentions from other researchers that suggest that oil wealth increases the value of staying in 
power and therefore causes dictators to reduce transparency, hiding their governments ’ corruption 
and inefficiencies (see also Egorov, et al. 2009). 
As expected, in most instances, the impact of business disclosure on fiscal transparency is positive 
and significant. This is not dissimilar to earlier findings by Tekeng and Sharaf (2015). The business 
disclosure index is a measure that shows the extent to which private actors are protected through 
disclosure of their ownership and financial information. It is employed as a proxy for transparency of 
the private sector. For the purpose of this study, it is our conviction that transparency in public 
activities should be accompanied by transparency in the private sector, at least in order to ensure 
significant detailed information about the procurements and contracts process by government 
bodies. As argued by Tekeng and Sharaf (2015), if private firms are subject to enhanced demands 
for transparency, at least when servicing government contracts, this could lead to enhancement in 
overall government transparency. Our analysis show that GDP growth has a negative relationship 
with fiscal transparency in all our models. For six of the seven estimated models, examination of 
growth and fiscal transparency nexus yielded a statistically significant relationship. We had 
hypothesised an ambivalent relationship between economic growth and fiscal transparency.  A 
positive nexus is expected if the growth is inclusive and thus lead to an improvement in the well-
being of the citizenry by providing them with better access to sources of information.  They become 
more knowledgeable about their rights and will be able to seek more transparency in use of public 





5.5.3 Post-estimation robustness checks 
Lastly, our post-estimation statistics presented along with our results in Table 5.5 examined the 
models for the presence of serial correlation and for over-identification with a view to establishing 
the robustness of our models. To achieve this, we employed the Arellano and Bond and 
Sargan/Hansen tests for the presence of autocorrelation and over-identification respectively. 
Dynamic panel data introduces the condition of no correlation in the error term (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2009). Arellano and Bond (1991) noted that to achieve unbiased estimations requires the absence 
of a second-order serial correlation of the error term. By design, the values for the error term could 
be serially correlated in the first order i.e. AR (1) could be statistically insignificant based on its p-
values. However, and as an important rule, a second-order serial correlation will be a sign of 
misspecification. Hence, our expectation is that the probability of 𝐴𝑟(2) (𝑝𝑟 > 𝑧) will not be significant 
at 5%, hence validating the absence of serial autocorrelation in the errors (see Labra and Torrecillas, 
2018), where z implies the standard normal distribution. The results of the AR (2-order) test for serial 
correlation, which is applied to the residuals in differences21, fails to reject the null hypothesis for a 
second order serial correlation in all the estimated models.  
Likewise, from the Hansen –J statistics reported in Table 5.5, we fail to reject the null hypotheses22 
of the Hansen test for over-identification (i.e. the overall exogeneity of the instruments used in the 
GMM estimation) at the 5% level for all the estimated models. We test for validity of exclusion 
restrictions using the Hansen –J tests. This leads to our conclusion (acceptance of the null 
hypothesis) that our over-identification restrictions are also valid. 
a. Null Hypothesis (𝑯𝟎) – All restrictions of over-identification are valid. 
b. Alternative Hypothesis (𝑯𝟏) – All restrictions of over-identification are not valid. 
Acceptance or rejection criteria 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑥2 ≥ 0.05 (5%) 
If our obtained probability (p-value) is ≥ 0.05, the instruments we employed are valid. Hence, over-
identification does not exist. And hence there is no evidence to reject our null hypothesis (Baum, 
2006). Generally, this indicates that the instruments are valid and the results of our GMM estimation 
are reliable. We reported the two-step robust standard errors corrected for a finite sample following 
Windmeijer (2005). Our results satisfy the key assumptions of system GMM estimations by Arellano 
and Bond (1991) and Windmeijer (2005). As such, our models can be described as appropriate 
models with which to situate a discussion on the institutional determinants of fiscal transparency in 
                                               
21 To check for first-order serial correlation in levels, second-order correlation in differences is checked because for GMM 
estimator, first-order serial correlation is expected a priori in the residuals in differences. Not surprisingly, the AR (1-order) 
serial correlation test results in most cases reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 5% level. 
22 The null hypothesis (H0) for the Hansen test is that all our over-identification restrictions are valid. In other words, the 





SSA. Our empirical results confirm the influence of some institutional forces in determining the level 
of fiscal transparency in Africa.  
5.6 Concluding remarks and policy recommendations 
The main objective of this chapter was to empirically examine the link between institutional factors 
and fiscal transparency in SSA. The theoretical literature and framework contextualised the budget 
process as a contract between the principals (the voters) and the agents (elected officials). While 
writing a perfect contract may be daunting owing to information asymmetry, writing a better contract 
for SSA countries with regard to the budget process is possible by improving the level of fiscal 
transparency which will increase the level of information available to both parties. This will reduce 
the level of information asymmetry, especially on the part of the principals (the voters) which will 
consequently strengthen their capacity for public accountability demand within the retrospective 
voter’s paradigm. Such an improvement in the public accountability process due to a reduction in 
information asymmetry could aid the writing of a better contract. 
Our empirical analysis reveals that an improvement in the overall institutional governance index will 
lead to an improvement in the level of fiscal transparency in Africa. However, when individual 
institutional indices are considered, not all the institutional factors have a positive relationship with 
fiscal transparency. The rule of law, and government effectiveness were statistically significant and 
positively related to fiscal transparency, while control of corruption, political stability, voice and 
accountability and regulatory quality did not yield the expected sign. 
Within the context of our research question, there are some policy implications that could help 
improve the level of fiscal transparency in Africa, which in turn, could help write a better contract for 
the budget process in Africa. As noted by Heald (2013), information flows (disclosure) can be 
expected to be compromised by attempts to cover the trail of corruption. Therefore, the SSA 
achievements in the fight against corruption could also contribute to improving the level of fiscal 
transparency. Shah (2007) argued that while there may be no ‘one size fits all’ solution to public 
finance corruption, streamlining of the regulatory framework and strengthening of enforcement 
together with building the capacity of public financial accountability institutions will help reduce public 
finance corruption. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, there is need for broad, concurrent and 
comprehensive institutional reforms involving all the dimensions of institutions as well as all the 
stakeholders in the budget process. Given the aggregate positive impact of the quality of institutions 
on fiscal transparency, such reforms should cover all the six sub-indices of institutions. This can lead 
to an increase in fiscal transparency, reducing the level of information asymmetry between the 
principals and agents in the budget process, and ultimately improving fiscal outcomes and improving 
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CHAPTER 6  
THE POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF FISCAL TRANSPARENCY: 
EVIDENCE FROM SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (SSA)23 
 
6.1  Introduction 
The importance of fiscal transparency towards realising desired fiscal outcomes has been 
established by extant studies such as Alesina and Perotti (1996), Alt et al. (2006) and Miles-Ferretti 
(2004). Similarly, Wehner and de Renzio (2013), Tekeng and Saharaf (2015), Andreula and Chong 
(2016) and Heald (2013) have identified a plethora of possible determinants of fiscal transparency 
which can be sub-classified into institutional, political and economic factors. Within the framework of 
the principal-agency theory and the common pool problem, it is becoming imperative to go beyond 
institutional factors and x-ray the political dynamics that influence fiscal transparency. Such a study 
in the context of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) could go a long way in helping to identify some of the 
reasons why fiscal transparency has been poor in SSA and consequently help provide some of the 
requisite insights into why fiscal outcomes have also been poor in SSA. In supporting the link 
between fiscal transparency and fiscal outcome, Eslava (2010) argued that fiscal discipline needs to 
be enhanced by fiscal transparency as fiscal deficits will be larger in context with less budget 
transparency. Rogoff (1990) opined that voters observe only part of the visible expenditures of 
government. Shi and Svensson (2006) argued that opportunistic fiscal deficits could arise if it were 
permissible for voters to observe all government programmes whilst at the same time making sure 
that some individuals remain oblivious of the fiscal balance. 
The last two decades have seen most African countries transiting largely from authoritarian military 
regimes to some form of democratic governance ranging from the British parliamentary system of 
government to the US style presidential system of government. Democracy in Africa has also 
experienced some deepening of late as evidenced by the peaceful transfer of power from one 
political party to another in many African states. However, as clearly argued by Schmitter and Karl 
(1991), elections alone do not equal democracy, even when they are periodically repeated and open 
to opposition parties. Brownlee (2007) characterised elections as symptoms, not causes, whilst 
Levitsky and Way (2010) argued that multiparty elections are not by themselves an independent 
cause of democratisation. Hence, it is also obvious that whilst elections are indicators of democracy 
                                               
23 This paper was presented at the 2017 African Finance Journal (AFJ) Conference organised at the Elephant Hills 





and even potential drivers of democratic progress, the dynamics and interplay of political parties and 
how they affect the budget process goes beyond mere elections.  
An emerging debate is the dynamics of development aid and the role of conditionality as they 
influence fiscal transparency reforms in SSA. Anwar Shah (2007) highlighted the different types of 
conditions that come with aid, among which are the governance and institutional reform conditions. 
Fölscher (2002) buttress this point stressing that aid conditionalities are increasingly emphasising 
the need for improved transparency and accountability as well as reforms in the budget process of 
recipient countries. Nevertheless, no known empirical study has been carried out on the impact of 
such conditionalities on transparency of the fiscal process in the exclusive context of SSA. 
Against the foregoing, this paper will focus more on the dynamics and interplay of political forces 
within a democratic setting and how these forces influence the level of fiscal transparency in SSA. 
Thus, the objective of this paper is to investigate the nexus between political forces and fiscal 
transparency in Africa. The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The background on fiscal 
transparency and why it is important is in Section 6.2. Sections 6.3 presents stylised facts on the 
quality of fiscal transparency in Africa vis-à-vis the world, and Section 6.4 reviews relevant literature 
and provides a theoretical underpinning of the study. Section 6.5 presents the methodology and 
discusses the results. Section 6.5 concludes with some policy implications.  
6.2 Background  
Despite the increased interest in the notion of fiscal transparency and its benefits by academics and 
policy makers, very few studies have explored its political determinants. This is especially so and 
more worrying as it pertains to SSA, a region of the world that has experienced some of the poorest 
levels of fiscal outcome and fiscal transparency for quite some time. Glennerster and Shin (2008) 
and Hameed (2005) revealed evidence that suggests that fiscal transparency is associated with 
better sovereign bond ratings and greater access to international capital markets. The renaissance 
in fiscal transparency and its political causes in most developing economies (including African 
economies) can be attributed to factors such as the current increase in the demand for good 
governance norms and best practice, political transitions from closed authoritarian regimes to 
competitive democracy, organised civil society, a more engaged citizenry, and an organised media.  
As clearly identified by the earliest work and template on best practices for budget transparency, this 
area of macroeconomics is completely enmeshed with politics given that fiscal policy is typically 
concerned with issues of redistribution across individuals, regions and generations, and these are 
the epicenter of political conflict.24 The OECD (2002, p. 7), defined fiscal transparency as “the full 
disclosure of all relevant fiscal information in a timely and systematic manner”. However, the most 
                                               





comprehensive definition of fiscal transparency remains that offered by Kopits and Craig (1998 p.1), 
who defined fiscal transparency as “openness toward the public at large about government structure 
and functions, fiscal policy intentions, public sector accounts, and projections. It involves ready 
access to reliable, comprehensive, timely, understandable, and internationally comparable 
information on government activities – whether undertaken inside/outside the government sector – 
so that the electorate and financial markets can accurately assess the government’s financial 
position and the true costs and benefits of government activities, including their present and future 
economic and social implications”. 
6.2.1 Some stylised facts on the level of fiscal transparency in Africa 
Globally, the 1990s and early 2000s saw several countries transiting from authoritarian and mostly 
single party autocratic regimes and embracing multiparty democratic rules of one form or another. 
The case was not different in Africa. Prior to this period, governments in most developing countries 
were characterised by a very low level of transparency and accountability given that there were very 
few institutions to perform checks and balances in the system of government they ran. Huntington 
(1991) referred to this period as the third wave of democratisation. Africa was not left out of this wave 
as most African states also transited from mostly military rule to democratic governance. At the core 
of democratic governance lies the principle of ‘separation of power’ or ‘checks and balances’. This 
presupposes that for good economic governance to prevail, the political institutions and forces of the 
state that facilitate checks and balances must operate optimally. Hence the oversight functions of 
the parliament to check and exert some form of transparency and public accountability from the 
executive organ of the government and vice versa becomes sacrosanct. Such demand for public 
accountability on the efficient use of public resources was highlighted by Schiavo-Campo (2007), 
who rightly identified transparency and accountability, amongst other factors, as crucial elements of 
good economic governance. 
Fiscal transparency is a vital component of political accountability as it aids voters’ understanding of 
government’s fiscal plans and processes. (Von Hagen, 2007). The budget process is a contract of 
some sort between the principals (the electorate) and the agents (elected officials). Von Hagen 
(2007)  in Shah (2007, p. 37) also argued that an essential condition of the retrospective voting 
paradigm is “the ability to compare the actual performance of the government against its past plans 
and intentions”.25 An improved level of fiscal transparency reduces the level of information 
asymmetry on the part of the electorate which in turn aids voters in making their voting decision 
within the retrospective voting paradigm. However, understanding the political dynamics of the 
budget process and how they affect fiscal disclosure is crucial to understanding why fiscal outcomes 
                                               
25 Retrospective voting paradigm refers to the process voting only upon taking into consideration, consideration factors 
such as the performance of a political party, an officeholder or an administration. It is more concerned with previous policy 





have been poor in Africa for quite some time. The ensuing question becomes, how is Africa faring in 
terms of fiscal transparency?  
The open budget index, the proxy for fiscal transparency, represented in Figure 6.1 shows that, apart 
from South Africa which shares the first position with New Zealand and discloses sufficient fiscal 
information, most SSA countries recorded poor fiscal transparency performance. The closest was 
Uganda with a score of 60%, which fell under the limited provision characterisation. What would be 
more worrying to fiscal policy makers and stakeholders is that a continent that has evidently and 
consistently recorded poor fiscal policy outcomes over the years is not making much effort at fiscal 
disclosure, a key ingredient for helping to address poor fiscal outcomes. Countries such as Lesotho 
and Niger scored 0, with most African countries scoring low – a categorisation for countries that 
recorded scores ranging from 0–40%. 
Besides the poor performance of SSA countries already highlighted, it is pertinent to point out that 
only one francophone country (Senegal) made it into the list of the top five best performing countries 
in SSA as indicated in Figure 6.2 (the fiscal transparency scores for SSA countries), the other top 
four were anglophone countries where common law is mostly the legal system in practice. Senegal 
is a former French colony with a French administrative and legal system. Another important 
observation from Figure 6.2 is the poor performance of mineral-rich states such as Nigeria, 
Botswana, Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo. This raises questions such as could there be 
a nexus between the possession of mineral wealth and the level of fiscal transparency in such a 
country? If fiscal transparency is this poor in SSA, what role have political factors played towards 







Figure 6.1: Global fiscal transparency levels 
 
Source: Computed by author based on data from International Budget Partnership – Open Budget Index 2017 
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Figure 6.2: Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA): fiscal transparency performance 
 
Source: Computed by author based on data from International Budget Partnership – Open Budget 
Index 2017 
6.3 Review of literature and conceptual framework 
6.3.1 Theoretical underpinning – the Principal Agency theory 
A fundamental principle in public finance is that some people are saddled with the responsibility of 
spending other people’s money. As rightly highlighted by Shah (2007), in democracies, voters 
delegate the power over public spending and taxes to elected politicians. As highlighted earlier, fiscal 
outcomes, especially deficits, are the products of fiscal transparency. Hence an adequate discourse 
on the political determinants of fiscal transparency must straddle the political economy of budget 
deficits, particularly macroeconomic populism and opportunism and common pool problems, as well 
as the challenges emanating from the principal agency relationship in the budget process. The 
theories underlying these three problems best explains the political forces behind the level of fiscal 
transparency experiences and why budget deficits persist in most developing countries, particularly 
SSA countries.  
Beginning with the principal-agency problems, Von Hagen (2007) contextualised the budget process 
arrangement with his twin arguments of the tendency for principal-agency problems and the common 
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fiscal process is their fear of potential backlash from their principals (the electorate) who hire and fire 
them via elections when poor fiscal outcomes are recorded or at the first sign of unexplained secrecy 
on how government finances are being managed. The principal-agency relationship is characterised 
by imperfect and asymmetric information which allows fiscal policy misconduct by self-interested 
agents. Within the framework of the principal-agency relationship, the obligatory release of fiscal 
information introduced by fiscal transparency measures will lessen the level of information 
asymmetry which was to the benefit of elected officials. As a result, this will consequently ease the 
monitoring of the agents (elected officials) by the principals (the electorate) and increase public 
accountability. Improvements in the level of fiscal transparency would facilitate the emergence of a 
government that will be more accountable and responsive to the electorate.  
Fiscal transparency thus become a crucial tool for rewarding (voting in) or sanctioning (voting out) 
agents as it helps voters to understand government’s fiscal plans and actions. Lindstedt and Laurin 
(2010) sum it up by describing fiscal transparency as the indispensable driver of the process of 
demanding public accountability from fiscal policy decision-makers (politicians) and, by extension, 
shows the effectiveness of citizens’ delegating power. As aptly described by Persson et al. (1997) 
and Seabright (1996), the principal-agent relationship is akin to an incomplete contract. This is owing 
to the fiscal information deficit between the electorate and the elected officials, which the officials will 
want to use strictly to their own advantage, leaving politicians with substantial residual powers over 
the electorate. The greater these residual powers are, the greater will be the divergence between 
voter preferences and actual policies. On their part, the electorate will want to reduce such privileges 
by subjecting politicians to stringent public accountability. Florinni (2000) argued that the value of 
transparency lies in its role as an evaluation tool helping to overcome or reduce the principal-agent 
problems, particularly the challenges that principals have in ensuring that agents’ actions are in 
tandem with what the principals want them to do, as against the interest of the agents. 
The common pool problem arises when politicians’ (or parties’) support increases in targeted 
spending that provide their constituencies with more public services for which they are responsible 
for barely a fraction of the total cost given that the spending is financed by general taxation. This 
ultimately results in a spending and deficit bias (Velasco, 2000; von Hagen, 2007). It is very important 
to point out that such situations are associated with a less transparent budget process. The common 
pool problem is at the heart of some of the externalities in managing public finances. Common pool 
problems emanate from heterogeneous interests across groups of voters and have been advanced 
by Eslava (2010) as another possible reason for pervasive deficits. Influential works by both 
Weingast et al. (1981) and Baron and Ferejohn (1989) expound the fiscal influence of such 
heterogeneous interest groups on the budget. They attributed the problem to different agents 
(elected officials) making budget decisions whilst representing different groups that are interested in 





resultant effect is that each group internalises the full benefit of specific projects, but only pays part 
of the cost, as the cost is shared by all the groups. This results in over-provision of government 
projects. Therefore, the size of the budget and the deficit increases as the number of districts 
involved in the design of the budget increases for a given revenue. 
The political economy hypothesis on the causes of fiscal deficits has also gained traction for quite 
some time. Particularly, the role of both macroeconomic populism and macroeconomic opportunisms 
has been emphasised. According to Dornbusch and Edwards (1990) as cited in Hossain and 
Chowdhury (1998), macroeconomic populism denotes a situation where a populist government 
undertakes ambitious programmes and gives priority to distributive objectives. 
Macroeconomic opportunism arises when non-democratic regimes attempt to maintain and 
legitimise their rule by buying allegiance of political elites of both the left and right. Hossain and 
Chowdhury (1998, pp. 152-153) surmised that “they are a reflection of the weakness of the state 
where government has either caved in to the demands of narrow interest groups or courts interest 
groups for its survival.” In identifying the structural causes of budget deficits in developing countries, 
one of the key issues identified by Tanzi (1982) as cited in Hossain and Chowdhury (1994) is the 
increased expenditure for political exigencies. This buttresses the notion that macroeconomics of 
deficits is interwoven with the state of national politics. In any country where the politicians are not 
accountable for the consequences of their policy decisions, they can get away with policy profligacy 
without worrying about the welfare of the citizenry. 
The very persuasive work by Eslava (2010) on the political economy of fiscal deficits concluded with 
findings that reinforce the position of Dornbusch and Edwards (1990) and Hossain and Chowdhury 
(1994). More Specifically, Eslava (2010, p. 665) argued that deficits may arises from diverse 
preferences and the conflicts of interest therefrom. It highlighted the following political economy 
related conflicts as causes of fiscal deficits: “i)deficits arising from the opportunistic motivations of 
incumbents trying to improve their chances of staying in office; (ii) deficits arising from the partisan 
preference of incumbents who either run deficits as a direct reflection of their preference for large 
governments, or run deficits to tie the hands of successors with different fiscal preferences; (iii) 
deficits that arise as the result of the fight of group with conflicting interests for a fixed pool of 
resources” (Eslava, 2010 p.665).   
It can be inferred from the aforementioned points by Eslava that the absence of transparency could 
allow incumbents to end up generating deficits with the view to convincing voters about their 
competence as providers of public goods. Drazen (2000) shared similar views pointing out that 
heterogeneity and conflicts of interest are vital to any political economic analysis. The case is not 
different when considering political and economic analysis of fiscal deficits and its causes. She went 





“preference heterogeneity between policymakers and voters (i.e. principal-agent relationship); 
heterogeneity of fiscal preferences across politicians (i.e. partisanship); or heterogeneity of fiscal 
preferences across social groups or regions” Eslava (2010, p. 646).  Heterogeneity of fiscal 
preferences across social groups or regions can be best captured or described by the degree of 
polarisation or ethno-fractionalisation in a country.  More so, Eslava (2010) argued further that fiscal 
discipline should be enhanced by transparency of the budget process as well as setting numerical 
limits to the deficits. It is imperative to point out that whereas African countries have tried setting 
numerical fiscal limits, not very much has been achieved in terms of fiscal transparency, hence 
necessitating a study such as ours. 
6.3.2 Review of relevant literature 
As highlighted earlier, whilst a significant amount of work has tried to examine the benefits of fiscal 
transparency, no known study has examined the relationship between political forces and fiscal 
transparency in the context of SSA. Our new interest may be owing to a gamut of factors most of 
which are akin to those put forward by Khagram et al. (2013) who itemised four key causal triggers 
(political transitions, fiscal and economic crises, political and corruption scandals, and external 
influences) whose complex interaction advances or impedes fiscal transparency. Khagram et al. 
(2013) opined that these triggers generate opportunities as well as incentives for players such as 
political leaders, CSOs and civil servants to take actions in planning, implementing and sustaining 
reforms with a view to enhancing fiscal openness.  
Over the past two decades, most African states have migrated from “closed” authoritarian regimes 
to multi-party democratic states. Huntington (1991) and Giovanni and Andrea (2016) described this 
period as the third wave of democratisation. Multiparty democracy as described by Khagram et al. 
(2013) is typified by separation of power, policy contestations, party competition, organised civil 
society organisations, engaged citizenry and an active media, all of which are crucial to a transparent 
society. Preceding this period, many African countries were previously characterised as closed, 
authoritarian regimes. Characteristically, such closed states were characterised by very poor 
transparency thresholds given the dearth of institutions for checks and balances in such systems. 
Fiscal and economic crises can trigger calls for higher levels of fiscal transparency. Various regional 
and global financial crises increased the need to reassess international efforts to promote fiscal 
transparency for two reasons. First, such crises revealed that most (developed and developing) 
governments had an inadequate understanding of their existing fiscal position as revealed by the 
emergence of previously unrecorded deficits and debts. The situation could be worse for SSA which 
Lledo and Poplawski-Ribeiro (2013) characterised as possessing weak budget procedures and 
inadequate budget institutions. Prior studies such as Caprio (1998) corroborate this position. 





countries during the financial crises were also the least transparent Asian countries. Second, as 
argued by Vishwanath and Kaufmann (1999), paucity or lack of transparency poses as a constraint 
on economic policy and social outcomes, negatively affecting welfare and development. 
Globally, political corruption scandals have emerged as triggers of fiscal transparency. Opposition 
parties often exploit reports of political corruption scandals amongst the ruling party as an opportunity 
to sell the lack of transparency and accountability of the ruling party before the electorate, and the 
opposition as a viable alternative. In the context of SSA, this seems to have had some effect as the 
promise of a viable alternative and a more accountable and transparent government by the 
opposition parties potentially contributed to the flurry of civil changes of governments via elections 
in the last four years ( Van Gyampo et al., 2017; Owen and Usman, 2015). Itodo and O’Regan (2018) 
concurred with the role that political and corruption scandals play in triggering fiscal transparency 
and accountability. Notably, on Africa’s most populous country (Nigeria), they argued that an 
invigorated push for transparency and accountability was needed in Nigeria owing to an increased 
level of activism coupled with a desire to collectively and robustly confront corruption. External 
influence is also a trigger on fiscal transparency. This mostly emanates from recent foreign policies 
by the insistence of major international donor countries and agencies such as the IMF, the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) and UK Aid Direct (UKaid) on tying future 
foreign aids to reforms related to improvements in fiscal transparency (Drummond, 2011). Acemoglu 
et al. (2003) described countries as possessing strong institutions if they are democratic, have 
relative equality, suffer few radical social cleavages, and have a variety of checks and balances on 
political behaviour. Wehner and De Renzio (2013) opined that government’s decision to publish or 
withhold information is primarily political, and thus it is likely it to be influenced by citizens via their 
exercise of the right to vote, and by the nature of party politics and political competition. 
From our theoretical underpinning, we opined that public accountability can only be enhanced via 
an improved level of fiscal transparency and vice versa. Generally, accountability can be defined as 
possessing the capacity to hold public officials to task for their actions or inactions. Whilst the public 
hold public officials to task via the power of their votes, parliament, whom the public vote in, are 
saddled with the direct responsibility of constantly demanding full disclosure from the executive via 
their oversight and public accountability functions, to establish whether or not there was corruption 
or waste and to ask for ‘value for money’. The World Bank (2006) summed it by defining oversight 
as “the monitoring of executive activities for efficiency, probity, transparency and fidelity, to ensure 
that funds appropriated by the parliament are used legally, effectively and for the purpose for which 
they were intended.” However, in some cases, it has been the case where coincidentally, the 
parliament is dominated by Members of Parliament (MPs) from the same political party as the sitting 
president. Under such a scenario, the demarcation between the tendency for the MPs to toe the 





takes precedence over legislative independence, public demand for fiscal transparency and hence 
public accountability will be sacrificed. This is where expectations of a healthy contentious 
atmosphere between parliament and the executive on the transparency of the budget process could 
be weakened, creating a weakened version of scrutiny and effectively reducing the legislature to a 
‘rubber stamp’ in most SSA countries. 
As aptly highlighted by Alesina and Perotti (1996), politicians typically do not have an incentive to 
adopt transparent practices. However, there are situations where politicians can implement 
transparent practices. Reacting to this position, Alt and Lassen (2006a) argued that should there be 
frequent political turnover, it would be in the interest of political parties to implement transparent 
political budget institutions with a view to decreasing opportunistic behaviour and consequently debt 
accumulation. However, this may not necessarily be the case in Africa as most of its prior 
governments were largely described as sit tight and it was only until recently that it began 
experiencing a considerable level of political turnover. 
Employing a robust data set on budget transparency developed by  the IBP  for 85 developed and 
developing countries, a study by Wehner and De Renzio (2013) explored the relationship between 
fiscal transparency and two critical sources of demand for fiscal transparency: citizens and 
legislators. Their study revealed a positive relationship between partisan fragmentation (i.e. political 
competition) and fiscal transparency. A few studies have been carried out to examine the relationship 
between ethno-linguistic fractionalisation26 (political polarisation) and fiscal transparency. La Porta 
et al. (1999) was one of the earliest studies to suggest that ethnofractionalisation is important in 
government activities, stressing, however, that legal origin was more important. Other early studies 
such as Canning and Fay (1993) and Mauro (1995) also highlighted the influence that ethnic 
fragmentation has on governments’ activities as well as the general quality of institutions. Studies 
such as Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) and Goldin and Katz (1999) all hinted at the negative impact 
of ethnically fragmented societies on efficiency, participation in social activities and most importantly, 
that trust is lower in economic decisions such as provision of public goods etc. 
Heavily fragmented societies have revealed evidence of poor and inefficient management of the 
economy. Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina et al. (1997) suggested that ethnic diversity lowers 
a country’s economic growth rate as well as provision of public goods. Ethno-linguistic 
fragmentations have been identified in the governance literature as contributing to poor outcomes. 
However, Wehner and De Renzio (2013) found a positive but statistically insignificant relationship 
between ethno-fractionalisation and fiscal transparency. Andreula et al. (2009) and Andreula and 
Chong (2016) found a positive relationship between fiscal transparency and ethno-fractionalisation, 
                                               
26 A full description of ethnofractionalisation is provided in the methodology section (5.4.1). In the course this study ethnic 





although unlike Wehner and De Renzio (2013) both Andreula et al. (2009) and Andreula and Chong 
(2016) found the impact was statistically significant. 
On the nexus between administrative heritage and fiscal transparency, studies by Alt and Lassen 
(2006) found a significant and positive relationship between common law (the opposite of civil law) 
and fiscal transparency. Similarly, and in line with expectations, using civil law as a measure of 
administrative heritage, Wehner and De Renzio (2013) found a negative relationship between civil 
law and fiscal transparency. Employing data from the 2006 open budget index survey, de Renzio et 
al. (2009) discovered that resource-dependent countries suffered from what they described as a 
transparency gap. As pointed out by Ross (2011) non-resource rich countries record higher fiscal 
transparency scores than resource-rich countries. An emerging but very important political driver of 
the level of fiscal transparency is the role played by foreign aid. Although an economic variable, it is 
gradually assuming the role of a political instrument with which donor countries seek greater fiscal 
transparency from recipient developing countries. Over the last decade, as a precondition for 
granting aid, most economic and political superpowers now demand improvements in the level of 
fiscal transparency in recipient countries. However, there are no known empirical reports on how 
much impact such policies have had on fiscal transparency in SSA (Drummond, 2011). 
6.4 Methodology  
This section entails a detailed outline of the econometric models and the underlying partisan and 
political forces influencing variations in fiscal transparency in SSA as well as the estimation 
procedure employed. The analysis spans the period 2006-2015. The section also provides a 
description of the data set employed as well as the sources and mode of measurement. Table 6.1 
presents a description of the variables and source of data. 
6.4.1 Variables, data sources and definition 
The first subsection entails a presentation of our descriptive statistics. Our measure of administrative 
heritage is based on the legal systems practiced by the various SSA countries. We employ dummy 
variables (1) for countries that practice civil law and (0) for countries that do not practice civil law. 
Civil law, which is rooted in the French legal system, was chosen as our preferred dummy variable 
measure of administrative heritage. This is partly because the notion of citizens’ right to fiscal 
information has its roots in article 14-15 of the French 1789 Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen 
which stipulates that society has the right to ask an official for an accounting of his administration. 
La Porta et al. (1999) argued that interventionist legal traditions predicated on civil law yield inferior 
government performance on many indicators, including corruption than those based on the British 





Table 6.1: Sources and definitions of variables 
Variable Definition and mode of measurement Data source 
Ft Fiscal Transparency is the degree of budget transparency ranging from 0 (complete lack of 
transparency) to 100 (full transparency). 
International Budget Partnerships, Open 
Budget Survey (2006-2015) 
Civil laws We employed dummy variables as proxy for administrative heritage. Dummy variable =1 if 




The sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in the government. It measures the 
multiplicity of political parties in a country.  
Inter-American Development Bank’s 
Database of Political Institutions 2018 (Cruz 
et al., 2018). 
Partisan 
Fragmentation 2 
One (1) minus the sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in the legislature. 
Independents are counted as single-member political parties. It measures multiplicity of 
political parties in a country, taking into consideration independent candidates. This technique 
of partisan fragmentation measurement is in line with Beck et al. (2001). 
Inter-American Development Bank’s 
Database of Political Institutions 2018 (Cruz 
et al., 2018).  
Ethno-
Fractionalisation 
One minus (1) the Herfindahl index of ethno-linguistic group shares and represented by the 
probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belong to different groups. 
It ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 connotes a highly heterogeneous ethno-linguistic society. 
Alesina et al. (2003). 
Checks Check and balances is a measure of the legislative and executive indices of electoral 
competitiveness (LIEC and EIEC).  
Inter-American Development Bank’s 
Database of Political Institutions 2018 Cruz 
et al. (2018). 
Military Number of military personnel as a percentage of the total labour force. World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 2016 
Aidgdp Total aid received as a percentage of GDP. World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 2016 
Natres Natural resource revenue as a percentage of GDP. World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 2016 
Growth Growth rate as a percentge of GDP at market prices. World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 2016 
Popngrowth The growth rate (in %) of the number of people in a particular country, World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 2016 





Similar to the methods employed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), Lijphart (1999) and Wehner and 
De Renzio (2013), we employed a Herfindahl index-based measure of partisan fragmentation. This 
was calculated using the seat shares of political parties represented in the legislature as 




where 𝑠𝑖 represents the seat share of party i in the government and N is the number of parties. H is 
the measure of partisan fragmentation. Our choice of this measure is predicated on the notion that 
when more parties are represented and the more evenly their power is distributed, executive control 
of the legislature is more difficult. Following Persson et al. (2007) and Wehner and De Renzio(2013), 
we took the sum of the squared seat shares of all parties represented, with independents treated as 
single-seat parties for this purpose, and subtracted them from one (1). Our resulting partisan 
fragmentation index (partisan2) takes a value of zero whenever a single party occupies all seats in 
the legislature and very close to 1 whenever each seat belongs to a different political party. However, 
not all SSA countries provide for the existence of independent candidature in elections (partisan1). 
In computing this measure, we extracted annual Herfindahl scores based on legislative seat shares 
from the Inter-American Development Bank’s Database of Political Institutions 2018 (Cruz et al., 
2018).  
A key distinguishing feature of a democracy is the presence of an independent legislature which is 
expected to guarantee checks and balances on the activities of the executive arm of government. 
The key legislative function of the parliament is legislative budget oversight and ensuring public 
accountability. This entails a frequent scrutiny of public accounts and ensuring value for money and 
making public findings from their audit investigations. Whilst the public always want fiscal 
transparency (transparency on how the executive branch is spending public funds), voters cannot 
easily demand it. Hence, we would expect greater transparency as checks and balances increase, 
although there is not so much offsetting effect of checks and balances emanating from a coalition 
government.  
Our measure of ethnic-fractionalisation is a Herfindahl -based measure derived as follows: 






2  represents the share of group 𝑖 (𝑖 = 1 … 𝑁) in country j, thus, 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 is computed as 
one minus the Herfindahl index of ethno-linguistic group shares and represented by the probability 






It is germane to point out that parties in a coalition might value opacity in their own spending (e.g. in 
the ministries that they control) more than they value transparency in the spending of other ministries 
not controlled by them. However, it is also imperative to point out that coalition parties are not very 
common in SSA, unlike in European democracies. Most times the experience is a merger of parties 
into one before national elections so that effectively they become one party, as was the case in 
Nigeria and Kenya in 2014 and 2016 respectively. Thus, it becomes safe to assume, ceteris paribus, 
that an improvement in the checks and balances score will lead to an improvement in fiscal 
transparency in SSA. In our analysis, check and balances (check) is a measure of the legislative and 
executive indices of electoral competitiveness. 
6.4.2 Estimation of the political forces influencing fiscal transparency in SSA 
Our empirical analysis will rely on the dynamic panel data model. This is predicated on the 
fundamental advantages of the dynamic panel data methodology in comparison to the static models, 
as well as the advantages of the panel data technique over cross-sectional techniques. Essentially, 
these advantages enable us to investigate our phenomenon of interest. As rightly argued by Labra 
and Torrecillas (2018:2), the dynamic panel data gives us the possibility of addressing the 
heterogeneity of the individuals as well as the use of several instrumental variables in order to deal 
with all sources of endogeneity of the variables in the model also known as the lagged variables. 
Endogenous models dependent largely on their past and accumulative process (Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Dosi, 1988).  
The dynamic panel model permits the inclusion of an endogenous structure into the model via 
instrumental variables. Endogeneity emanates from the existence of correlation between the 
dependent variable and the error term. This is also related to the causal relationship between the 
explanatory variables of the model (Mileva, 2007; Wooldridge, 2013). It may also emanate from poor 
data quality, autoregression and autocorrelated errors and/or omission of relevant variables. Largely, 
panel data econometric analysis comes with some advantages over cross-sectional studies (Hsiao, 
2007). First, it permits us to gain more degrees of freedom through an increase in the variability of 
data, ensuring a greater level of sample variability than would be the case if a cross-sectional 
technique was employed. Also, as highlighted by Wooldridge (2010), cross-sectional regression 
estimates could be biased as a result of risks emanating from omitted-variable bias. 
Our hypothesised nexus between political factors and fiscal transparency in SSA is represented with 
the following panel data model: 
𝐹𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  𝑖 = 1, … … . . 𝑁; … … … … , 𝑇  (6.1) 
Where 𝐹𝑇𝑖𝑡 represents fiscal transparency measured in percentage for country 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 





vectors of parameters we intend to estimate. The composite error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is represented as 𝜀𝑖𝑡 =
𝜓𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡, where  𝜓𝑖 represents the unobserved country specific effect and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error 
term. Our explanatory variables include partisan fragmentation1; partisan fragmentation2; Checks 
and balances; Ethnofractionalisation; Civil law; Military; Natural Resource (percentage of GDP); 
Growth, Population Growth and Aid % GDP (see definitions in Table 5.1). Our empirical models will 
examine the nexus between our determinant variables and fiscal transparency in SSA. In line with 
studies by Alt and Lassen (2006), La Porta et al. (1999), Wehner and De Renzio (2013) and Khagram 
et al. (2013), the level of political competition in a country has been found to wield a positive and 
significant influence on the level of fiscal disclosure. However there exist two variants of how to 
measure the level of competition in a country: those employed by Beck et al. (2001) and Cruz et al. 
(2018). Both of them are Herfindahl index based, but while the Beck et al. measure discounts for the 
existence of independent candidates, the Cruz et al. measure was used in its raw form without 
discounting.  
Recall that in a democratic setting, calls for accountability are demand-driven; hence our analysis 
will focus on the roles of both legislators and citizens in determining or influencing the level of fiscal 
disclosure by the government. A similar position was argued by Benito and Bastida (2009) by 
emphasising the need for an effective legislature and a robust civil society. As an innovation for 
capturing how effective the legislature in Africa has been in demanding fiscal transparency from the 
executive, we included the Cruz et al. (2018) measures of checks and balances in our model. 
Over the years, the relationship between partisan fragmentation and fiscal transparency has been 
examined but limited to studies that were not exclusive to SSA. Alt and Lassen (2006) focused on 
OECD countries and found a positive relationship between political competition (often used 
interchangeably with partisan fragmentation) and the level of fiscal transparency. Similar findings 
were recorded by Khagram et al. (2013) and Wehner and De Renzio (2013). Studies including 
Easterly and Levine (1997), Alesina et al. (1997) and Wehner and De Renzio (2013) highlighted the 
negative nexus between ethnically fragmented societies and efficient management of the economy. 
Following the extant studies, the relationship between political polarisation measured by ethno-
linguistic-fractionalisation and fiscal transparency has also been examined, with findings that were 
contrary to the hypothesised negative association (e.g. Andreula et al., 2009; Wehner and De 
Renzio, 2013; Khagram et al., 2013). 
Andreula et al. (2009) found a significant positive relationship between Ethnofractionalisation and 
fiscal transparency. Like Andreula et al. (2009), Wehner and De Renzio (2013) found a positive but 
insignificant relationship between political polarisation (ethnofractionalisation) and fiscal 
transparency. A similar result was recorded by Khagram et al. (2013). A plausible explanation for 
such unexpected findings may be attributed to the fact that in some situations, the unintended 





public expenditure pattern for fear of marginalisation of linguistic groups yields an improvement in 
fiscal transparency. Hence, unlike with other economic and institutional inefficiencies such as poor 
economic growth which are associated with high ethnofractionalisation, the reverse could be the 
case when it comes to demand for fiscal transparency. This is especially so as overwhelming 
empirical evidence lends support to a positive link between ethnofractionalisation and demand for 
fiscal transparency.  
The socioeconomic control variables considered include administrative heritage proxied by civil law 
or type of legal system, military expenditure, revenue derived from natural resources as a percentage 
of GDP; business disclosure (business), aid as a percentage of GDP, and growth and population 
growth rate (Popngrowth). These socioeconomic factors may affect fiscal transparency positively or 
negatively. Studies such as Wehner and De Renzio (2013) and Tekeng and Sharaf (2015) showed 
that natural resource wealth has consistently being negatively related to fiscal transparency. This 
may not be unconnected with the rentier state nature of such economies and their attendant 
vulnerabilities such as corruption which studies such as De Simone (2017) show is negatively 
correlated to fiscal transparency. The poor level of transparency in the extraction of such natural 
resources may also be a contributing factor. Private disclosure and overall government disclosure 
are connected. Tekeng and Sharaf (2015) underscores this point, arguing that subjecting private 
firms to a high demand for transparency, at least when servicing governments contracts, could 
contribute to an overall improvement in government transparency.  
We included a variable measuring the share of military personnel out of the total population of country 
(World Bank, 2016) with a view to establishing the degree of sway wielded by political regimes or 
administrations at the expense of freedom of expression. The degree of militarisation of a country 
relative to the total labour force is likely to be negatively associated with fiscal transparency (Tekeng 
and Sharaf, 2015). From the perspective of developing countries, larger armed forces can be linked 
to less transparent government policies for two reasons. Tekeng and Sharaf (2015) buttress this 
point, stressing that the prominence of the size and role of the armed forces is connected to the 
likelihood of oppression by the protected government over the population. This could impede civil 
society’s efforts to hold governments accountable for the outcomes of its policies. And large armed 
forces could be connected with high-handed and opaque government expenditure on military 
equipment.  
Civil law is rooted in the French legal system. It was selected as our preferred dummy variable 
measure of administrative heritage. In line with the a priori expectations, Alt and Lassen (2006) found 
a significant and positive relationship between common law and fiscal transparency. Similarly, using 
civil law as a measure of administrative heritage, Wehner and De Renzio (2013) revealed a negative 
relationship as expected although it was not statistically significant. Population growth is expected 





pressure for judicious and transparent use of resources. However, economic growth is expected to 
yield an ambivalent relationship with fiscal transparency. When growth is knowledge-based and 
inclusive, it will yield an improvement in general well-being in the citizenry. Under such a scenario, 
the citizenry will be more knowledgeable of their rights and will be able to seek more transparency 
in the use of public funds. The opposite will be the case if growth is strictly commodity-based (or not 
knowledge-based).  
Equation 6.1 assumes that fiscal transparency responds to changes in the covariates instantly. This 
is a major concern with the regression as in reality, such covariates could impact on fiscal 
transparency with some lags. Additionally, preceding levels of fiscal transparency could potentially 
influence subsequent fiscal transparency levels. De Renzio (2011) rightly suggests that current 
levels of fiscal transparency influence future transparency levels given that part of the major 
preconditions by donor countries for future aid is an improvement by recipient countries on their 
current levels of budget transparency. Moreover, a contemporary published level of fiscal 
transparency usually leads to calls by CSOs for future improvement, especially against the backdrop 
of the abysmal level of fiscal transparency performance amongst African countries. Consequently, 
we consider a dynamic model given its provision for partial adjustments in this fashion: 
𝐹𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑓𝑡𝐹𝑇𝑖 𝑡−1 + 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (6.2) 
Where 𝐹𝑇𝑖 𝑡−1 is the lagged dependent variable, and 𝛽𝑓𝑡 represents our measure of adjustment 
process, which is expected not to be greater than one (1). All our variables previously defined above 
are contained in 𝑥𝑖𝑡, fiscal transparency measured in percentage, and 𝑓𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 is its lagged value 
(dynamic component). 𝑥𝑖𝑡 represents a matrix of the components of our political variables as well as 
our control variables. 
Equations 6.1 and 6.2 represent the static and dynamic fiscal transparency models respectively. The 
static panel model may be predisposed to limitations such as endogeneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity as well as cross-sectional dependence challenges. Whereas the unobserved 
heterogeneity effect can be addressed using the fixed effect (FE) estimator by treating the 
unobserved effects as time invariant, the random effect (RE) estimator is employed whenever 
statistical evidence suggests that the unobserved heterogeneity is a random variable and is not 
correlated with the covariates (𝑥𝑖𝑡). 27 Endogeneity problems could emanate from political factors, or 
from omission of other relevant variables from the model. The unobserved time invariant 
heterogeneity issues and the endogeneity issues can be addressed using the IV estimator that is 
based on FE. Nevertheless, results from both the FE and IV could be biased due to the presence of 
                                               
27 The choice between FE and RE estimators is determined by carrying out the Hausman test with a null hypothesis (Ho): 
unobserved heterogeneity ( 𝜔𝑖) is not correlated with the covariates (𝑥𝑖𝑡). Under the null Hypothesis (H0), the RE is 
consistent and efficient. Regardless of whether or not H0 is true, the FE estimator is always consistent, the random effect 





a cross-sectional relationship. It is noteworthy that SSA countries may be made up of independent 
states, however, there still exists the possibility of identical responses from countries to common 
shocks. This implies that some of the political or socio-economic factors considered in the model 
and ultimately fiscal transparency may be correlated. 
The dynamic panel model (Equation 6.2) is predisposed to some econometric challenges such as 
those highlighted above. This is further complicated by challenges presented by correlation between 
the lagged dependent variable and the error term, specifically with regard to the unobserved country-
specific heterogeneity  𝜓𝑖. In addition to these challenges, given that 𝐹𝑇𝑖𝑡 is also a function of 𝜓𝑖 
which is time invariant, our inclusion of 𝐹𝑇𝑖 𝑡−1 as one of the regressors in Equation 6.2 could 
correlate with 𝜓𝑖 , and hence with 𝜀𝑖𝑡. Also, the presence of the lagged dependent variables 𝐹𝑇𝑖 𝑡−1 
as one of the regressors in the model could lead to autocorrelation challenges in the model. As aptly 
argued by Roodman (2009), given such situations, employing the OLS technique will yield biased 
and inconsistent estimates and it would be better to adopt the GMM technique over the FE and IV 
estimators. Furthermore, as highlighted by Bond (2002), the panel data estimator permits the 
consideration of the dynamic process which is very important for recovering consistent estimates of 
the parameters of interest. 
To avoid results that are potentially biased in our empirical analysis, we adopt the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) GMM estimator as it controls for the unobserved country heterogeneity (country-fixed effect), 
endogeneity (bi-directionality) of the explanatory variables, and the lagged dependent variable to 
estimate our dynamic model. More importantly, the dynamic panel GMM methodology will permit us 
to treat fiscal transparency as a dynamic process as well as addressing such issues of bi-
directionality. 
Two types of GMM estimators exist: the difference GMM (DGMM) estimator and the systems GMM 
(SGMM) estimator. Our estimations of the empirical relationship between fiscal transparency and 
our variables of interest will rely on the SGMM estimator given that it has proven to be more efficient 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995). When the SGMM is employed, additional instruments are easily 
obtained from the system of two equations (a differenced and a level equation). The addition of the 
second equation yields more instruments. The SGMM is more suitable and particularly applicable 
for our study as it is designed for situations with short time periods and many countries (Roodman, 
2006). This clearly fits our dataset which has a short time period of five, and a large number of SSA 
countries (23 countries).  
Likewise, two types of systems GMM estimator exist – the one-step estimation and the two-step 
estimation. We employed the two-step estimator which has the Windmeijer (2005) corrected 
standard errors because it is asymptotically more efficient than the one-step estimator. We used the 





maximising the sample size. In conclusion, in checking for consistency of our estimates, we used 
two specification tests, the Arellano and Bond Sargan test for second-order serial correlation in the 
error term and the Hansen test of over-identification restrictions. The Sargan/Hansen test measures 
the validity of the instruments by analysing sample analogues of the moment conditions used in the 
estimation. By design, the error term may be serially correlated in the first order. Nevertheless, 
having second-order serial correlation will be a sign of misspecification, consequently, the AR (2) 
should not be significant. 
To achieve normality of our response variables and overcome potential skewness, we took a log 
transformation of our key response variables i.e. partisan fragmentation1 (lpartisan1), partisan 
fragmentation2 (lpartisan2), checks and balances (lcheck), and ethno-linguistic fractionalisation 
(lethnofract). Also, and very important, throughout the estimation, as a rule with system GMM 
technique we made sure the number of instruments was never more than the number of groups. We 
also looked at the trend of our control variables, i.e. natural resources as a percentage of GDP, 
military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, administrative heritage proxied by the legal system 
practiced (civil or common law), population growth, business environment and economic growth, and 
population growth. As earlier argued in line with Hurlin and Mignon (2007), there was no need to 
carry out the panel unit root test owing to the small sample nature of the study (unbalanced panel of 
3-5 years) for just 23 countries. Hurlin and Mignon strongly argue that unit root tests generally have 
low power in small sample sizes to distinguish non-stationary series from stationary series that are 
persistent. Increasing the power of unit root tests will entail increasing the number of observations: 
this is not feasible in our case given our fixed scope of study (SSA) and a maximum period of 3-5 
years.  
6.5 Empirical results and discussions  
6.5.1 Summary statistics and correlation matrix 
In this section, our preoccupation is on presentation and discussion of the empirical results from our 
model estimations. We begin with the descriptive statistics followed by the presentation of the 
correlation matrix and finally, the formal presentation of our empirical analysis that tests our 
hypothesised relationships. The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 6.2. Our summary 
statistics reveal a 32.33% average level of fiscal transparency for Africa over the period 2006-2015. 
This is abysmal and corresponds to a “low level” of fiscal transparency characterisation on the Open 
Budget Index (OBI) scale (0-100%). The minimum score is 0 and the maximum score by any African 
country score is 92 with a standard deviation of 23.5%. This signifies a very high disparity amongst 
SSA countries in terms of fiscal transparency. Interestingly, most of the SSA countries (including 
Uganda, Senegal and Benin) that allow independent candidates are amongst those that score above 





allow independent candidates in their electoral process: this is an important deduction that can be 
investigated further. Upon inspection of partisan 2, our summary statistics reveal a mean partisan 
fragmentation index of 0.446, a standard deviation of 0.572 and a maximum of 0.770. This measure 
reveals that although with a wide dispersion from the mean value, the mean value is close to 0.5 – 
an indication of a significant level of partisan fragmentation. 
 Table 6.2: Summary statistics 




Ft 104 32.327 23.531 0 92 
Civillaw 104 0.442 0.499 0 1 
Partisan Fragmentation 1 104 0.955 0.572 0.23 4 
Partisan Fragmentation 2 104 0.045 0.572 -3 0.77 
Checks 100 2.480 1.235 0 5 
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalisation 104 0.725 0.169 0.22 0.92 
Military 97 0.551 0.567 0.08 2.71 
Aidgdp 99 9.759 19.079 0.07 150 
Natres 104 15.443 12.935 1.37 58 
Growth 104 5.729 3.978 -9.09 19 
Popngrowth 104 2.832 0.715 1.05 4.61 
Urpopn 85 15.007 0.975 13.7 17.2 
 
Source: Computed by the author. 
 
With the Cruz et al. (2018) measure (partisan1), the average level of partisan fragmentations in SSA 
is 0.995. This suggests a very ‘high level’ of partisan fragmentation in Africa. With the Becket al. 
measure of partisan fragmentation, the average level of partisan fragmentation in Africa is 0.045 and 
the maximum recorded by any African country is 0.77. Another important deduction from this stage 
of the analysis is that there is a significant level of revenue from natural resources as a percentage 
of GDP in Africa. This reflects that a large number of SSA countries differ from the mean value of 
partisanship fragmentation recorded in Africa. SSA has a ‘very high’ ethno-linguistic fractionalisation 
average level of 0.75, thus a high level of competitiveness for resources that is ripe for common pool 
problems since most times the constituency delineation is along semi-homogeneous ethnic groups. 
The SSA level of fractionalisation may not be surprising given the many ethno-linguistic groups that 
make up the continent.  
The high level of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation in SSA connotes the presence of diverse groups 
with diverse policy expectations from the budget, increasing the earlier highlighted common pool 
problem on the budget. The average natural resources as a percentage of GDP in SSA is ~15%. 





resources. This also can breed institutional vulnerabilities such as a rentier system that is 
characterised by corruption. The average growth rate for SSA is 5.73% whilst Africa’s population 
grew at an average of 2.83% for the period covered by our analysis. The average GDP per capita is 
US$2,494.13 with a minimum value of US$182. This perhaps explains why most SSA countries are 




The pairwise correlation matrix for the variables employed in our empirical analysis presented in 
Table 6.3 serves as a pointer for causal relationships as well as the presence or absence of 
multicollinearity. However, correlation does not establish causality. As expected, natural resource 
revenue, ratio of military force to total labour force, and civil law exhibited a negative correlation with 
fiscal transparency. The negative correlation between fiscal transparency and other factors such as 
Aidgdp and Partisan2 are contrary to expectations. An ambivalent relationship is expected between 
fiscal transparency and growth as well as population growth. In line with expectations, most of our 
variables of interest except partisan1 and 2 do not show a very high pairwise correlation. The high 
correlation between partisan1 and partisan2 is not a source of concern as they will not both be 
employed in the same model nor will they be employed in the construction of any index. Therefore, 
there is no cause for concern of multicollinearity, owing to the fact that generally, the independent 
variables do not hold very high correlation values amongst one another.  
                                               





Table 6.3: Correlation table of variables 
 
ft Civillaw Partisan1 Partisan2 Checks Ethnofract Military Aidgdp Natres Growth Popngrowth 
ft 1.000 
          
Civillaw -0.597* 1.000 
         
Partisan1 0.190 -0.280* 1.000 
        
Partisan2 -0.191 0.280* -1.000* 1.000 
       
Checks 0.002 -0.182 -0.331* 0.330* 1.000 
      
Ethnofract 0.200* -0.260* 0.192 -0.192 0.154 1.000 
     
Military -0.091 -0.117 0.058 -0.058 -0.424* -0.210* 1.000 
    
Aidgdp -0.099 -0.088 -0.037 0.037 0.404* 0.122 -0.228* 1.000 
   
Natres -0.406* 0.286* -0.064 0.064 0.108 0.096 -0.045 0.255* 1.000 
  
Growth -0.164 0.057 0.023 -0.023 0.053 -0.022 0.035 0.071 0.234* 1.000 
 
Popngrowth -0.587* 0.493* 0.019 -0.019 0.042 0.018 -0.374* 0.261* 0.512* 0.131 1.000 
 
Source: Author’s computation 
 





6.5.2 Findings of the underlying political drivers of fiscal transparency 
Our estimation results are presented in Table 6.4. Our analysis and reports are based on outputs 
derived from the dynamic panel data system GMM models (Equation 6.2). There are four regressions 
in the results table representing our regression estimates of the various political forces that influence 
fiscal transparency: Partisan fragmentation1(lpartisan1); Partisan fragmentation2(lpartisan2), 
Checks and Balances (lcheck), and Ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, (lethnofract). Because 
sometimes political factors can be somewhat correlated, employing these variables of interest 
individually in each model allows us to capture the near-exact impact (magnitude) of each variable 
on fiscal transparency, thus avoiding the likelihood of overlapping impact. 
We hypothesised that both measures of partisan fragmentation as well as checks and balances have 
a positive and significant relationship with fiscal transparency. Hence, our expected or predicted 
signs for βs are expected to be positive and statistically significant for both measures of partisan 
fragmentation and for checks and balances and negative for Ethnofractionalisation.  
From Table 6.4 the lag of our dependent variable Ft(t-1) in all the models is statistically significant 
and positively associated with cotemporaneous levels of fiscal transparency in Africa. More 
importantly, the absolute value of the autoregressive parameter is less than 1. This is a necessary 
condition for a dynamic panel data model to be considered stationary (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
Our unadjusted measure of political competition, also known as partisan fragmentation (partisan1), 
exhibits a negative but statistically significant association with fiscal transparency in Africa. This 
relationship though significant at 5% does not conform to expectations. However, upon adjusting to 
account for independent candidates, partisan2 shows a positive and significant relationship. This 
implies that taking into consideration the presence of independent candidates, an increase in 
partisan fragmentation will lead to an improvement in the level of fiscal transparency. This finding is 
in line with a priori expectations and with the position argued by extant studies. For example 
Halleberg (2004) suggested that political competition is important for transparent fiscal institutions, 
and Rosendorff and Vreeland (2006) found a positive relationship between political competition and 
fiscal transparency. Also, worthy of note is the importance of independent candidates in the party 
fragmentation variable. This could mean that the more independent candidates there are in 
parliament, the better for fiscal transparency and overall good governance. Of course, the presence 
of independents could also mean a lot for the nature of the socio-political context and underlying 
structure. A multi-party system may not fully represent groups in an ethno-fragmented society. The 
ethnic groups with larger numbers can capture government agenda to the detriment of other groups. 
The presence of more independents serves to ensure that the other groups are not neglected in the 





Studies by Wehner and De Renzio (2013) on a global data set and von Hagen (2007) also revealed 
a positive relationship between partisan fragmentation and fiscal transparency. Alt and Lassen 
(2006) argued that political competition is important for the adoption of transparent fiscal institution 
given that the higher the level of political competition, the less similar the preferences of opposite 
parties, and consequently the higher the benefits of tying the hands of a political adversary by 
initiating fiscal transparency reforms. However, this can only be the case if there is frequent political 
turnover, then it will be in the interest of all the political parties to implement some form of 
transparency with the budget institutions with a view to reducing opportunistic behaviour of political 
opponents as well as the debt accumulation in political equilibrium. In essence parties will mostly 
cooperate on fiscal transparency when they are not sure of the ability or identity of future candidates 
and as far as both parties are sure that they both are equally likely to be in government in the near 
future (Alt and Lassen, 2006). Studies by Wehner and De Renzio (2013) on a global data set 
revealed a positive relationship between partisan fragmentation and fiscal transparency. An 
argument that can be made in this regard is that independent candidates, as the name implies, 
cannot be consumed by the “toe the party line syndrome”. Rather, most times, when such 
independent candidates prevail in elections, it is often attributed to society’s trust in their sense of 
independence, integrity and desire to seek a transparent and accountable government. 
From our estimated results, contrary to a priori expectation, checks and balances showed a negative 
association with fiscal transparency albeit the relationship is not statistically significant. In the context 
of SSA, this result is not entirely surprising. A plausible explanation can be attributed to the toeing 
the party line syndrome where allegiance to the party trumps allegiance to parliament as an 
independent institution. This vitiates or diminishes the oversight function of the parliament as well as 
the public accountability role of the legislature, ultimately leading to a drop in the level of fiscal 
transparency. For instance, section 80, sub-sections (3&4) of Nigeria’s constitution vests the powers 
over the Federal Government’s purse on the Parliament. It provides that no expenditure on behalf of 
the Federal Government of Nigeria shall be carried out without the approval of the National Assembly 
(Nigeria’s parliament). However, in 2018 the President paid for procurement for military war planes, 
though apparently in good faith, but before informing the parliaments as required by the country’s 
constitution -a gross breech of constitutional provisions. Parliamentarians of the opposition party saw 
this as a constitutional misnomer and lack of regard for the parliament and as such wanted the 
president reprimanded. Nevertheless, the leadership of the country’s parliament being of same party 
with the President and at the same time the ruling party, ignored the seeming affront on the 





reprimand. Thus, ignoring the seeming constitutional breach and seeming disregard for the 
legislature, Vanguard (May 2nd, 2018)29 
In line with expectations, ethno-fractionalisation (lEthnofract), sometimes loosely referred to as 
polarisation, has a negative relationship with fiscal transparency which is also highly statistically 
significant at 1%. Contrary findings were arrived at by Wehner and De Renzio (2013) and Andreula 
and Chong (2016). One of the early studies to point out the deleterious impact of a highly 
fractionalised society was Alesina et al. (2003), who argued that ethnic and linguistic fractionalisation 
are associated with negative outcomes in terms of the quality of government. Studies by Canning 
and Fay (1993) and Mauro (1995) shed light on the influence of ethnic fragmentation on 
government’s activities as well as the quality of institutions. La Porta et al. (1999) was one of the 
earliest empirical studies to suggest that ethno-fractionalisation is important in government activities, 
although legal origin matters more.  
We also controlled for some socio-economic and political economy factors. Most of our employed 
control variables have been used by the prevailing literature on determinants of fiscal transparency 
(see e.g. Tekeng and Sharaf, 2015; Wehner and De Renzio, 2013). From Table 6.4 the factors 
include natural resources revenue as a percentage of GDP (Natres), administrative heritage proxied 
by legal system (civil law dummy), military force as a percentage of total labour force; business 
disclosure index; GDP and population growths, and Aid as a percentage of GDP. 
 
Table 6.4: Empirical results of the political drivers of fiscal transparency 
Dependent variable: Natural log of fiscal transparency   
Explanatory Variables 
  Model Model Model Model   
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Ft(t-1)    0.568***  0.271**  0.471***  0.501***   
   (0.059) (0.096) (0.052) (0.035)   
lPartisan1   -0.474**      
   (0.212)      
lPartisan2    0.425*     
    (0.238)     
lChecks     -0.251    
     (0.393)    
lEthnofract      -2.962***   
      (0.818)   
Civillaw   -0.055 -0.448  0.479 -0.714   
   (0.275) (0.367) (0.853) (0.511)   
Military   -0.078 1.343** -0.421 -0.211**   
   (0.070) (0.534) (0.293) (0.088)   
                                               
29 See  Nigerian Vanguard News Papers  https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/05/purchase-496m-tucano-aircraft-





Natres   -0.005 0.005 -0.003 -0.002   
   (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003)   
Growth   -0.032* -0.069 -0.032** -0.038*   
   (0.017) (0.056) (0.014) (0.021)   
Popngrowth   -0.313 -1.378** -0.760 -0.006   
   (0.375) (0.571) (0.548) (0.568)   
Aidgdp    0.018***  0.019**  0.022***  0.016**   
   (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)   
Constant    2.436**  7.089***  4.132***  1.393   
   (0.951) (1.443) (1.295) (1.490)   
Diagnostics:         
Number of observations   71 37 65 71   
Number of group   21 14 20 21   
Country Fixed Effects Included   Yes Yes Yes Yes   
F-test   720.6*** 439.2*** 132.3*** 159.7***   
AR (1): (p-value)   0.185 0.525 0.310 0.264   
AR (2): (p-value)   0.788 0.569 0.399 0.465   
Hansen: (p-value)   0.996 0.999 0.986 0.990   
  
Source: Author’s computation 
 
Notes:  (a) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicate 99%, 95% and 90% significance levels 
respectively. 
 (b)  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
   (c)  Variables in small letters are in log form and variables in capital letters are in levels.  
   (d)  All estimations are undertaken in STATA 14. 
In line with a priori expectations, Aid as a percentage of GDP (Aidgdp) has a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with fiscal transparency in the four models estimated. This also justifies our 
estimation technique, as the call by donors for an improvement in the level of transparency in the 
management of government finances emanates mostly from the high level of opacity evidenced by 
past fiscal transparency performance. This in essence transforms aid into an international political 
instrument, which if deployed properly can lead to improvements in fiscal transparency. As a 
precondition for receipt of foreign aid, Drummond (2011) pointed out the need for aid recipient 
countries to be more transparent with their national budgets (including revenues from their extractive 
industries). IBP’s (2010) open budget survey discovered that in some cases, external pressure from 
donors forced aid recipient authorities to improve on their level of budget transparency. Reacting to 
this finding, IBP (2010) recommended the incentivisation of aid to recipient countries in ways that 
enhance budget transparency in recipient countries. Epstein (2011) also highlighted the importance 
of fiscal transparency and the need for adoption of languages demanding for enhanced fiscal 
transparency by aid recipient countries as it pertains to donor agencies and aid-recipient 
governments cooperation. The US State Department (2008) acknowledged that budget 
transparency and accountability are critical to sustainable development. Government opacity 
enables mismanagement and corruption, undermining development and hobbling economic growth. 





In consonance with a priori expectations regarding employing a civil law, our study revealed that civil 
law governments are preponderantly associated with a lower level of fiscal transparency in SSA. 
Wehner and De Renzio (2013) found a similar relationship to ours although their results were not 
statistically significant. Similarly, studies by Alt and Lassen (2006) revealed a positive correlation 
between common law legal origin and the measure of fiscal transparency in a set of 19 OECD 
countries. One of the critical political measures of repression impacting on demand for transparency 
is the extent of militarisation of the labour force. From our analysis, in line with our a priori 
expectation, the percentage of military personnel including paramilitary forces in the population of 
the country is negatively associated with fiscal transparency in all our four models and highly 
statistically significant in two of the models. Tekeng and Sharaf (2015) in their study on developing 
countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia, found similar results. In the context of developing 
countries, heavily militarised societies are characterised by larger military forces and expenditure 
and are most times associated with suppression of all forms of freedoms as well as oppression of 
the population by the protected government. Under such situations it is easier to experience a high 
level of fiscal opacity (less fiscal transparency). Such repressive tendencies could impede on the 
media as well as CSO’s attempts to hold the authorities accountable with a view to achieving a better 
level of fiscal transparency and better fiscal outcomes. 
Empirical findings from our study reveal that natural resources as a percentage of GDP in Africa 
have a negative relationship with fiscal transparency in most of our models, although none of these 
relationships in the models were statistically significant. This implies that the more an SSA country’s 
revenue was from natural resources, the less the level of fiscal transparency it will exude. Similar 
findings were arrived at by earlier studies (e.g. Khagram et al., 2013; Egorov et al., 2009 which found 
a negative and significant association between oil income and fiscal transparency amongst 
autocratic states. Ross (2011) also found mineral wealth associated negatively with the level of fiscal 
transparency. Khagram et al. (2013) concluded that oil wealth increases the value of staying in power 
and hence causes dictators to reduce transparency, hiding their government ’s corruption and 
inefficiencies.  
Unsurprisingly, some reports by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) identified the 
unaccounted use of revenues and corruption as part of the problems with the oil mineral sector. Ross 
(2011) narrowed the cause of the relationship to the democracy–autocracy divide stressing that 
amongst democracies, a country’s mineral wealth was found not to be related to the transparency of 
its financial management. However, amongst autocratic states, greater oil wealth was found to 
correlate with less fiscal transparency. This is analogous to Hossain and Chowdhury (1994) which 
argued that non-democratic regimes tend to maintain and legitimise their rule by buying the 





Our empirical result yielded a negative association between population growth and fiscal 
transparency in all four of our models. We had hypothesised an ambivalent relationship that if SSA’s 
growth in the last decade is knowledge-based and inclusive, it will lead to improved welfare and well-
being. The public will be more educated and informed which will in turn empower the public to 
demand better accountability. The opposite will be the case if growth is mostly financed by 
commodities rather than knowledge driven. The latter could be the explanation for the African 
experience. Also, population growth puts pressure on resources and can result in budget deficits. 
Similarly, our growth variable in the empirical analysis revealed a negative relationship with fiscal 
transparency in all of our models, three of which were significant.  
6.5.3 Post-estimation robustness checks 
The post-estimation statistics presented alongside our results in Table 6.4 examined the models for 
the presence of serial correlation and for over-identification with a view to establishing the robustness 
of our models. To achieve this, we employed the Arellano and Bond and Sargan/Hansen tests for 
the presence of autocorrelation and over-identification respectively. According to Cameron and 
Trivedi (2009), dynamic panel data introduces the condition of no correlation in the error term. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) noted that to achieve unbiased estimations requires the absence of a 
second-order serial correlation of the error term. By design, the values for the error term could be 
serially correlated in the first order i.e. AR (1) could be statistically insignificant based on its p-values. 
However, and as an important rule, a second-order serial correlation will be a sign of 
misspecification. Hence, our expectation is that probability of 𝐴𝑟(2) (𝑝𝑟 > 𝑧) will not be significant at 
5%, validating the absence of serial autocorrelation in the errors (see Labra and Torrecillas, 2018) 
where z signifies the standard normal distribution. The results of the AR (2-order) test for serial 
correlation, which is applied to the residuals in differences30, fails to reject the null hypothesis for a 
second order serial correlation in all the estimated models.  
Similarly, from the Hansen –J statistics reported in Table 6.4, we fail to reject the null hypotheses31 
of the Hansen test for over-identification (i.e. the overall exogeneity of the instruments used in the 
GMM estimation) at the 5% level for all the estimated models. We test for validity of exclusion 
restrictions using the Hansen –J tests. This leads to our conclusion (acceptance of the null 
hypothesis) that our over-identification restrictions are also valid. 
a. Null Hypothesis (𝑯𝟎) – All restrictions of over-identification are valid. 
b. Alternative Hypothesis (𝑯𝟏) – All restrictions of over-identification are not valid. 
                                               
30 To check for first-order serial correlation in levels, second-order correlation in differences is checked because for GMM 
estimator, first-order serial correlation is expected a priori in the residuals in differences. Not surprisingly, the AR (1-order) 
serial correlation test results in most cases reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 5% level. 
31 The null hypothesis (H0) for the Hansen test is that all our overidentification restrictions are valid. In other words, the null 





Acceptance or rejection criteria 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑥2 ≥ 0.05 (5%) 
If our obtained probability value (p-value) is ≥ 0.05, the instruments we employed are valid. Hence, 
overidentification does not exist – there is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis (Baum, 2006) 
and it indicates that the instruments are valid and the results of our GMM estimation are reliable. 
We reported the two-step robust standard errors corrected for finite sample following Windmeijer 
(2005). Our results satisfy the key assumptions of system GMM estimations by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) and Windmeijer (2005). As such, our models can be described as appropriate models with 
which to situate a discussion on the political determinants of fiscal transparency in SSA. Our 
empirical results confirm the influence of some internal and external political factors on determining 
the level of fiscal transparency in Africa.  
6.6 Concluding remarks and policy recommendations 
The main objective of this paper was to empirically examine the relationship between political factors 
and fiscal transparency in the context of SSA. The theoretical literature review and framework 
contextualised the budget process as a contract (delegation of duties) between the principals (the 
electorate) and the agents (elected officials). An improvement in the level of fiscal transparency will 
increase the level of information available to both parties and consequently reduce the extent of 
information asymmetry, especially on the part of the principals (the electorate). This will consequently 
strengthen their public accountability demand within the retrospective voter’s paradigm. Such 
improvement in the public accountability process due to a reduction in information asymmetry could 
aid the writing of a better contract. 
By and large, our empirical findings confirm that internally, political forces such as partisanship and 
ethnic fractionalisation play a role in determining the level of fiscal transparency in SSA. Our results 
further indicate the failure of the most important political instrument (checks and balances) in 
contributing to better public accountability in SSA. Importantly, our results indicate that factoring in 
independent candidates, partisan fragmentation leads to an enhanced level of fiscal disclosure in 
SSA. Externally, our result confirms the crucial role played by external political factors such as the 
preconditions of improvements in fiscal transparency attached to Africa’s receipt of foreign aid. For 
about a decade foreign aid, came with conditions of improved fiscal transparency as a matter of 
policy, and this contributed significantly to improvements in fiscal transparency in SSA. The results 
show that over militarisation of the labour force, an indicator of repression is negatively associated 
with fiscal transparency. These results, although the first exclusively on SSA countries, lend weight 





Three key policy implications can be drawn from the study. First, in addition to creating more space 
for multiparty politics, more SSA countries should consider institutionalising a role for independent 
candidates in the electoral process. This offers the principals (the electorate) a gamut of choices as 
regards the best choice of candidates that will be more transparent in the management of public 
finances. As evidenced by our empirical analysis, when independent candidates are considered, 
partisan fragmentation holds a significant and positive relationship with fiscal transparency in SSA. 
This can be attributed to the fact that independent candidates do not get consumed by the toe the 
party line syndrome that helps to perpetrate the opacity in the management of public finances. Also, 
the fear of the unknown extent of reforms independent candidates may want to carry out will force 
the hands of the government parties to carry out fiscal transparency reforms themselves so as to 
take the credit and manage the process.  
Secondly, there is a need for capacity building for both the legislature and executive arms of 
government. They are the critical agent for checks and balances and hence public accountability. 
Evidently contrary to expectations, our measure of checks and balances (Legislative-Executive 
competitiveness) revealed a negative relationship with fiscal transparency. Toeing the party line does 
not mean surrendering the independence of an independent arm of government, the legislature to 
the executive and vice versa. The opportunity cost of such loss of independence, which is the real 
cost, is an increase in fiscal opacity (less fiscal transparency). This has dire implications for the 
management of the entire economy including fiscal discipline.  
Lastly, international donor agencies and superpowers should stick to their current policy of 
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CHAPTER 7  
THE ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF FISCAL TRANSPARENCY: 
EVIDENCE FROM SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (SSA) 
 
7.1 Introduction 
From existing studies on the possible drivers of fiscal transparency, three discernable groups of 
factors influencing fiscal transparency can be identified: the institutional, the political and the 
economic (Wehner and De Renzio, 2013; Tekeng and Sharaf, 2015; Andreula and Chong 2016). In 
the wake of the various regional and global financial crises, the need to reassess global efforts to 
promote fiscal transparency increased for two reasons. First, the crisis revealed that, even amongst 
developed economies, governments’ understanding of the existing fiscal position was inadequate, 
as shown by the emergence of previously unrecorded deficits and debts. This connotes a poor level 
of fiscal transparency which IMF (2012, p. 4) referred to as “the clarity, reliability, frequency, 
timeliness, and relevance of public fiscal reporting and the openness to the public of the 
government’s fiscal policy-making process”. The case could be worse for SSA countries which are 
characterised by weak budget procedures and inadequate budget institutions (Lledo and Poplawski-
Ribeiro, 2013). Secondly, the crisis demonstrated that, in many cases, countries had substantially 
underestimated the risks to their fiscal prospects, especially those emanating from the financial 
sector. Cross-country studies (including Glennerster and Shin, 2008; Hameed, 2005) suggest that 
fiscal transparency is associated with better sovereign bond ratings and greater access to 
international capital markets.  
Against the foregoing backdrop, this chapter focuses on establishing the third group of factors, the 
economic forces influencing the level of fiscal transparency in SSA. The rest of the chapter is 
structured thus: first is the background to fiscal transparency in SSA, followed by a review of relevant 
extant literature. Next is a detailed discussion of our empirical method, strategy and estimation 
technique, followed by presentation and discussion of our empirical results. The final section is the 
conclusion and policy recommendations.  
7.2 Background 
Very little has been written on the causes of SSA’s poor fiscal policy outcomes or its recorded poor 
levels of fiscal transparency. Studies such as Alesina and Perotti (1996), Alt and Lassen (2006a) 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) have all espoused the importance of fiscal transparency towards achieving 
desired fiscal outcome. In buttressing this point, Elslava (2010) highlighted the significance of fiscal 





absence of good levels of fiscal transparency will lead to larger fiscal deficits. Shi and Svenson 
(2006) made similar arguments for enhanced fiscal transparency. They argued that wherever it is 
possible for voters to observe all government programmes whilst also being oblivious of the 
prevailing fiscal balance, this could lead to an increase in opportunistic fiscal deficits. This connotes 
a fiscal environment of less transparency.  
Various definitions of the concept of fiscal transparency have been provided. The OECD (2002, p. 
7) defined fiscal transparency as “the full disclosure of all relevant fiscal information in a timely and 
systematic manner”. An earlier but somewhat nebulous definition was offered by Premchand (1993) 
which defined budget transparency as the public availability of information regarding government 
decision-making procedures and transactions. This last definition lacked key elements such as 
timeliness, accessibility and international comparability. Nevertheless, the most comprehensive 
definition of fiscal transparency remains that offered by Kopits and Craig (1998, p. 1), who defined 
fiscal transparency as “openness toward the public at large about government structure and 
functions, fiscal policy intentions, public sector accounts, and projections. It involves ready access 
to reliable, comprehensive, timely, understandable, and internationally comparable information on 
government activities—whether undertaken inside or outside the government sector—so that the 
electorate and financial markets can accurately assess the government’s financial position and the 
true costs and benefits”. 
As highlighted by Gollwitzer (2010), one of the ambitions of African countries is to metamorphose 
into a common market, with the possibility of transforming into an economic union in the future. This 
entails the easing of restrictions on cross-border capital flows as well as movement of labour. As 
such, an exclusively SSA analysis such as ours will be beneficial in a number of ways. First, it will 
help to identify the economic forces influencing fiscal transparency. Fiscal transparency reduces 
fiscal deficits and thus enables countries aspiring to join a regional economic arrangement to fulfil 
the convergence criterion which is essentially a regional requirement for fiscal discipline. Therefore, 
at a regional level, this study will aid understanding the economic factors influencing fiscal 
transparency, with a view to drawing policy recommendations that can improve fiscal transparency 
and ultimately contributing to achieving regional fiscal convergence criteria. Also, our study could 
provide a basis for continent-wide reform of public financial management. 
In their efforts to achieve fiscal discipline SSA economies adopted one form of fiscal rule or another. 
Most of these fiscal rules were supranational with convergence criteria that were adopted by member 
countries of the various sub-regional economic areas. For instance, the eight-member West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) adopted a convergence criterion (fiscal rule) of deficit not 
exceeding 3% of GDP and the nominal debt-to-GDP ratio was kept at 70% of GDP. However, over 





countries were still recording persistent and unsustainable deficits and debt thresholds over and 
above the adopted national or supranational convergence criteria that constitute their fiscal rules.32  
Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Alt and Lassen (2006a) highlighted the need for fiscal rules to be 
accompanied by fiscal transparency as a necessary condition, if fiscal rules are to yield the desired 
result. Focusing on Latin America, Alesina et al. (1999) found that rules that guarantee transparency 
and comprehensiveness of the budget process helped to achieve fiscal discipline more than other 
good budget practices, for instance centralisation. Dabla-Norris et al. (2010) recorded similar findings 
for a group of low-income countries. In the same vein, at the supranational level, Milesi-Ferretti 
(2004) argued the effects of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union member countries on the 
fiscal transparency–fiscal outcomes nexus, positing that fiscal transparency assists in shaping fiscal 
performance, given that a very transparent fiscal context allows politicians to implement the requisite 
practices needed to balance the budget. Thus, a study in the context of SSA could go a long way in 
helping to identify some of the economic reasons why fiscal transparency levels have been poor in 
SSA and provide some of the requisite insights into why fiscal outcome has also been poor in SSA. 
Contrary to expectations, very few studies have explored the economic factors driving fiscal 
transparency, especially in the context of SSA given that most African countries have experienced 
poor fiscal performance over time. Gollwitzer (2010) admitted that very little has been written on 
Africa’s fiscal policy performance as there was limited information (minimal transparency) available 
on fiscal policies and procedures in Africa. One of the key features of a poorly managed budget 
process with its attendant negative impact on budget outcome is the level of opacity surrounding the 
budget process.  This also has impact on service delivery. The World Bank (2003) as cited in 
Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008, p.2), identified “poor budget management as one of the main reasons 
why governments in developing countries finds it difficult to translate public spending into effective 
service”. 
Two clear deductions can be drawn from Figure 7.1. First, there have been fluctuations in the level 
of fiscal transparency in Africa. Secondly, it is obvious that on average, SSA has generally 
experienced an unimpressive performance in terms of fiscal transparency – it has never performed 
better than providing minimal information (21-40%) on how public finances are being managed.  
                                               
32 IMF (2017) Fiscal Rules at a Glance. The supranational fiscal rule (i.e. convergence criteria) for the East Africa Monetary 
Union (EAMU) includes a 50% ceiling on NPV of gross public debt and a 3% of GDP budget balance rule. For the Central 
African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), the fiscal rule (i.e. convergence criteria) is that net public debt 
should be kept below 70%, and the basic structural fiscal balance as a percentage of nominal GDP should be in balance 





Figure 7.1: SSA average fiscal transparency performance (%) 2006-2017 
 
Source: International Budget Partnership’s Open Budget Index 2006-2017 
In the 2006 Open Budget Survey, SSA recorded an average of 37% on the OBI fiscal transparency 
scale. There was a 29% decrease to -26.2% level of fiscal transparency as at the 2008 Open Budget 
Survey. Whilst there where modest improvements in the level of fiscal transparency in SSA for the 
2010, 2012 and 2015 open budget surveys, there was a sharp increase in fiscal opacity (decrease 
in fiscal transparency) between 2015 and 2017. What then are the economic and socioeconomic 
factors influencing these variations in the level of fiscal transparency in the context of SSA? 
 
7.3 Theoretical underpinning  
SSA’s efforts at achieving greater fiscal discipline is also tied to its quest for greater economic 
integration. In their efforts to overcome fiscal indiscipline, most SSA economies adopted one form of 
fiscal rule or another. Most of these fiscal rules were supranational with convergence criteria that 
were adopted by member countries of the various sub-regional economic areas. Why do most 
African countries pose fiscal deficits that are higher than their fiscal convergence criteria? This has 
been mostly associated with political economy hypothesis particularly, the role macroeconomic 
populism as well as other political theoretical constructs such as the common pool problem. 
Dornbusch and Edwards (1990) as cited in Hossain and Chowdhury (1998) described 
macroeconomic populism as a situation where a populist government undertakes ambitious 
programmes and gives priority to distributive objectives.  Hence, it can be argued that the 
macroeconomics of deficits is cannot be divorced from the state of national politics. In climes where 
the politicians are rarely held accountable for the consequences of their policy decisions, the 



























citizenry increases. The common pool problem of public finance arises when politicians’ (or parties’) 
support increases in targeted government spending that provide their constituencies with more public 
services for which they are responsible for barely a fraction of the total cost given that the spending 
is financed by general taxation. This ultimately results in a spending and deficit bias (Velasco, 2000; 
von Hagen, 2007). 
It is pertinent to point out that such situations are associated with a less transparent budget process. 
The common pool problem is at the heart of some of the externalities in managing public finances. 
Common pool problems mostly emanate from heterogeneous interests across groups of voters and 
have been identified as possible reason for pervasive deficits. As cited elsewhere, Eslava (2010) 
highlighted that fiscal deficits emanates from three sources of conflicts of interest namely: 
“preference heterogeneity between policymakers and voters (i.e. principal-agent relationship); 
heterogeneity of fiscal preferences across politicians (i.e. partisanship); or heterogeneity of fiscal 
preferences across social groups or regions” Eslava (2010, p. 646). It is pertinent to point out that 
whilst most African countries have tried setting numerical fiscal limits, very little has been achieved 
in terms of better fiscal outcome and fiscal transparency. 
 
7.4 Review of relevant literature 
The literature on the economic drivers of fiscal transparency is still at an embryonic stage. Few 
studies have examined the relationship between economic factors and fiscal transparency, 
especially in the context of SSA. Allen (2001) classified the different forces driving fiscal 
transparency, suggesting that the significant differences in the political systems, government 
structures and economic and social objectives impact on financial reporting. Similarly, Montesinos 
(2001) buttressed this point by relating government financial reporting to political, social and 
economic factors. Thus, it becomes increasingly important for economic forces to be taken into 
consideration when investigating the determinants of fiscal transparency.  
Khagram et al. (2013) listed four “causal triggers” whose complex interaction advance or impede 
fiscal transparency. These triggers are: political transitions, fiscal and economic crises, political and 
corruption scandals, and external influences. Whereas most prior studies such as Wehner and De 
Renzio (2013), Andreula et al. (2009), Andreula and Chong (2016) and De Simon et al. (2017) have 
mostly focused on political and institutional factors including corruption, very little attention has been 
paid to economic factors. As argued by Von Hagen and Harden (1995) and reinforced by Benito and 
Bastida (2009, p. 405) “institutional rules governing the budget process (among them, a large degree 
of transparency) affect fiscal performance in 12 EU countries”. Benito and Bastida argued that to 
achieve satisfactory fiscal performance, it is essential to have adequate instruments such as fiscal 





transparency and accountability are crucial not only for the tasks carried out by competent 
authorities, but also aid in reducing the incentives for fiscal irresponsibility, consequently controlling 
budget deficits. Thus, higher debt and deficits to GDP ratios serve as indicators of the level of control 
the government has over the economy. Comparing budget institutions amongst OECD countries, 
Tanzi (1994) revealed the differences in the levels of transparency amongst the OECD countries. 
The study also revealed that lack of transparency hinders control of expenditure. 
Some of the earliest studies that suggest a nexus between central government’s fiscal situation and 
budget transparency include Alesina and Perotti (1996), Von Hagen and Vabo (2005) and Stein et 
al. (1998). Findings from Alt and Lassen’s (2006a) empirical study of OECD countries revealed a 
negative association between deficits as well as debt levels and fiscal transparency. Alt et al.’s (2006) 
study of US states concluded that in addition to political competition, past (historical) fiscal conditions 
of the state, especially debts and budget imbalances, seem to influence the level of fiscal 
transparency. A similar finding was recorded by Stein et al. (1998) and Marcel and Tokman (2002) 
for Chile. More recently, the literature on the determinants of fiscal transparency was narrowed down 
by Tekeng and Sharaf (2015) and Wehner and De Renzio (2013) to investigate the role of economic 
forces in influencing fiscal transparency. The economic factors considered include trade openness, 
capital account openness, natural resource revenue inflow (as a percentage of GDP), aid (as a 
percentage of GDP), literacy level, administrative heritage, budget surplus/deficit, and debt, amongst 
others.  
In a study of 27 developing countries, Tekeng and Sharaf (2015) revealed a positive relationship 
between literacy level and fiscal transparency. Their study also revealed a similar positive 
relationship between the quality of institutions (proxied by regulatory quality) and fiscal transparency. 
Their study revealed that the level of natural resources and the openness of capital account have a 
negative relationship with fiscal transparency. Tekeng and Sharaf (2015) extended the literature on 
fiscal transparency, being the first study to consider the impact of economic and socioeconomic 
forces such as de jure trade openness, capital account openness and literacy level on fiscal 
transparency. The literature on the influence of foreign aid on fiscal transparency is gaining traction 
as an important driver of fiscal transparency. For over a decade, most international donor agencies 
and countries have adopted as a policy the requirement of improvements in the level of fiscal 
transparency by recipient countries as a precondition for development assistance (Drummond, 2011; 
IBP, 2010 and 2013; Epstein, 2011). However, no identifiable prior empirical reports in the last 
decade have investigated the relationship between aid and the level of fiscal transparency especially 
in the context of SSA. 
The general conjecture is that there is a link between budget systems, the levels of transparency 
therefrom and the general administrative machinery of any country. La Porta et al. (1999) stated that 





performance on a range of indicators, including corruption, than those based on the British common 
law tradition. In a study of 19 OECD countries, Alt and Lassen (2006b) showed a positive correlation 
between common law legal origin and their measure of fiscal transparency. Wehner and De Renzio 
(2013) revealed a negative and statistically insignificant relationship between civil law as a measure 
of administrative heritage and fiscal transparency.  
7.5 Methodology  
7.5.1 Estimation of the economic forces influencing fiscal transparency in SSA 
This section provides an in-depth outline of the estimation procedure employed in estimating our 
econometric model of the economic factors influencing variations in fiscal transparency in Africa. Our 
empirical study covers the period 2006-2015 within the framework of a panel data analysis. Hsiao 
(2007) accentuated the advantages of panel data econometric analysis, pointing out that it augments 
the variability of the data and hence enables us to gain more degrees of freedom. This grants us 
more sample variability than would be the case if cross-sectional data analysis were employed. As 
emphasised by Wooldridge (2010), estimates from cross-sectional regression analysis could be 
biased owing to risks originating from omitted-variable bias. Employing panel data analysis will 
permit the control of unobserved time constant variables, thus solving the problem. Another key 
advantage of panel analysis is that it provides for a time variation, within-country standard deviation, 
as well as country variation, between-country standard deviation (Agbloyor et al., 2016). Hence, for 
this study, the nexus between economic factors and fiscal transparency in SSA will be tested 
employing the following panel data model: 
𝐹𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  𝑖 = 1, … … . . 𝑁; … … … … , 𝑇  (7.1) 
Where 𝐹𝑇𝑖𝑡 denotes fiscal transparency measured in percentage for country 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 signifies 
a set of time varying as well as time invariant covariates, 𝛽′ stands for the related vectors of 
parameters we intend to estimate. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is our composite error term. It is represented as 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡, 
where  𝛾𝑖 stands for the unobserved country-specific effect and 𝜖𝑖𝑡, is the idiosyncratic error term. 
Our determinant variables comprise Trade Openness, de facto (actual) Capital Account Openness; 
de jure (formal) Capital Account Openness, Overall Balance, Debt Service, Natural Resource 
Revenue as a percentage of GDP, Civil law, Military personnel as a percentage of total labour force, 
Growth, Population Growth, Aid as a percentage of GDP, and inflation. It is pertinent to point out that 
we employed the both the de facto and the de jure measures of capital account openness but in 
different models with a view to capturing both the influence emanating from the formal-political (de 
jure) as well as that emanating from the actual (de facto) financial liberalisation in view of the diverse 





A new dimension in the fiscal transparency literature is the role of openness to trade as well as 
openness to movement of capital as drivers of fiscal transparency. Tekeng and Sharaf (2015), 
argued that capital mobility as well as trade openness enhances fiscal effectiveness as it reduces 
budget deficits. They opined that “countries that are not naturally open are more corrupt because of 
available rents; while openness, as a policy, leads to less corruption, to potentially sounder budget 
systems and to more efficient fiscal administrations” (Tekeng and Sharaf, 2015, p. 81). This tries to 
establish a connection between a country’s level of openness and its level of fiscal transparency. 
Tekeng and Sharaf argued that international trade openness and capital movements enhance fiscal 
transparency as they reduce the costs and increase the benefits of fiscal transparency given that 
trade openness leads to increased competition and economic growth, whilst mobility of international 
capital fosters efficient economic environments. Both aspects of openness (trade and capital account 
openness) are considered. 
Pursuant to our aim of capturing the diverse facets of the ongoing process of financial globalisation, 
unlike Tekeng and Sharaf (2015) that employed only the Chinn-Ito (2008) index, de jure (formal-
political) measure of capital account openness, we went further to test the de facto (actual) measure 
of capital account openness. Our decision not to choose any measure over the other is buttressed 
by Gehringer (2013) submission that a formal economy may not necessarily be practically so and 
vice versa. More so, employing both measures but in different models, will avail us the opportunity 
to measure the disparity in the degree of association between both measures and fiscal 
transparency. This is important given the varied measures of financial globalization Gehringer 
(2013).   
Tekeng and Sharaf (2015) hypothesise a positive nexus between trade openness and fiscal 
transparency and use the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and the Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
for the estimation. Their findings were ambiguous. Whilst their OLS model revealed a negative 
relationship between openness to international trade and fiscal transparency, their 2SLS estimations 
revealed a positive and significant relationship. Results from Tekeng and Sharaf ’s (2015)study 
revealed a negative association between capital account openness and fiscal transparency. It is 
interesting to point out that one of the most important economic factors influencing fiscal 
transparency is Debt Service. This nexus is yet to receive any attention in the literature of fiscal 
transparency. Debt service is usually a first line charge on revenue. First line charges on revenue 
are charges which are netted out before arriving at discretionary revenue (Fölscher, 2002). They 
have the potential of a negative impact on government’s discretionary expenditure if they increase, 
limiting government’s expenditure on critical infrastructures and services, thus triggering calls for 
more transparency on the management of government resources. Debt-service cost is determined 
by applying the interest rate to the government stock of debt and assets (Shah, 2007). As 





service) also increases. Being a first line charge on revenue, this consequently leads to a dip in 
government net revenue and accordingly government ability to service other critical expenditure 
items such as infrastructure, education, defence and overall security. Such key infrastructure and 
service deficit normally see the citizens demanding enhanced transparency in the management of 
public finances, therefore we hypothesis a positive nexus between debt service and fiscal 
transparency.  
Andreula and Chong (2016), instrumenting inflation and external debt, revealed a positive and 
significant relationship between inflation and the index of fiscal transparency. Generally, a spike in 
inflation often leads to anxiety on the efficient management of the economy as a whole. High levels 
of inflation also affect government expenditure that accentuates government borrowing and 
government deficits. Thus, we include an inflation variable in one of the models. Other 
socioeconomic control variables were considered and their hypothesised relationship with fiscal 
transparency proffered. We expect aid as a percentage of GDP, business disclosure (Business) and 
population growth to have a positive association with fiscal transparency. Conversely, we anticipate 
a negative relationship between fiscal transparency and proportion of military force to the overall 
labour force, revenue derived from natural resources (as a percentage of GDP) as well as with 
administrative heritage proxied by (Civil law). The relationship between growth and fiscal 
transparency is ambivalent. Hence, the directions of influence of the identified socioeconomic factors 
on fiscal transparency may differ: whilst some are expected to have a positive relationship with fiscal 
transparency, others are expected to exhibit a negative relationship or, in some cases, an ambivalent 
relationship. 
Wehner and De Renzio (2013) show that natural resource wealth has consistently been negatively 
related to fiscal transparency. Similar findings were arrived at by Tekeng and Sharaf (2015). This 
may be attributed to the rentier state nature of such economies and their attendant predisposition to 
corruption. Studies such as De Simone (2017) revealed a negative correlation between corruption 
and fiscal transparency. The high-level opacity surrounding the contracting process of extraction of 
natural resources may serve a contributing factor 
An evolving argument advanced by Tekeng and Sharaf (2015) in the literature on fiscal transparency 
is that private business disclosure is positively related to overall government disclosure. They argue 
that subjecting private firms to high demands for transparency, especially when servicing 
government contracts, could lead to an improvement in government transparency. The degree of 
militarisation of a country measured by the percentage of military force to total labour force in a 
country can impact negatively on the level of fiscal transparency (Tekeng and Sharaf, 2015). They 
also contend that over militarisation could be connected with high-handed and opaque government 
expenditure on military equipment. The variable measuring the percentage of military personnel out 





measure of influence held by political regimes or administrations at the expense of freedom of 
expression. In the context of developing countries, maintaining larger armed forces have been linked 
with less transparent and oppressive regimes. In such climes or regimes, civil society’s efforts to 
hold governments accountable are mostly restricted. 
Over time, the influence of administrative heritage on fiscal transparency has come under scrutiny. 
A seminal study by La Porta et al. (1999) argued that countries operating the common law system 
(mostly with a history of British rule) are more market-oriented and less government-oriented than 
civil law countries. It concluded that the greater protection of private property against the state, which 
is typical of common law systems, enhances several aspects of government performance including 
governance. In this study, our selected dummy variable measure of administrative heritage is civil 
law rooted in the French legal system. We anticipate a negative association between civil law and 
fiscal transparency in our model. Employing civil law as a measure of administrative heritage, a study 
by Wehner and De Renzio (2013) revealed a negative relationship between civil law and fiscal 
transparency as is expected although the relationship is not statistically significant. 
The relationship between population growth and fiscal transparency has not been explored in 
previous studies. We hypothesise that population growth should have a positive relationship with 
fiscal transparency. It is anticipated that an increase in population across SSA countries will increase 
the pressure for judicious and transparent use of resources. It is also possible that an increase in 
population could put more pressure on government spending, hence could contribute to deficits. 
Published prior fiscal deficits could lead to a demand for greater fiscal transparency by the citizenry 
(Alt et al., 2006). On the other hand, it is anticipated that economic growth will yield an ambivalent 
relationship with fiscal transparency. Under an inclusive growth scenario, growth will yield an 
improvement in general well-being as well as an increase in income and standard of living of the 
citizenry as they will become more knowledgeable and informed of their rights. Having had more 
access to information, they will be able to seek more transparency in the use of public funds. This 
may not necessarily be the case in a non-inclusive growth. Thus, the net impact could be ambiguous. 
In summary, we posit that openness (international trade and capital), debt service, inflation and 
business disclosure will have a positive influence on fiscal transparency. We hypothesise a negative 
relationship between natural resource revenue and fiscal transparency. A similar negative 
relationship is hypothesised between fiscal transparency and civil law. Thus, our predicted signs for 
βs are expected to be positive and statistically significant for measures of trade and capital account 
openness, debt service and inflation, whilst our predicted signs for βs are expected to be negative 
for natural resource revenue, overall balance and civil law.  
In Equation 7.1 it is assumed that fiscal transparency responds to changes in the covariates instantly. 
A major concern is that in reality, it is also possible for our covariates to affect fiscal transparency 





subsequent fiscal transparency levels. De Renzio (2011) rightly argues that contemporary levels of 
fiscal transparency do influence future transparency levels given that part of the major preconditions 
by donor countries for future aid is an improvement in recipient countries’ levels of budget 
transparency. This argument is further strengthened by the role of CSOs, who advocate for 
improvements in the level of fiscal transparency against the backdrop of the abysmal level of fiscal 
transparency in Africa. Consequently, we consider a dynamic model given its provision for partial 
adjustments in this order: 
𝐹𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑓𝑡𝐹𝑇𝑖 𝑡−1 + 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (7.2) 
In Equation 6.2, 𝐹𝑇𝑖 𝑡−1 represents the lagged dependent variable, and 𝛽𝑓𝑡 represents the measure 
of adjustment, which is expected not to be greater than one (1). All our explanatory variables as 
previously defined are contained in 𝑥𝑖𝑡. Equations 6.1 and 6.2 represent fiscal transparency models 
in their static and dynamic forms respectively. However, a static panel model may be disposed to 
limitations such as endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence 
challenges. Whilst the unobserved heterogeneity effect can be treated using the fixed effect (FE) 
estimator by treating the unobserved effects as time invariant, the random effect (RE) estimator is 
employed whenever statistical evidence suggests that the unobserved heterogeneity is a random 
variable and is not correlated with the covariates (𝑥𝑖𝑡). 33  
Our unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity issues as well as the endogeneity issues can be 
addressed using the Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator that is based on FE. However, results 
from both the FE and IV could also be biased owing to the presence of a cross-sectional relationship. 
Although SSA is made up of independent nation states, there exists the possibility of identical 
responses from countries to common shocks. This implies that some of the economic and socio-
economic factors considered in the model could be correlated with fiscal transparency. 
In addition to the earlier identified challenges, our dynamic panel model (Equation 7.2) is also 
disposed to some econometric challenges, such as correlation between the lagged dependent 
variable and the error term; more specifically with regard to the unobserved country-specific 
heterogeneity 𝛾𝑖  which further complicates the earlier mentioned challenges. Given that 𝐹𝑇𝑖𝑡 is also 
a function of 𝛾𝑖 , which is time invariant, our inclusion of 𝐹𝑇𝑖 𝑡−1 as one of the regressors in Equation 
7.2 could correlate with 𝛾𝑖 , and hence with 𝜀𝑖𝑡. The presence of the lagged dependent variables 
𝐹𝑇𝑖 𝑡−1 as one of the regressors in the model could also lead to autocorrelation problems in the 
model. Roodman (2009) argues that given such situations, employing the OLS technique will yield 
biased and inconsistent estimates. Hence, it will be more appropriate to adopt the generalised 
                                               
33 The choice between (FE) and (RE) estimators is determined by carrying out the Hausman test with a null hypothesis 
(Ho): unobserved heterogeneity ( 𝜔𝑖) are not correlated with the covariates (𝑥𝑖𝑡). Under the null Hypothesis (H0), the (RE) 
is consistent and efficient. Regardless of whether or not Ho is true, the (FE) estimator is always consistent, the random 





method of moment (GMM) technique over the FE and IV estimators. Bond (2002) strongly 
highlighted that GMM panel data estimator allows for the consideration of the dynamic process, 
hence it is very important for recovering consistent estimates of the parameters of interest.  
In our efforts to prevent results that are potentially biased in our empirical analysis, we employed the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator as it controls for the unobserved country heterogeneity 
(country-fixed effect), endogeneity (bi-directionality) of the explanatory variables, and the lagged 
dependent variable, in estimating our dynamic model. More crucially, the dynamic panel GMM 
methodology allows us the latitude to treat fiscal transparency as a dynamic process as well as 
addressing such issues of bi-directionality. Our estimations of the empirical relationships in this 
model are based on the SGMM given its proven efficiency. Employing the SGMM allows additional 
instruments to be obtained from the system of two equations (a differenced and a level equation) as 
the addition of the second equation yields more instruments. The SGMM is suitable for our study as 
it is designed for scenarios with short time periods and many countries (Roodman, 2006). This 
evidently fits our dataset given our short time period of five years and the large number of SSA 
countries (23 countries). A key weakness of the difference GMM estimator and thus of estimates 
therefrom emanates from its use of lagged levels of the explanatory variables as instruments for the 
regression equation in differences, especially when the explanatory variables are persistent over 
time. Also, as a cardinal rule with the system GMM technique, we kept the number of instruments 
less than the number of groups. 
The two-step estimator which has the Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors was employed 
in our empirical analysis because it is asymptotically more efficient than the one-step estimator. 
Given that we have a panel with gaps, we maximise our sample size using the orthogonal deviations. 
Finally, to check for the consistency of our estimates, we employed two specifications tests: the 
Arellano and Bond Sargan test for second-order serial correlation in the error term (i.e. AR test) and 
the Hansen test of over-identification restrictions, which measures the validity of the instruments by 
analysing sample analogues of the moment conditions used in the estimation. Our error term by 
design could be serially correlated in the first order. However, having second-order serial correlation 
will be a misspecification; hence the AR (2) must not be significant.  
Given the small sample in this study (unbalanced of 3-5 years) for just 23 countries, the unit root test 
was not conducted. This is buttressed by Hurlin and Mignon’s (2007) position that when faced with 
small sample sizes, unit root tests have low power in trying to distinguish stationary series that  are 
persistent from non-stationary series. Hurlin and Mignon argued that to increase the power of such 
unit root tests, will entail increasing the number of observations.  Given the scope of our study (i.e. 
SSA countries) and a maximum period of five OBI published cycles (5 time periods), it is not 





7.6 Empirical results and discussion  
7.6.1 Summary statistics 
This section contains a presentation and discussion of results from our empirical analysis. Table 6.1 
below is a presentation of our descriptive statistics. From our summary statistics in Table 6.1, it can 
be seen that the average level of fiscal transparency for the period 2006-2015 is 32.33%. This 
represents a less than impressive performance as it corresponds to a “low level” of fiscal 
transparency characterisation on the Open Budget Index (OBI) scale (0-100%). Whilst the highest 
score by an African country is 92%, some African countries score an abysmal 0%. The standard 
deviation is 23.5%. This indicates a very high range of dispersion amongst SSA countries in terms 
of fiscal transparency. Unsurprisingly, natural resources revenue as a percentage of GDP recorded 
an average of over 15% in SSA. Most African states depend on revenues from natural resources. 
The average growth rate of SSA countries is 5.73% whilst Africa’s population grew at an average of 
2.83% for the period 2006-2015. The average inflation rate amongst SSA countries for the period 
under consideration is 8%, with a maximum of 37% inflation and a standard deviation from the mean 
of 6%. This is a significantly high rate of inflation that could easily call for scrutiny on general 
macroeconomic management. The average levels of international trade and financial openness 
Kaopen2 stand at about 71.9% and 113% respectively. This signifies a very significant level of trade 
and financial openness. 
7.6.2 Correlation matrix 
Table 6.2 presents our pairwise correlation matrix for the variables employed in our empirical 
analysis. Correlation results mostly serve as a pointer of causal relationships although they do not 
establish causation. In terms of signs, upon examination some interesting observations can be 
deduced from our correlation matrix. Our correlation table shows a negative relationship between 
fiscal transparency and natural resource revenue, civil law, military force ratio to total labour force, 
trade openness, aid, economic growth, population growth, overall balance and debt service. Of 
these, only natural resources revenue, civil law and military force ratio to labour force have the 
expected negative correlation.  
On the other hand, as expected, our correlation matrix reveals a positive relationship between fiscal 
transparency and capital account openness as well as with business disclosure. Both natural 
resources revenue and capital account openness have the expected signs, are significant at 10% 
and in terms of magnitude have a sizeable relationship with fiscal transparency. As natural resource 
revenue in Africa increases, fiscal transparency reduces. This is not surprising as natural resource-
rich African countries have exhibited a poor level of fiscal transparency over the years as evidenced 
by IBP’s OBI (2006-2015). The rentier nature of such economies makes them vulnerable to 





openness is positively correlated to fiscal transparency. The only known study that has investigated 
the nexus between capital account openness and fiscal transparency Tekeng and Sharaf (2015) 
found a positive nexus between both.  
As expected, the practice of civil law is negatively correlated with fiscal transparency, corroborating 
works such as La Porta et al. (1999) which argued that the civil law administrations are associated 
with weak governance including corruption which mostly thrives better in an atmosphere of less 
transparency. Importantly, it can be observed that most of our key economic determinant variables 
do not hold a high pairwise correlation amongst each other. Of all our main economic variables of 
interest, only trade and kaopen2 have a modestly high correlation of 0.659. Both of them will not be 
used in the same model. Upon examination, our results from Table 6.2, give us no cause for concern 
of multicollinearity. However, the exact nature (causality) of these relationships can only be 






Table 7.1: Variables and definitions and source 
Variable Definitions N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
ft Fiscal Transparency – the degree of budget transparency ranging from 0 (complete 
lack of transparency) to 100 (full transparency) 104 32.33 23.53 0 92 
Natres Natural Resource Revenue as a percentage of GDP 104 15.44 12.93 1.37 58.037 
Trade Trade Openness measured as the sum of export and import as a ratio of GDP 104 71.97 28.30 19.1 179.12 
Kaopen Chinn-Ito’s de jure measure of capital account openness, which considers the presence 
(or absence) of legal restrictions on capital transactions. 100 1.60 1.50 0.01 4.37 
Kaopen2 De facto measure of capital account openness, which quantifies flows or stocks of 
foreign assets and/or liabilities. 100 113.13 91.36 42.10 661.11 
Business Business Disclosure – measures the extent to which private actors are protected  
via disclosure of their ownership and financial information. 100 5.02 1.93 0 8 
Aidgdp Total Aid received as a percentage of GDP 99 9.76 19.08 0.07 150.25 
Growth The growth rate (%) of GDP at market prices 104 5.73 3.97 -9.09 18.989 
Popngrowth The growth rate (%) of the number of people in a particular country 104 2.83 0.71 1.047 4.61 
Inf Inflation rate (%) year-on-year 103 8.387 6.05 -2.078 37.39 
Ovbal Overall Fiscal Balance as a percentage of GDP. 79 -2.00 5.81 -11.3 32.8 
Debtservice Debt Service as a percentage of GNI. 95 2.77 13.83 0.25 135.38 
Civillaw =1 if the legal origin of country is French, 0 if otherwise 104 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Military Number of military personnel as a percentage of total labour force 97 0.55 0.57 0.08 2.71 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on data from International Budget Partnership’s Open Budget Index (OBI); Chin-Ito Index; Lane 






Table 7.2: Correlation matrix of variables 
 
ft Natres Trade Kaopen Kaopen2 Business Aidgdp Growth Popngrowth Inf lOvbal Debtservice Civillaw Military 
ft 1.000 
             
Natres -0.406* 1.000 
            
Trade -0.067 0.553* 1.000 
           
Kaopen 0.222* 0.025 0.145 1.000 
          
Kaopen2 0.135 0.321* 0.659* 0.353* 1.000 
         
Business 0.169 -0.114 0.189 -0.124 0.013 1.000 
        
Aidgdp -0.099 0.255* 0.336* 0.280* 0.708* -0.155 1.000 
       
Growth -0.164 0.234* 0.006 0.054 -0.084 -0.105 0.072 1.000 
      
Popngrowth -0.587* 0.512* 0.168 -0.036 -0.076 -0.226* 0.261* 0.131 1.000 
     
Inf 0.053 0.128 -0.045 0.033 0.025 -0.486* 0.086 -0.045 -0.051 1.000 
    
lOvbal -0.275* 0.178 -0.108 0.070 -0.216 0.007 -0.105 0.026 0.025 -0.026 1.000 
   
Debtservice -0.133 0.284* 0.480* 0.165 0.616* -0.044 0.735* 0.059 0.229* 0.153 -0.093 1.000 
  
Civillaw -0.597* 0.286* 0.089 -0.431* -0.213* 0.314* -0.088 0.057 0.493* -0.399* 0.152 -0.072 1.000 
 
Military -0.091 -0.045 0.116 -0.060 0.020 -0.195 -0.228* 0.035 -0.374* 0.270* 0.075 -0.048 -0.117 1.000 
 
Source: Author’s computation 
 





7.6.3 Findings of the underlying economic drivers of fiscal transparency 
In this sub-section we present our empirical findings and a robust discussion of the empirical findings 
from our cross-country regression. Our estimation results are presented in Table 6.3 below based 
on outputs derived from the dynamic panel data system GMM models. It is pertinent to point out that 
we have six models, each capturing an economic factor that constitutes the economic forces (our 
main variables of interest) driving fiscal transparency. However, sometimes economic factors can be 
somewhat correlated. Employing our main variables of interest individually in each model allows us 
to capture the near-exact impact (magnitude) of such variables on fiscal transparency, thus avoiding 
the possibility of overlapping impact.  
From Table 7.3, the lag of our dependent variable (L.lft) is highly statistically significant at 1% level 
and positively associated with cotemporaneous levels of fiscal transparency in Africa in all the 
regression equations. Most crucially, as theoretically expected, the absolute value of the 
autoregressive parameter is less than one (1). This is an essential condition for a dynamic panel 
data model to be considered stationary (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
Table 7.3: Empirical results of the economic drivers of fiscal transparency 















L.lft 0.663*** 0.678*** 0.783***  0.553*** 0.733*** 0.495*** 
 (0.061) (0.096) (0.052)  (0.056) (0.101) (0.048) 
Military 0.201 0.070 0.311***  0.141 0.168 -0.138 
 (0.117) (0.128) (0.103)  (0.210) (0.139) (0.163) 
Growth -0.045*** -0.047*** -0.026  -0.015 -0.035 -0.059*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.021)  (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) 
Popngrowth 0.593*** 0.512** 0.327  0.711*** 0.485** 0.538*** 
 (0.206) (0.199) (0.237)  (0.247) (0.194) (0.140) 
Aidgdp 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.020***  0.010** 0.015*** 0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Business 0.160** 0.134** 0.096  0.156** 0.145* 0.149** 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.076)  (0.072) (0.070) (0.060) 
Civillaw -0.569** -0.444* -0.141  -0.918*** -0.393 -0.762*** 
 (0.214) (0.244) (0.214)  (0.208) (0.306) (0.164) 
ltrade 0.339***       
 (0.100)       
lkaopen  0.063      
  (0.046)      
lkaopen2   -0.188     
   (0.110)     
ldebtservices     0.368**   
     (0.137)   
lnatres     
 
-0.038  
     
 
(0.074)  
linf      
 
0.055 







Constant -2.300** -0.529 0.311  -0.795 -0.809 0.113 
 (0.868) (0.835) (1.182)  (1.093) (0.942) (0.812)     
 
   
Observations 68 68 68  64 68 67 
No. of Group 21 21 21  20 21 21 
Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 2018*** 149.8*** 706.5***  902.0*** 4532.0*** 552.6*** 
AR (1): (p-value) 0.174 0.145 0.148  0.130 0.137 0.227 
AR (2): (p-value) 0.886 0.757 0.851  0.710 0.747 0.678 
Hansen: (p-value) 0.333 0.332 0.327  0.293 0.223 0.258 
        
        
 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
Notes:  (a) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (99%, 95% and 90% significance levels respectively). 
 (b) Standard errors in parentheses. 
 (c) All estimations are undertaken in STATA 14. 
 
 
Our empirical analysis reveals a positive relationship between debt service and fiscal transparency 
in SSA for our period of study. This relationship is significant at 1% and is in line with the 
hypothesised expectation. This may be attributed to the fact that countries with higher debts are 
more likely to come under the tutelage of international organisations such as the IMF which requires 
reforms of the fiscal frameworks especially, as it pertains to transparency in the management of 
public finances. Also. as highlighted by the World Bank’s Public Expenditure and Financial 
Accountability (PEFA) framework (2016), high debt service costs will make governments unable to 
deliver planned services. This has implications for strategic allocation and distribution as some 
obligatory fiscal requirements such as investments in critical infrastructure, education and defence 
may not be met owing to the attendant decline in net government revenue resulting from increased 
debt servicing. Such a situation will lead to an increase in citizens’ demand for more information 
(transparency) on how government finances are being managed. Essentially, as the government 
debt threshold increases owing to persistent prior deficits that were financed by debts, debt service 
will also increase and inadvertently expose government’s inability to meet fiscal obligations 
especially for vital sectors such as education, health and defence. Such a decline in public services 
could trigger an increased demand for fiscal transparency in the management of public finances. 
We had hypothesised a positive and significant expectation on the international trade openness–
fiscal transparency nexus. In line with expectations, our empirical results show a highly significant 
and positive association between trade openness and fiscal transparency in SSA. Earlier studies by 
Tekeng and Sharaf (2015) focused on 27 developing countries. Their 2SLS models show the a priori 
expected positive results. This finding implies that improvements in trade liberalisation policies in 
African countries, characterised by greater trade openness policies, contributes towards a greater 





Africa, which has been the case. As evidenced by AfDB (2016), intra-regional trade amongst African 
countries has risen from 9.18% in year 2000, to 13.80% in 2010 and subsequently 15.71% in 2014 
(AfDB, 2016). This will enhance government revenue and contribute to an improvement in overall 
economic governance including fiscal transparency. However, there is room for improvement. As 
shown by AfDB (2016), other continental regional integrations in Europe, Asia and the Americas 
have higher intra-regional trade: this is a positive sign, especially as the region aspires to greater 
economic integration, and possibly a common market with the possibility of an economic union. 
Our results have significant trade and fiscal implications. They indicate that such trade openness 
contributes to better fiscal transparency. Better fiscal transparency and possibly better fiscal 
outcome, connotes that trade openness could indirectly aid SSA countries to meet their EU-like 
Maastricht Treaty fiscal convergence criteria sought by such economic integrations. Gollwitzer 
(2010) buttressed a similar point; stressing that with the ambitions to transform the African Union 
into a common market and possibly into an economic union in the future, this will ease restrictions 
on the cross-border flow of capital and labour. As highlighted earlier, an improvement in fiscal 
transparency levels helps to achieve fiscal discipline, i.e. better fiscal outcome (debts and deficits). 
As African countries strive to achieve their regional convergence criteria (stipulated deficit and debt 
thresholds), improved fiscal transparency will help to reduce fiscal deficits and enable countries 
aspiring to join a regional economic arrangement to fulfil the convergence criterion which is 
essentially a regional requirement for fiscal discipline. With more African countries signing the African 
Continental Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), this could see an improvement in SSA’s intra-regional 
trade and the benefits therefrom. 
In terms of the international financial openness–fiscal transparency nexus, we considered both the 
de facto (actual) as well as the de jure (formal-political) measure of capital account openness as 
earlier defined but in a separate model. Contrary to a priori expectations, our de facto measure of 
capital account openness has a negative and statistically insignificant relationship with fiscal 
transparency in SSA. This implies that financial liberalisation policies as they pertain to capital 
account openness have not contributed towards the enhancement of fiscal transparency in Africa for 
the period under consideration. Although our de jure measure of capital account openness presented 
a positive relationship with fiscal transparency, this was not statistically significant. The lack of 
significant empirical evidence of capital account openness contributing to fiscal transparency in 
Africa is not surprising, because most African countries’ net capital outflow is negative due to the low 
level of financial sector development and increase in illicit capital flows. This exerts a negative 
influence on the exchange rate and government revenue.  
Tekeng and Sharaf’s (2015) study of developing countries employing the Chin-Ito de jure measure 
found a negative relationship between capital account openness and the index of fiscal transparency. 





study revealed a positive relationship between capital account openness and fiscal transparency, 
which was significant at 5%. In sum, there is no strong evidence of financial openness or financial 
liberalisation policies leading to improvements in fiscal transparency in SSA. As expected, our 
empirical studies revealed a positive relationship between inflation and fiscal transparency although 
the result was not significant at the conventional 5%. As posited, an increase in inflation rates 
increases anxiety in the general management of the economy and consequently increases demand 
for transparent reforms in fiscal and macroeconomic management of the country. Our positive 
findings are similar to findings by Andreula et al. (2009) and Andreula and Chong (2016). However, 
it is important to point out that the studies of both Andreula et al. (2009) and Andreula and Chong 
(2016) are based on a larger sample of size of over 80 developed and developing countries and the 
relationship from their studies were significant at the conventional 5%. 
Interestingly, our empirical study reveals a negative relationship between natural resources and 
fiscal transparency. However, this relationship is not statistically significant. Ross (2011) and 
Khagram et al. (2013) found a negative connection between mineral resource wealth and fiscal 
transparency. Khagram et al. (2013) attributed this negative relationship to the allure of power, 
suggesting that oil wealth increases the value of staying in power and hence causes dictators to 
reduce transparency, hiding their government’s corruption and inefficiencies. A similar argument was 
advanced by Ross (2011) who found that oil wealth was correlated with lower levels of fiscal 
transparency. Consistent with a priori expectations, aid as a percentage of GDP entered our models 
as having a positive and statistically significant relationship with fiscal transparency. 
From the foregoing literature, it has been argued that aid can serve as an international economic 
and political instrument for fostering improvements in fiscal transparency. Our result is hence in 
consonance with Drummond (2011) and IBP (2013). Both argued for improved transparency in all 
national budgets, including payments from extractive companies, without which progressive nations 
should stop giving aid to governments which obscure budgets from their citizens. IBP’s (2010) Open 
Budget Survey (OBS) discovered that in some cases, external pressure from donors made recipient 
governments improve their level of budget transparency. An IBP (2010) study recommended the 
incentivisation of aid to beneficiary countries in ways that improve budget transparency in recipient 
countries. Epstein (2011) underscored the importance of donor countries’ insistence on improved 
fiscal transparency on the part of aid recipient countries as a precondition for future aid from donor 
countries. Both the US State Department and their UK equivalent, UKAid, acknowledged the need 
for budget transparency and accountability as critical to sustainable development and as such 
adopted as requirements for support to recipient countries. 
From our empirical analysis, Business disclosure enters the empirical models as positive and 
significant as expected in almost all instances of our specifications. This new and still evolving 





found a positive relationship between business disclosure and fiscal transparency. Contrary to a 
priori expectations, the extent of militarisation did not yield the expected negative association with 
fiscal transparency in most of our models and was not significant. Most developing countries with 
larger than necessary armed forces have been connected with repressive and less than transparent 
regimes. In such regimes, civil society’s effort to hold governments accountable is limited. A plausible 
explanation for why the military control variable yielded the opposite result from expectations may 
be attributed to the fact that when considering the influence of economic factors (non-institutional or 
political factors) on fiscal transparency in Africa, the influence of economic factors such as debt 
service, trade and the opacity surrounding the reporting of revenue from natural resources far 
outweighs the role of the size of the military. Most SSA countries depend on minerals or commodity 
trade. Militarisation is measured as the number of military personal as a percentage of the total 
labour force of a country. Our findings are contrary to findings by Tekeng and Sharaf (2015)34 which 
is the only empirical study that has examined this relationship. Under the highlighted circumstances, 
it may be easier to experience less transparency in terms of government fiscal processes. Such 
repressive predispositions could also hinder civil societies’ efforts to hold the authorities accountable 
with the sole objective of achieving a greater degree of fiscal transparency.  
As argued elsewhere in our study, a spike in SSA’s population growth is anticipated to increase the 
pressure for judicious and transparent use of resources. Interestingly, in line with expectations, our 
results reveal a positive relationship between population growth and fiscal transparency in Africa as 
all our models yielded a positive relationship. Of the six models, five were statistically significant. 
Although SSA’s population growth is positively related to its degree of fiscal transparency, an 
increased fiscal awareness campaign by effective CSOs that can sway voters’ oversight function will 
educate the public on what to look out for when clamouring for transparency in the management of 
public finances. Such awareness could aid the increasing population to ask the appropriate 
questions that will improve SSA’s fiscal transparency levels from the current performance. Such 
improvement in voters’ fiscal awareness contributing to enhanced demand for fiscal transparency 
can help overcome the fiscal illusion theoretical arguments by Buchanan and Wagner (1977) and 
Alesina and Perotti (1996). Buchanan and Wagner best capture the population (loosely defined as 
voters) and fiscal transparency nexus. This theory opines that politicians generally prefer to be 
ambiguous (less transparent) and that uninformed or naïve voters will underestimate the cost of 
current and future public programmes, particularly when the budgets are not transparent. 
We had hypothesised an ambivalent economic growth–fiscal transparency nexus. Specifically, we 
hypothesised that under an inclusive growth scenario, growth will yield an improvement in general 
well-being in the citizenry as they will become more knowledgeable of their rights and will be able to 
                                               
34 Their study comprised countries from 27 developing countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia. Only six SSA 





seek more transparency in use of public funds. However, under the scenario of non-inclusive growth, 
the opposite will be the case. Economic growth entered our estimation with a negative sign in all our 
models. This was statistically significant in four out of six of our models. Our results hint at the 
possibility of non-inclusive growth in SSA with its attendant poor standard of living, including 
education, hence limiting the citizens’ knowledge of their rights to demand greater transparency on 
how public finances are being managed. 
The nexus between administrative heritage and the level of fiscal transparency in Africa was also 
investigated by our study. Our measure of administrative heritage is based on the legal systems 
practiced by individual African countries. We adopted the use of dummy variables where one (1) 
stood for countries where civil law is practiced and zero (0) for countries where common or other 
forms of legal tradition is applicable. For our empirical analysis, we choose civil law which has its 
origin in the French legal system as our preferred indicator variable for measure of administrative 
heritage. A pivotal study by La Porta et al. (1999) concluded that interventionist legal traditions 
predicated on civil law produces inferior government performance to those based on the British 
common law tradition. In line with a priori expectations and employing civil law as a measure of the 
impact of administrative heritage, our study revealed that civil law regimes in Africa are associated 
with lower levels of fiscal transparency. This result is statistically significant in four out of six of our 
models. Similar findings were recorded by Wehner and De Renzio (2013) albeit their results were 
not significant and their analysis was based on a global data set. Our findings corroborate the 
conclusions drawn by the seminal work by La Porta et al. Our findings are also similar to findings by 
Alt and Lassen (2006) which revealed that common law (the opposite of civil law) is associated with 
higher levels of fiscal transparency in OECD countries.  
7.6.4 Post-estimation robustness checks 
Finally, our post-estimation statistics presented alongside the results in Table 6.4 examined the 
models for the presence of serial correlation and for over-identification with a view to establishing 
the robustness of our models. To achieve this, we employed the Arellano and Bond and 
Sargan/Hansen tests for the presence of autocorrelation and over-identification respectively. 
Dynamic panel data introduces the condition of no correlation in the error term (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2009). Arellano and Bond (1991) noted that to achieve unbiased estimations requires the absence 
of a second-order serial correlation of the error term. By design, the values for the error term could 
be serially correlated in the first order i.e. AR (1) could be statistically insignificant based on its p-
values. However, and as an important rule, a second-order serial correlation will be a sign of 
misspecification. Hence, our expectation is that the prob of 𝐴𝑅(2) (𝑝𝑟 > 𝑧), where z connotes the 
standard normal distribution, will not be significant at the 5% level; thus validating the absence of 
serial autocorrelation in the errors (Labra and Torrecillas, 2018). The null and alternative hypotheses 





a. Null Hypothesis (𝑯𝟎) – Autocorrelation does not exist in the model. 
b. Alternative Hypothesis (𝑯𝟏) – Autocorrelation does exist in the model. 
Rejection or failure to reject criteria 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑥2 ≥ 0.05 (5%) 
The rejection rule stipulates that when the p-value (𝑝𝑟 > 𝑧) is higher than 0.05, the error terms are 
not serially correlated. The results of the AR (2-order) test for serial correlation, which is applied to 
the residuals in differences35, fails to reject the null hypothesis for a second order serial correlation 
in all the estimated models as presented in Table 6.3. By and large our results satisfy the first part 
of the key assumptions of system GMM estimations by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Windmeijer 
(2005). 
Likewise, from the Hansen –J statistics reported in Table 6.3, we fail to reject the null hypothesis36 
of the Hansen test for over-identification (i.e. the overall exogeneity of the instruments used in the 
GMM estimation) at the 5% level for all the estimated models. We test for validity of exclusion 
restrictions using the Hansen –J tests. This leads to our conclusion (failure to reject the null 
hypothesis) that our over-identification restrictions are also valid. The null and alternative hypotheses 
for the Hansen test are presented below as: 
a. Null Hypothesis (𝑯𝟎) – All restrictions of over-identification are valid. 
b. Alternative Hypothesis (𝑯𝟏) – All restrictions of over-identification are not valid. 
Rejection or failure to reject criteria 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑥2 ≥ 0.05 (5%) 
The rule stipulates that, if our obtained p-value (𝑝𝑟 > 𝑧) is ≥ 0.05, the instruments employed in the 
model are valid. Hence, over-identification does not exist. And hence there is no evidence to reject 
our null hypothesis (Baum, 2006). Roodman (2009) provides a perfect decision guide that where the 
probability is close to one (1), it implies that the asymptotic properties of the test have been applied 
and hence we must reject 𝐻0. It is recommended that 𝑃(𝑥
2) should be in the range of 0.05 ≤ 𝑃(𝑥2) <
0.8. This will be at the optimal level to achieve a probability of 0.1 ≤ (𝑥2) < 0.25. Overall, the results 
of our Hansen test indicate that the instruments are valid and the results of our GMM estimation are 
reliable. Furthermore, we reported the two-step robust standard errors corrected for finite samples 
following Windmeijer (2005). Our results satisfy the key assumptions of system GMM estimations by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Windmeijer (2005). As such, our models can be described as 
appropriate models with which to situate a discussion on the economic determinants of fiscal 
                                               
35 To check for first-order serial correlation in levels, second-order correlation in differences is checked because for GMM 
estimator, first-order serial correlation is expected a priori in the residuals in differences. Not surprisingly, the AR (1-order) 
serial correlation test results, in most cases, reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 5% level. 
36 The null hypothesis (H0) for the Hansen test is that all our over identification restrictions are valid. In other words, the 





transparency in SSA. Our empirical results confirm the influence of some economic factors on 
determining the level of fiscal transparency in Africa.  
7.7 Concluding remarks and policy recommendations 
Apart from institutional and political factors, recent literature points to the role of economic forces 
influencing the level of fiscal transparency. This paper has attempted to empirically establish the 
relationship between economic factors and fiscal transparency in the context of SSA. Our empirical 
findings confirm that economic factors such as trade openness, debt service and foreign aid 
positively and significantly influence the extent to which African countries are transparent in the 
management of public finances. Our empirical results also reveal positive connections between other 
economic factors such as population growth and business disclosure with fiscal transparency in 
Africa.  
Conversely, and as expected, natural resource revenue and the practice of civil law were found to 
be negatively associated with fiscal transparency in SSA. Some policy recommendations can be 
drawn from our findings. First, the significant and positive trade openness–fiscal transparency nexus 
in Africa calls for greater trade liberalisation reform policies by African states. This will be a step in 
the right direction for a continent that seeks closer economic integration with adopted convergence 
criteria for fiscal policy management. Hence, it be beneficial if more African countries ratify the 
African Continental Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA). Given the significant positive relationship 
between foreign aid and fiscal transparency, it will be beneficial if international donor agencies 
sustain their current policy of tying receipt of foreign aid to improvements in levels of fiscal 
transparency of beneficiary countries. This conditionality could be extended to improvements in 
levels of business disclosure in African countries, given its positive relationship with fiscal 
transparency. Finally, given the negative relationship between natural resource revenue and fiscal 
transparency as revealed by our findings, more African countries need to embrace EITI’s resource 
charter on the standards of reporting revenues from mineral sales. This will reduce the opacity 
surrounding the reporting of mineral revenues. 
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CHAPTER 8  
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The broad objective of this thesis is to examine the performance of fiscal policy in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) and to empirically establish the economic, political and institutional determinants of fiscal 
transparency. For over a decade, to address the problems of poor fiscal outcomes, most African 
states adopted some form of national and supranational fiscal rules but with minimal success. From 
various studies, fiscal transparency has been identified as a crucial controllable factor which must 
accompany fiscal rules if the government’s objective of fiscal discipline is to be realised. African 
countries have shown a very high level of fiscal opacity (poor levels of fiscal transparency) as well 
as poor fiscal outcomes. Having established the concurrent poor fiscal outcome and fiscal 
transparency in Africa, irrespective of the presence of fiscal rules, and considering the importance 
of fiscal transparency towards achieving desired fiscal outcomes, our study embarked on empirical 
investigations of the drivers of fiscal transparency in SSA. Our motivation is also based on the fact 
that, despite Africa’s poor fiscal policy performance and its attendant macroeconomic instability, no 
known study on Africa’s public finance has tried to establish the controllable factor(s) influencing 
fiscal outcomes in Africa. This makes our study, as far as we know, the first rigorous empirical study 
on the drivers of fiscal transparency in Africa. 
To achieve its overall objective, the thesis has been structured as a collection of essays. First, as a 
background study, the thesis examined the performance of fiscal policy outcomes in Africa against 
existing fiscal rules. Subsequently, the thesis sought to empirically establish the determinants of 
fiscal transparency, given its crucial role as a controllable factor that influences fiscal policy outcome. 
In line with prevailing discernible studies, this thesis was compartmentalised into investigating three 
distinct categories of drivers of fiscal transparency: institutional, political and economic factors. The 
study began by analysing the performance of fiscal policy in Africa vis-à-vis its operational fiscal 
rules and what may have led to the poor fiscal performance, especially in terms of deficits, debts and 
revenue, despite the presence of such fiscal rules. It also examined the level (or degree) of fiscal 
transparency in Africa. 
The thesis makes unique contributions to the literature on fiscal outcome and fiscal transparency in 
three ways. First, it is the first known study that seeks to isolate the controllable factors influencing 
fiscal policy in Africa and to empirically investigate the determinants of such controllable factors. 





Sharaf, 2015; Andreula and Chong, 2016) focused on a mix of countries (developed and developing), 
this study is the first known study to focus exclusively on SSA countries. This is predicated on the 
fact that SSA is one of the regions that has suffered the most but received less research focus in 
terms of poor fiscal performance and the attendant macroeconomic instability, hence it constituted 
the bulk of the countries that received HIPC initiative relief. With the current rising trend of SSA’s 
deficits and debts, findings from a study such as ours can contribute in preventing a return to pre-
HIPC fiscal experiences in Africa. 
Second, this study makes significant contributions in terms of the methodology employed for its 
analysis. It is the first known study to employ a dynamic panel data analysis in investigating the 
determinants of fiscal transparency. The dynamic panel data technique was employed because of 
its inherent advantages including overcoming all sources of endogeneity as well as overcoming the 
limitations associated with prior cross-sectional studies on the determinants of fiscal transparency 
as clearly elucidated in the methodology section of each empirical paper. 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the study introduced a new dimension to the discourse and 
controversies in public finance management, fiscal transparency and public accountability literature 
in Africa. It is the first known study to situate such a discourse within the framework of principal-
agency theory and the budget process as a fiscal contract between the principal (the electorate or 
voters) and the agents (elected officials). In seeking to establish the determinants of fiscal 
transparency, this study aims, via establishing factors that influence fiscal transparency, to reduce 
information asymmetry between the electorate and the elected officials, and hence strengthen the 
electorate’s capacity to demand public accountability. This will help to contribute to improved public 
accountability and fiscal outcomes in Africa. 
8.2 Summary of key findings 
In the face of numerous studies highlighting poor fiscal policy performance in Africa and thus the 
need for improved fiscal policy outcome, very little is known of the importance of fiscal transparency 
in achieving better fiscal outcome. Our first extensive chapter, Chapter 4, fills this literature gap. 
Using SSA data on fiscal rules monitor and open budget index (OBI) covering the period 2008-2018 
obtained from the IMF and IBP respectively, findings from this chapter addressed the following 
research questions in Chapter 4: To what extent are fiscal policy outcomes determined by fiscal 
discipline (adherence to fiscal rules) in Africa? To what extent does fiscal transparency matter for 
fiscal outcomes? To our knowledge, there is no known extensive study focusing on these issues in 
the context of SSA. Our findings were established using virtual statistics such as graphs, tables and 
charts. Results from the background study (Chapter 4) of the thesis revealed a failure of fiscal rules 





debts and revenue persists, despite the presence of such fiscal rules. Our findings also revealed the 
presence of poor levels of fiscal transparency in Africa. 
Having established the failure of fiscal rules to produce better fiscal outcomes in Africa as well as 
the presence of poor fiscal transparency in Africa, we proceeded to empirically investigate the 
various determinants of fiscal transparency. This is owing to the importance of fiscal transparency 
as an accompanying tool to fiscal rules if better fiscal outcomes are to be realised and the current 
poor level of fiscal transparency in Africa is to be reversed. 
The first substantial chapter, Chapter 5, empirically established the institutional determinants of fiscal 
transparency. Findings from this chapter addressed the research question: What institutional factors 
drive fiscal transparency in Africa? Employing a dynamic panel data GMM technique with a view to 
overcoming all sources of endogeneity and the weaknesses of prior cross-sectional studies, this 
chapter contributes to the literature on the underlying institutional drivers of fiscal transparency 
particularly in SSA. The chapter provides insight with respect to developing reliable policy 
recommendations, based on institutional factors that could be used to improve fiscal transparency 
in Africa. It contributes to the literature in terms of scope and methodology as prior studies such as 
Andreula et al. (2009) and Andreula and Chong (2016) were mostly cross-sectional studies involving 
a global mixture of countries (developed and developing).  
Results from our first empirical paper, Chapter 5, reveals that, collectively, institutional factors 
comprising rule of law, government effectiveness, citizens’ voice and accountability, governments’ 
regulatory quality, political stability and absence of violence and control of corruption, positively 
influence the level of fiscal transparency in Africa. However, when considered individually, only rule 
of law and government effectiveness significantly and positively influence fiscal transparency in 
Africa. This implies that an overall improvement in institutional governance indices will lead to an 
improvement in the level of fiscal transparency in Africa. However, when individual institutional 
indices are considered, not all the institutional factors positively influence fiscal transparency, thus 
confirming the findings of Andreula et al. (2009) and Andreula and Chong (2016) that improvements 
in aggregate institutional index are positively associated with fiscal transparency. Whereas the rule 
of law and government effectiveness were positively related to fiscal transparency, control of 
corruption, political stability, voice and accountability and regulatory quality did not yield the expected 
positive relationship with fiscal transparency. This implies that the influence of institutional 
governance factors on fiscal transparency is more positively impactful only when all of them are 
considered pari passu. 
The underlying political factors (dynamics) driving fiscal transparency in SSA were examined in the 
second empirical chapter, Chapter 6. This chapter also used the dynamic GMM panel data 





Wehner and De Renzio (2013), amongst other novelties, this chapter contributes to the literature on 
fiscal transparency by being the first to empirically examine the relationship between the executive-
legislative competitiveness (checks and balances) and fiscal transparency; the first to employ a 
measure of partisan fragmentation that captures the role of independent candidates, and more 
importantly, focuses exclusively on SSA countries. Findings from this chapter addressed the 
research question in Chapter 5: What political forces influence fiscal transparency in Africa? The 
empirical evidence revealed that both internal and external political factors influence fiscal 
transparency in Africa.  
Specifically, the empirical findings of this chapter substantiate the notion that internal political forces 
such as partisanship (partisan fragmentation) and ethnic fractionalisation play a key role in 
determining the level of fiscal transparency in Africa. Interestingly, contrary to expectations, empirical 
evidence from Chapter 6 reveals the failure of the most important political instrument for public 
accountability (i.e. checks and balances) to enhance fiscal transparency and better public 
accountability in Africa. A plausible reason for this finding may be attributed to “the toe the party line 
syndrome” where party allegiance trumps democratic and institutional responsibilities, as is 
sometimes experienced in less developed democracies. This is also an indication of institutional and 
capacity weaknesses as loyalty to institutions or branches of government to which elected officials 
belong is supposed to trump party loyalty on issues of transparency and accountability. 
Another key finding from this chapter is the role of independent candidature in the improvement of 
fiscal transparency in Africa. Factoring independent candidates into the measure of partisan 
fragmentation leads to an enhanced level of fiscal transparency in Africa. On external political 
influence, our result confirms the crucial role played by the conditionality of improvements in fiscal 
transparency attached to Africa’s receipt of foreign aid from donor agencies and their country of 
origin. This has significantly contributed to improvements in fiscal transparency in SSA in the last 
decade. Also, our findings indicate that over militarisation of the labour force, an indicator of a 
repressive government, is negatively associated with fiscal transparency in Africa. These results, 
though exclusively on SSA, lend weight to findings by Alt and Lassen (2006), Alt et al. (2006) and 
Wehner and De Renzio (2013) that political forces do sway fiscal transparency. 
Our final substantial empirical chapter, Chapter 7, explores the emerging debate on the impact of 
economic forces on fiscal transparency in the context of African countries. The chapter makes 
contributions to the literature in terms of the scope, methodology and factors examined. It is the first 
time that the economic factors–fiscal transparency nexus is examined in the context of SSA and in 
the context of a dynamic panel data analysis. The chapter also contributed to literature by being the 
first known study to examine the influence of the different measures of capital account openness (de 
facto and de jure) on fiscal transparency. Prior studies such as Tekeng and Sharaf (2015) examined 





Therefore, the empirical study seeks to address the main research question of Chapter 7: What 
macroeconomic factors affect fiscal transparency in Africa? 
Empirical findings from Chapter 7 reveal that fiscal transparency in Africa is positively influenced by 
economic factors including the extent of trade openness, debt service, foreign aid and business 
disclosure. As expected, the study revealed a negative and significant association between natural 
resource revenue as a percentage of GDP and fiscal transparency. This is not surprising given the 
level of opacity surrounding the reporting of mineral revenues in mineral-rich countries. Our study 
also revealed that the practice of civil law is associated with lesser fiscal transparency in SSA. This 
finding lends support to findings by Wehner and De Renzio (2013) as well as the foundational study 
by La Porta et al. (1999) which argued that the interventionist legal traditions predicated on the 
practice of civil law produce lesser government performance on a range of indicators including 
corruption than those based on the British common law tradition. Whilst the de jure measure of 
capital account yields a positive but not significant association with fiscal transparency, the de facto 
measure yielded a negative but statistically insignificant nexus with fiscal transparency in Africa. 
In summary, our findings corroborate the proposition that fiscal policy implementation and outcomes 
in Africa have been poor and that adopting fiscal rules alone as a policy towards realising better 
fiscal outcomes has not yielded the desired policy objective of sustainable fiscal deficits and debt 
thresholds. To return to a sustainable fiscal path, SSA countries need enforcement of its fiscal rules 
in combination with highly improved levels of fiscal transparency. Furthermore, findings from our 
study persuasively confirm the hypothesis that the level of fiscal transparency in Africa is influenced 
by institutional, political and economic factors. Thus, addressing the policy recommendations from 
our empirical papers in addition to the adopted fiscal rules could help African countries achieve their 
sustainable fiscal policy objectives. 
8.3 Recommendations 
In the context of our empirical findings, this thesis recommends some essential policy interventions 
that could help improve the level of fiscal transparency in Africa, which in turn could help achieve 
better fiscal outcomes. On the institutions–fiscal transparency relationship, there is a need for 
comprehensive institutional reforms involving all the stakeholders in the budget process. These 
reforms should cover all the six sub-indices of institutions (underscored in section 8.2) so as to 
achieve a significant increase in fiscal transparency.  
On the political forces–fiscal transparency nexus, three key recommendations can be drawn from 
our findings. First, in addition to creating more space for multiparty politics in SSA, African countries 
should consider institutionalising the role of independent candidates in the electoral process. Such 





of candidates on the basis of transparency in the management of public finances. This follows from 
evidence that when independent candidates are considered, partisan fragmentation holds a 
significant and positive relationship with fiscal transparency. This may be attributed to the fact that 
independent candidates are immune from the “toe the party line syndrome” that encourages opacity 
in the management of public finances. Also, the fear of the unknown extent of reforms that 
independent candidates may want to carry out could force the hands of the governing political parties 
to carry out fiscal transparency reforms so as to take the credit for such reforms, and manage the 
process and the extent of such reforms.  
Secondly, there is also the need for capacity building for all arms of government that are involved in 
the budget process because they are the critical agents of proper checks and balances and hence 
public accountability. Manifestly, contrary to expectations, our measure of checks and balances 
(legislative-executive competitiveness) revealed a negative relationship with fiscal transparency. In 
ideal democracies, loyalty to party or toeing the party line, is restricted to party political and economic 
ideology as contained in party manifesto and does not mean surrendering the independence of an 
independent arm of government, the legislature to the executive or vice versa. The opportunity cost 
(the real cost) of such loss of independence is an increase in fiscal opacity (less fiscal transparency) 
with the attendant dire implications on the management of the entire economy including fiscal 
discipline.  
Lastly, on the external political scene, given the established positive relationship between foreign aid 
and fiscal transparency in Africa, international donor agencies and major donor countries should 
sustain their current foreign policy of tying foreign aid to reforms such as improvements in fiscal 
transparency and political reforms as preconditions for aid of any form.  
On the economic factors –fiscal transparency nexus in Africa, there is a need to reverse the negative 
influence of mineral revenues on fiscal transparency in Africa by institutionalising the precepts and 
resource charter of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiatives (EITI), which sets the global 
standard for the good governance of oil, gas and mineral resources especially as it pertains to 
transparent reporting of revenues accruing from mineral wealth. This will address the opacity 
surrounding the reporting of mineral revenues in mineral-rich countries which forms the bulk of their 
foreign earnings. Also, the positive link between trade openness and fiscal transparency indicates 
that countries of the world are more willing to trade with countries that are more transparent in the 
management of their central government’s finances. This calls for greater trade liberalisation reforms 
policies by Africa. Reform policies that promote intra-regional and extra-regional trade openness will 
contribute to enhancing fiscal transparency, hence should be promoted. In particular, policies such 
as the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), which aims at fostering greater 
economic openness and integration, should be embraced by African countries that are yet to ratify 





transparency suggests that extending the donor agencies’ policy of tying foreign aid to improvements 
in fiscal transparency to include improvements in the level of business disclosure in Africa, could 
accelerate the improvement in fiscal transparency, better public accountability and service delivery 
in Africa.  
8.4 Challenges and recommendations for future studies 
One of the main challenges faced by this study is the paucity of fiscal transparency data for African 
countries. Open Budget Index (OBI) data have been published for over a decade, however, from 
available data employed in our study, despite the increase in the number of African countries that 
have signed up for the Open Government Partnership, some African countries are yet to take part 
in the IBP’s Open Budget Survey (OBS). This reduces our sample size and gives room to statistical 
challenges such as less reliable variability of the standard deviation and under coverage bias. 
However, as evidenced by our unbalanced panel dataset, with each round of OBI survey conducted, 
one or two new African countries join the list of countries with fiscal transparency data. Thus, this 
may be completely addressed in the near future as this would give us a larger sample size in a few 
years’ time and more reliable statistics can be derived.  
In terms of recommendations for future research, as additional data become available in the near 
future, future empirical studies on the association between fiscal transparency and human 
development indices such as health, education and housing in SSA could be explored. The nexus 
between fiscal transparency and economic growth will also be a germane topic for examination. 
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